FID or COIN? does it matter

[JM2008]

Before I start giving my two cents on this matter let me first caviat it by saying that my knowledge on Afghanistan is the result of 1x 9month deployment to RC-East doing MI at the tactical level. I did my best to pay attention to the bigger picture but that may have been hampered by the need to fully grasp the unique social/cultural/tribal dynamics of the two provinces that were in our AO. What I did learn is that there were no cookie-cutter solution between neighboring districts within the same province province... and I would venture to say that is the case throughout RC-East. The knowledge I have of RC-South has come from studying that command since returning home and what I know is it is a completely different world than the East.

Well onto the my reply...
The question of are/should we be conducting FID or COIN in AFG:
We should be doing both, but we are doing neither. To say that the operations in Afghanistan are COIN IMO would be wrong. The reason being that we are missing fundamental elements. We are attempting a "CLEAR"-"go back to the FOB"-"try to build--indirectly fund the insurgency through corrupt contractors--demonstrate our inability to secure our own construction project sites little-on the populace". We are completely missing the HOLD phase and many people overlook the SHAPE phase as well. Our failed BUILD phase means that we are merely CLEARING valleys/villages until the end of the CONOP period. We kill some guys, kick in some doors, and maybe take some "Bad" guys away, but as soon as we are out of the area the INS come right back and HOLD the terrain. Until we conduct all 4 phases it is not COIN it is merely just a dog-and-pony show.

As for the FID side... this is not something that we can do from the side lines. Yeah we have diplomats and civil service members in country but really what are they doing? To say they are DOING the job of their Afghan counterparts I think would be just as inaccurate as saying they are supporting them. They simply try to "mentor" the Afghan officials to do things in our Western-friendly "Afghan" way but that is not the Afghan way. There are "western ideals" that Afghans must adapt such as checks and balances in every level of government. This is essential to exposing corruption to the population with the intent of the population policing their government.

So how do we determine which is best for Afghanistan, FID/COIN? I think that you can implement FID in areas where GIROA has at least Marginal legitimacy but not in the areas where they don't. How do you help a government that has only authority but never gained legitimacy. Many people may view the two as one but it is important to note that authority is something a government has by means of existence but legitimacy is something that only a population can give to a government. There are areas in Afghanistan that GIROA has authority while the TB has legitimacy (RC-S). There are areas where neither has legitimacy and that is given to the tribal leadership (RC-E).

So how do we get the populace to legitimize GIROA? IMO we conduct COIN with GIROA in the backseat. We SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD but we build in a way to show GIROA is the one building. "They" build the means for the populace to HOLD the terrain w/ GIROA support. Then they build the social structures/programs needed to begin building other "stone and mortar" projects. The US military then becomes the FID players we should be and not the COIN force.

For what its worth,
James

[Ken White]

NYT:TALLIL AIR BASE, Iraq — In this desert brush land where the occupiers and occupied are moving into an uneasy new partnership, American and Iraqi commanders sat side by side earlier this week and described their biggest problems to Robert M. Gates, the visiting defense secretary.

For Staff Maj. Gen. Habib al-Hussani, the commander of the 10th Iraqi Army Division, the trouble was not enough equipment for patrols on the border with Iran. For Col. Peter A. Newell, the commander of the first American advisory brigade to Iraqi troops, it was something else.

“The hardest thing to do sometimes,” he told Mr. Gates, “is step back and not be in charge.”

(LINK).

Therein lies the 'problem' that we have created. If it's FID, we can't be in charge; if it's COIN we have to be in charge. Thus we are ...

What we're SUPPOSED to be doing is FID and helping the Host Nation with THEIR COIN effort since we cannot do COIN because they aren't our insurgents and isn't in our country. The capabilities and qualities of their government are irrelevant -- it is still not ours. By over controlling, we're confusing everyone -- except the bad guys who are taking advantage of it...

That will be dismissed by some as simplistic. It is not. Having lived and fought under that dichotomy in three other Nations under perhaps more violent circumstances and with the exact same 'problem' a while ago, let me assure you that I learned the hard way over a few years that is not a good plan.

[jmm99]

A couple of weeks ago, we had a brief (non-fires) exchange re: a quote from JP 3-07.1 (JTTP FID), here and here.

The quote from the manual was this (my concern focused on the last sentence, bolded by me):

(3) In all cases, the strategic initiative and responsibility lie with the HN. To preserve its legitimacy and ensure a lasting solution to the problem, the host government must bear this responsibility. A decision for US forces to take the strategic initiative amounts to a transition to war.

You advised:

You should be concerned with the legal aspects because that is the intent of the paragraph you quote.

and that I have done - thought about it.

But, first, another point you raised (which I should have answered) - the dictionary and legal definition of "war" (the dictionary from you, with JMM bolding):

war (wôr)
n.
1.
a. A state of open, armed, often prolonged conflict carried on between nations, states, or parties...

That is the basic Geneva definition (an "armed conflict"), which expanded the Hague definition of "war" - slightly with respect to state on state conflicts; but substantially by bringing in non-state parties ("Powers") to armed conflicts via Common Articles 2 and 3.

Moving back to FID (Foreign Internal Defense, where "internal" and "defense" are key words), that can occur in the context with no armed conflict or in the context of an armed conflict (subject to Geneva). Both situations are covered in JP 3-07.1.

Far be from me to interpret definitively what the CJCS meant by "A decision for US forces to take the strategic initiative amounts to a transition to war", but here is what I think.

Where the US "takes charge" (takes the "strategic initiative"), we transition our status from being an "assister" to being a "belligerent". In the case of Iraq, a co-belligerent with them against their insugencies, I suppose. That would be a tricky position legally, given the executive agreement (whether a SOFA or SA is not particularly material) in effect. As you pointed out, 50 USC 33 (War Powers Resolution) could well come into play.

Astan is different. There, we are engaged in FID and assisting them (usually taking the primary role in personnel and materiel) in their COIN efforts. Add the UN-NATO mandate to that, which is peace enforcement (not peacekeeping). But, we are also carrying on a separate war (armed conflict) against AQ-Taliban pursuant to the 2001 AUMF, as a belligerent - which spills over into Pstan and, as to which, Astan is not a co-belligerent. That is a complex situation legally, and from all appearances militarily.

Vietnam was different still, but that is another thread.

The issues raised above are really a mix of legal and military, where the right and left hands have to co-ordinate via a common brain. In that respect, COL Newell seems a good choice for Iraq since he researched and wrote a very intelligent thesis on a related area where legal and military concerns have to be met. I've lauded that elsewhere.

[jcustis]

Let's assume that we are striving to apply the SHAPE - CLEAR - HOLD - BUILD paradigm to getting Afghanistan back on its feet.

Through the CLEAR phase, what measures of effectiveness are applied to it? Is the task to clear an area(s) of Taliban, corrupt elements (official or tribal or both), Al Qaeda, or is it to clear the area of those elements that do not support the freely elected government? Is it to prevent random violence at the hands of [insert local boogeyman title here], the imposition of Sharia-based law, or illegal drug trafficking? Where is the line, or is that line so terribly blurred from the interagency struggles we face that we will never run a tactical and operational effort that is nested in the strategy?

Maybe I'm just dense or exceptionally confused, but I seem to remember this hoopla about preventing Afghanistan from becoming this lawless, borderless, sieve that facilitates safe harbors for Islamic fundamentalists (specifically AQ). I'm beginning to wonder (as I always do when considering the 2nd and 3rd order of kinetic effects) about what would happen in Afghanistan if we weren't there...if we simply picked up and left and spent our resources mitigating terrorism the old fashioned way.

I don't believe the Pottery Barn rule applies in AFG. Is it a mess? Absolutely, but will those expenditures in blood, money, and time ever truly result in a net gain in our security or the security of the region? Is security the end goal? From a distant perch, we are all over the place, and the only folks with any sort of productivity in this area are the think tanks and their studies mills.

[jmm99]

in your wonderment ...

I'm beginning to wonder (as I always do when considering the 2nd and 3rd order of kinetic effects) about what would happen in Afghanistan if we weren't there...if we simply picked up and left and spent our resources mitigating terrorism the old fashioned way.

I also wonder if any change in policy would result if we were today or tomorrow to kill UBL and Zawahiri ?

[davidbfpo]

(from Jon Custis)what would happen in Afghanistan if we weren't there...if we simply picked up and left and spent our resources mitigating terrorism the old fashioned way.

Jon and JMM,

Look back at Imperial British history, with three Afghan Wars and regular cross-border issues (even during WW2, NWFP was fully manned). The British Empire learnt, very painfully, notably in 1845, that it was best not to stay, just visit; visiting with a very large "stick" and some "carrots". Ironically I suspect many said this about the Soviet intervention and upon their exit.

What would we say to all Afghans if we were to leave? "Don't allow 'X' or we will be back", "We tried to change you and failed. Please forgive us and we will pay you" and more. I do not assume there is such a common nationality shared by all Afghans.

davidbfpo

[Bill Moore]

What would we say to all Afghans if we were to leave? "Don't allow 'X' or we will be back", "We tried to change you and failed. Please forgive us and we will pay you" and more. I do not assume there is such a common nationality shared by all Afghans.

I haven't been to Afghanistan in years and since reality is always different from what you read in the press, no comment on our current strategy in OEF-A. However, this discussion in general is interesting to me. My thinking has evolved to the point that are no end points, and what is called the Powell Doctrine is deeply flawed. Conditions change, policies change, objectives change (based on new policy or conditions) on a continuous basis. If we see ourselves getting involved more and more in these messy poorly defined conflicts like Afghanistan, etc., doesn't it seem unrealistic to base our strategy on government, economic and essentially cultural reform? We just don't have enough resources to do this world wide the way we're approaching it now.

What prompted this thought is the question above, "what do we tell the people"?

When we make public such idealistic views and goals I think we make our moralist quagmire and the muck we're stuck in is our own idealism. Agree or disagree? If you agree, what is alternative strategy?

I'm ducking for cover, but will be back up in a few days.

[SWJED]

When we make public such idealistic views and goals I think we make our moralist quagmire and the muck we're stuck in is our own idealism.

Well said Bill.

[Schmedlap]

Maybe I'm just dense or exceptionally confused, but I seem to remember this hoopla about preventing Afghanistan from becoming this lawless, borderless, sieve that facilitates safe harbors for Islamic fundamentalists (specifically AQ). I'm beginning to wonder (as I always do when considering the 2nd and 3rd order of kinetic effects) about what would happen in Afghanistan if we weren't there...if we simply picked up and left and spent our resources mitigating terrorism the old fashioned way.

That is the best question on the issue and not one that I have read or heard anyone address. I can't help but think that if the Taliban were in control of Afghanistan that they would be having the same legitimacy issues that the GIRoA is having now. Afghanistan seems to favor the insurgent. Perhaps we would be better positioned if the Taliban were the government and we were aiding the insurgents who seek to oust it. I suspect that we could do that for substantially less money and with a far smaller footprint. And as to whether or not the insurgents ever succeed - so what?