I know these guys pretty well. I was their O/C at NTC back in January 2008. They were a good company with a very good commander. They were definitely the cream of the crop in the battalion. However, I too was dismayed by some things in the video, particularly the M203 blind over the wall.

One thing it is hard to train at places like NTC is these sustained firefights. We really tried to do this and by the time we did the next A'stan rotation at NTC, there was a method to 'surge' the OPFOR for lengthy (over 15 minutes - usually 45-60 minutes) firefights.

Niel, the nice ambush was also conducted by these guys - just days after an IED along a trail killed a brand new replacement troop. They have taken some hard licks but they also delivered some.

The reporter, Richard Engel, has shot a lot of video with these guys. He has been embedded over the course of the year for several weeks at a time, from what I can tell. In one series, they maneuvered a platoon as bait and came into contact. While engaging the Taliban with mortars, they had a fratricide against one of their own (from the mortars). You could see the frustration/pain on the face of the commander when he got the report.

I agree that the performance wasn't the best. An interesting point may be turnover in leadership. I am pretty sure the platoon leader didn't go through the train-up at NTC. It is possible the platoon sergeant didn't either. With injuries, a 36-man Army infantry platoon can pretty quickly look like less than 2 squads of Marines. I doubt they have more than 2 full squads plus weapons squad to maneuver with at this point.

Also it didn't seem like much more than a squad was involved with this mission. What were the rest doing? Probably holding the fort back at their platoon COP. This is some amazing terrain and movement at night is pretty hazardous, especially when burdened with all the crap they are required to carry. With the enemy having fantastic ISR, it is hard to get to a vantage point over them. They know where we are and attack when they think they may have an advantage. If we put out ambushes anywhere near a village, the Taliban will probably know and just not show up.

I am not sure where the Korengal valley fits into the big picture but I am sure that Viper Company, and the rest of their battalion, is an economy-of-force. They don't have the manpower to hold all the valley, so they kick out these patrols to keep the enemy from getting established close to their COP. It isn't pretty, but it seems to be all they can manage at this point.

Tankersteve