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Thread: Deterrence of Irregular Threats

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  1. #11
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    http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfa...do_joc_v20.doc

    DO JOC v2 might be a good start to look at how the US approaches deterrence now. There has been a considerable shift from the Cold War approach. Keith Payne and Colin Gray would be two good academics/policymakers to read. They have had considerable influence in how we should understand deterrence post-9/11. I'm in the middle of finishing a paper so I can't extrapolate much more. However, if you need any more sources I would be glad to forward you a reading list Bob's World, I have been studying this for two years so I have most of what has been written on it. Send me a PM if you need any resources about a specific subject area on deterrence.

    I'll just put forth a couple of points:

    1. In the p-9/11 security environment the US needs to deter more actors from taking different sets of actions. During the Cold War the US faced a single risk adverse actor, in the current security environment there a number of risk taking actors. Game theory works well when there are only two actors, once you have a n+ situation the theory becomes more problematic.

    2. Prospect theory has had the most influence on how policymakers view deterrence p-Cold War. Specifically, it argues that the an actor may view the cost of inaction to be higher than any benefit of inaction, making deterrence both unstable and harder. There is a lot more to it than that, suffice to say the theory itself resulted in DO JOC V2.

    3. Cold War deterrence after Kennedy was not based on massive retaliation, but flexible response. It was a more nuanced approach then you are making it out to be.

    4. In terms of 'irregular threats' how do you deter a individual or group with no fixed address?

    5. How do you deter a individual or group if they perceive that the cost of inaction is higher than the benefit of inaction, or if death is seen as a reward/benefit in itself?

    4 and 5 are the most common questions on deterrence p-9/11, so if you can answer then you will have a number of people interested.

    From what I can work out the Airforce has been working on deterrence p-CW so make sure to read DO JOC V2., if you haven't already, otherwise they might pick your propositions to pieces.
    Last edited by Taiko; 08-01-2009 at 09:38 PM.

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