Results 1 to 20 of 311

Thread: Deterrence of Irregular Threats

Threaded View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #11
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Posts
    1,457

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    The base premise here is simply that:

    1. What we are really attempting to do through GWOT is deter irregular threats from attacking the US and US interests.

    2. The US also has an enduring mission to deter "regular" threats from doing the same

    3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

    4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

    5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.
    I don't have any real disagreements with that, but I don't see how you get from there to a policy holding governments accountable for peoples they have no control over - ie. HA and various tribes along the AF-PAK border.

    I also "get" that new communication tools do have powerful effects though maybe not to the extent that you think they do. Technology certainly has made demagoguery easier than it's probably ever been and governments have pretty much lost the ability to significantly control negative information. That is a powerful combination.

    BTW, I also like your slide.

    Wilf,

    On deterrence correlation is not causation. Other factors may play a prominent or decisive role in "preventing" action. Gauging the reasons an enemy chooses a particular course of action is not always straightforward as it appears and the opportunity for assumption and mirrior-imaging are significant. In fact, failed deterrence is the result of failing to properly understand the motivations of an adversary.

    Someone upthread said that "terrorists" cannot be deterred because they are not afraid to die for their cause. In some cases that is true, but fear of failure is universal. For example, all the additional security measures protecting airplanes are deterring those who'd like to blow them up or fly them into buildings because their chances of success are greatly diminished.
    Last edited by Entropy; 08-01-2009 at 02:13 PM. Reason: spelling

Similar Threads

  1. Replies: 65
    Last Post: 08-03-2009, 04:16 PM
  2. Pedagogy for the Long War: Teaching Irregular Warfare
    By CSC2005 in forum Training & Education
    Replies: 5
    Last Post: 01-02-2008, 11:04 PM

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •