Renamed Thread: Operational Design Discussion

[HumanCOGRachel]

Hi William,

When working on counterinsurgency definition with the Pentagon, we were looking at various thought leaders in preparing 3.24.2 (December 2006 revision). The idea with Human COG is to redefine the term to understanding the motivators and drivers of humans in the OE, and then understanding that those motivators (and human actors obviously) are what drive battlefield changes, whether of kinetic or non-kinetic effect. This is not a new idea, and has been floating around for some time now, and used in discussion amongst TRADOC, overall force transformation folks.

Please PM me if you want to talk about this further.

Cheers,
Rach

(HOOAH)

[Dr Jack]

Here's how we're defining "design" in the new FM 5-0 draft chapter 3:

"Planning consists of two separate, but closely related components: a conceptual component, represented by the cognitive application of design, and a detailed component, which introduces specificity through a formal planning process, such as the military decision making process. During planning, these components overlap—no clear delineation exists between them. As commanders conceptualize the operation, their vision guides the staff through design and into detailed planning. Like planning, design is continuous—it evolves with increased understanding and drives the operations process. It underpins the exercise of battle command, guiding the iterative and often cyclic application of understanding, visualizing, and describing."

"Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex problems and develop approaches to solve them. Critical thinking captures the reflective and continuous learning essential to design. Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas. Design is a way of organizing conceptual work within an organization to assist commanders in understanding, visualizing, and describing the operational environment and to develop approaches to solving complex, ill-structured problems. Design occurs throughout the operations process before and during detailed planning, through preparation, and during execution and assessment."

[jmm99]

is an interesting term. So, HumanCOGRachel are you using that in the context of the Political Struggle, or in the context of the Military Struggle ?

And, in any event, how are they "targeted" - in your construct ?

I should suppose that "kill, capture or convert" would be three possible end states for the "targeted human" - which in CORDS-Phoenix ran about 1/3, 1/3 and 1/3 (the general term used was "neutralize").

[IntelTrooper]

Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas.

Oh, so that's creative thinking.

I don't mean to be a jerk (though I often am anyway) but does this really need to be said? And if so, is this going to provide some epiphany to an otherwise un-creative thinker, or someone who is unable to recognize it? And even then, how is the institution going to be re-structured to encourage such "creative thinking" without just calling it "insubordinate"?

[HumanCOGRachel]

Check out what SAMS and TRADOC is doing to help push creative design. BGEN McMaster is a good POC on this - I'm sure he has some publications out. Check with NDU Press - I'm pretty sure he published an article recently on this subject.

Cheers,
Rach

(Hooah!)

[jmm99]

about what I thought re: this:

from HCR
[1] The targeted humans part simply meant as an identified group of persons, who range from non-involved to highly invested actors. [2] Counterinsurgency assumes that insurgency involves political AND military struggles (two-pronged) - [3] See Bard O'Neill for further leadership on this issue...

1. So, backfilling with your other posted statements: Do a General Area Study with a detailed Operational Area Intelligence Study; followed by a continuing Area Assessment after insertion ?

2. Gee, something like the attached - or, as well stated, in Dr. Zhivago:

Liberius: I could have you taken out and shot!

Razin, Liberius' Lieutenant: And could you have The Party taken out and shot? Understand this: as the military struggle draws to a close, the political struggle intensifies. In the hour of victory, the military will have served its purpose - and all men will be judged POLITICALLY - regardless of their military record! Meanwhile, there are still White units in this area - the Doctor stays.

3. Been there; done that.

[Haooh]

[slapout9]

JMM, sounds like they are trying to do a 5 rings analysis. The Human COG's are usually found in Ring 1-Leadership targets, unless they saw some of my LE adaptions.

[Dr Jack]

Oh, so that's creative thinking.

I don't mean to be a jerk (though I often am anyway) but does this really need to be said? And if so, is this going to provide some epiphany to an otherwise un-creative thinker, or someone who is unable to recognize it? And even then, how is the institution going to be re-structured to encourage such "creative thinking" without just calling it "insubordinate"?

Well – there is a difference between the concepts of “innovation” and “adaptation” that is reinforced in design. Innovation involves taking a new approach to a familiar or known situation, whereas adaptation involves taking a known solution and modifying it to a particular situation. Both concepts are central tenets of design – and the concept of innovation is closely tied (in the doctrinal definitions) to creative thinking.

This will require close dialog and collaboration – encouraging creative thought for innovative approaches to problems… which will require reinforcing the best practices of great staffs that encourage innovation and adaptation.

[jmm99]

delusions of grandeur ....

JMM, sounds like they are trying to do a 5 rings analysis. The Human COG's are usually found in Ring 1-Leadership targets, unless they saw some of my LE adaptions.

Seriously, could be a 5-ring analysis; or simply a classification of the population from pro-HN to anti-HN, and everything in between (with whatever variations and branches you have time to make).

In any event, to do any of that you need to do something akin to the studies mentioned in my point #1 (General Area Study, etc.). Which, BTW, are 50 years old - from FM 31-21 (Apps III & IV; 1958, rev 1961), Guerrilla Warfare.

Might want to read the two Apps - not much new under the sun, except new buzzwords.

[slapout9]

delusions of grandeur ....

Yea them little blue pills are sumtin man

[William F. Owen]

When working on counterinsurgency definition with the Pentagon, we were looking at various thought leaders in preparing 3.24.2 (December 2006 revision).

How and why did the definition change?

The idea with Human COG is to redefine the term to understanding the motivators and drivers of humans in the OE, and then understanding that those motivators (and human actors obviously) are what drive battlefield changes, whether of kinetic or non-kinetic effect.

The COG is something you strike. The JP3 definition is wrong, and less it explicitly makes that point or unless it wants to invent a new term.
What I think you are saying is the HumanCOG is the motivation that cause people to act. Correct?

The targeted humans part simply meant as an identified group of persons, who range from non-involved to highly invested actors.

Does this mean, trying to understand what everyone wants?

Counterinsurgency assumes that insurgency involves political AND military struggles (two-pronged) -

So an insurgency is exactly the same as any other type of warfare.

[Bob's World]

The COG is something you strike.

I think US military doctrine has botched the hell out of COG theory in an effort to over codify it. But I also find it counter intuitive that if the COG is the Enemy's "source of all stregth and power" why I would by necessity "strike" it, when in fact what I want to do is "Defeat", "Neutralize", "Co-opt" or in whatever way is appropriate (acceptable, suitable, feasible) render it ineffective.

Dr. Strange's work helped my think about this, but I could never fully get on board with his analysis either. It just didn't make sense to me to call something the COG's "Critical Capability" and then say it was something that the COG requirred. To me it was something the COG produced.

So to may way of thinking (makes sense to a mind educated in the Myrtle Creek public school system)
- A COG is like a factory that is the producer of the things the enemy must have to prevail
- Critical Capabilities are the things that factory produces. Targeting this output has little effect on the COG, but does reduce effectiveness. The importance of these things are what validates your assessment of what the COG is.
- Critical Requirements are those raw inputs to the COG that it must have to produce the Critical Capabilities. These are what must be disrupted to render the COG ineffective.
- Critical Vulnerabilities. THESE MUST BE A SUBSET OF YOUR CRITICAL CAPABILITIES. CVs are those CCs that are also vulnerable to attack. You can get at them with reasonable risk, and their disruption will produce your desired effect.

Anyway, I always think of attacking the COG like attacking an Enemy Strongpoint. Yes its important, but you don't want to attack it if you can defeat it in other ways. Find the CVs, and attack those.

[William F. Owen]

I think US military doctrine has botched the hell out of COG theory in an effort to over codify it. But I also find it counter intuitive that if the COG is the Enemy's "source of all stregth and power" why I would by necessity "strike" it, when in fact what I want to do is "Defeat", "Neutralize", "Co-opt" or in whatever way is appropriate (acceptable, suitable, feasible) render it ineffective.

Strike merely means the action that does harm.

[MikeF]

Dr. Jack,

Sir, is your work to incorporate wicked/ill-defined/un-structured problems going to lead to a new version of MDMP, or are y'all simply providing guidelines for commanders on how to rethink or relook problems?

Mark O'neill / Wilf,

Some of this thread is confusing me, and I've spent two years studying this stuff. I'll try to explain it as best that I can. In the most simplest form, all these folks are trying to do is determine better ways of problem solving. That's it. In most circles, the main strategy to devise better answers is more defined and thorough problem definition.

Wicked, ill-defined, unstructured problems are big ones like global warming, terrorism, failed/failing states, etc....None of this is new, but some of the approaches are.

My favorite is what I call the "Huddle." The Academics will call it "collaberation." On the tactical level, a leader simply brings all his team together and allows everyone to give their assesments and recommendations before he makes a decision. The huddle allows the leader to avoid forgetting something. Many leaders do this intuitively. On the strategic level, a commander brings in regional and specialized experts to advice him on big decisions. GEN Patraeus's "Council of Colonels" is a great example of this.

Out of all the literature, I best enjoyed Dr. James Adams' Conceptual Blockbusting: A Guide to Better Ideas. As Dean of Stanford Engineering back in the early 1970's, he became frustrated b/c his students were book smart but could not think creatively. So he wrote a book on how to think creatively. It's short, and provides cool tricks to entertain with at a pub.



v/r

Mike

[slapout9]

I think US military doctrine has botched the hell out of COG theory in an effort to over codify it. But I also find it counter intuitive that if the COG is the Enemy's "source of all stregth and power" why I would by necessity "strike" it, when in fact what I want to do is "Defeat", "Neutralize", "Co-opt" or in whatever way is appropriate (acceptable, suitable, feasible) render it ineffective.

That is exactly why EBO was invented....you want to affect(cause) a target to change to something (effect). And how you do that may be kinetic or non-kinetic,lethal or non-lethal.

[jmm99]

from MikeF
My favorite is what I call the "Huddle." The Academics will call it "collaberation." On the tactical level, a leader simply brings all his team together and allows everyone to give their assesments and recommendations before he makes a decision. The huddle allows the leader to avoid forgetting something. Many leaders do this intuitively.

Attached is the 1944 version of the "Huddle" - 1/117-30ID. Mid-Nov 1944 planning session for Bn's attack on the "Paper Village" near Warden, Germany - after the Siegfried Breakthrough was successful. Guy with pointer is LTC Bob Frankland (retired as a MG), with his 5 company commanders.

Looking at the apparent age of the captains, I'd have to agree with Ron that the people are some of the new things under the sun - and that a lot of lessons learned have to be relearned by future generations.

PS: I'd also add army hair styling to the list of differences - then and now.

[HumanCOGRachel]

Jack,

I just got off a conference call....have you looked into SAMS's COE project on OD?

JMM,

The targeted humans part simply meant as an identified group of persons, who range from non-involved to highly invested actors. Counterinsurgency assumes that insurgency involves political AND military struggles (two-pronged) - See Bard O'Neill for further leadership on this issue...

PM me for more details....

Have a great day,
Rach

(Hooah!)

[Dr Jack]

Jack,

I just got off a conference call....have you looked into SAMS's COE project on OD?

Cheers,
Rach

(hooah!)

Rach - roger; much of the great SAMS work provided the foundation for the integration of design into FM 5-0. Working closely with SAMS on the development of the concept...(hooah!)

[William F. Owen]

"Planning consists of two separate, but closely related components: a conceptual component, represented by the cognitive application of design, and a detailed component, which introduces specificity through a formal planning process, such as the military decision making process. During planning, these components overlap—no clear delineation exists between them. As commanders conceptualize the operation, their vision guides the staff through design and into detailed planning. Like planning, design is continuous—it evolves with increased understanding and drives the operations process. It underpins the exercise of battle command, guiding the iterative and often cyclic application of understanding, visualizing, and describing."

So planning now takes longer and is a less well defined process? If design is really SOD by the back door, then planning is going to become more complex, less effective, take longer, and allow people not to be held accountable for poor decisions.

[Dr Jack]

Well, let me address each element –

So planning now takes longer and is a less well defined process?

Well, actually the process is more defined – planning has two components: 1) a conceptual thinking component about how to address the problem (design) and 2) a detailed component that goes into the nuts and bolts (MDMP or JOPP). It won’t necessarily take more or less time – but the process is more defined with design.

If design is really SOD by the back door...

There certainly are components of SOD in design, but it’s not SOD (or EBO) sneaking in by the back door. Design actually gets to certain “outcomes” that are not evident in SOD, such as a problem statement, the initial commander’s intent (purpose and end state), the mission narrative, and planning guidance (that includes the operational approach).

...planning is going to become more complex, less effective, take longer, and allow people not to be held accountable for poor decisions.

More complex? Perhaps, because design is normally applied for complex, ill-structured problems – but it’s still a commander-centric process – the commander is assisted by the staff (as always) but still accountable and responsible with design. The commander's decisions should be more effective if design is used properly – because the commander has stepped back, not relied solely on intuition, and considered the essence of his problem using design:

What’s really going on (what’s the problem?)… where do we want to take this situation (what are the desired future conditions?)… how do we bridge the gap between what we have now and what we want (what's the broad operational approach?)… who else needs to be involved in understanding of the problem (dialog and collaboration?)… and a willingness to step back periodically to assess the changes in the problem (reframing).

Design, in this context, is intended to provide a common sense methodology that good commanders have always used - and to provide tools to assist in the process of thinking about a problem before delving into the details.