Tips to Information Operations

[Cavguy]

Michael,

Excellent article. I would consider publishing it here rather than at Infantry, more eyes will see it. (Although it is certainly a great thing to be published there).

Your experience reflects mine. I would consider expanding on the following, this is what I wrote briefly on the subject last year if you think it fits:

8. Understand perceptions matter far more than truth. Counterinsurgency is political conflict for power, and control of the population is the primary means to gain that power. History is replete with examples of counterinsurgents winning the tactical battles while losing the strategic campaign for the support of the host and home nations . We have learned that operations will be assessed through the lens of information effects. Information engagement is not a staff section’s responsibility or an operations order annex, but a commander’s program through which all efforts, lethal and non-lethal, must be viewed. Counterinsurgents must constantly ask, “What are the various audiences, and how will this action be perceived by each one? Then, ask what can we do to shape that perception to our advantage?” A successful counterinsurgent is proactive in shaping the information message of his actions. When reacting to events in the current media environment, speed and accuracy are key. To increase tempo, media engagement authority must be decentralized as much as possible out of theater and corps headquarters down to battalions and companies. Creating credible perceptions of increasing success and momentum are critical to re-establishing legitimacy and restoring the population’s confidence and trust in the host government.

9. Communicate effectively. We transmit, but how well is our message received, understood, and accepted? Too often we communicate using methods the populace doesn’t understand or use in ways that undermine our message. Early on, we distributed Arabic language flyers into Turkoman-speaking populations, and wondered why our messages didn’t resonate. Once we learned and understood how the host nation communicates, we used those streams, and our efforts improved markedly. In some areas messaging may best be carried out in tea shops, use newspapers in another area and local leaders in a third. Once we learned to communicate though appropriate mediums in the host nation our successful results multiplied. We learned to place local figures at the forefront. A local citizen is always more credible than a foreign one in any setting. Many Iraqis believed “Baghdad Bob’s” fantastic tales of victory because he was an Iraqi.

And finally, credibility matters most. The narrative and tactical actions have to agree. If I say I'm here to protect the people, yet my actions are focused on chasing the bad guys, I am not credible. What do we call a person who says one thing and does another? You guessed it. Too often our narrative spouts platitudes our actions don't reinforce.

Congrats on writing your experiences for publication. More need to do it.

Niel

[Michael C]

Cavguy,

Both your points are excellent. I have thought about publishing this article in the SWJ, but I have another piece on training new platoon leaders that I think would fit better here. I am going to package my thoughts on IO with some thoughts on KLEs and using interpreters and try and publish that with Infantry magazine. For tactical advice I think it is the best forum.

I can't stress how I agree with most of your points. Platitudes are always seen through. Tailoring a message to the local population is vital. Pushing IO down to the lowest level is always the best policy (not to mention pushing operations, intelligence, support and everything as far down as it can go is usually the best policy.)

Thank you for the advice and the support.

[MikeF]

Michael C,

I appreciate your thread, and I will take some time to check out your blog. Additionally, congrats on writing and good luck with where ever you decide to publish. To reiterate Niel (Cavguy), more need to do it. As for Information Operations, I tend to side with Niel and Schmedlap. I will attempt to offer one other point to be considered for the tactical level operations.

Deeds not Words.

As Schmedlap noted, trying to advertise support for the government can oftentimes become very Orwellian particularly if the host government is not playing nice to the people in your AO. It's like waving your hand over the populace and proclaiming everything is okay when in fact it is not. In this modern version of COIN, where we often interdict to play referee against the host nation and those that would seek to rebel against it or localized tribes fighting against each other, some of the best impacts are derived from our actions not our voice.

Just throwing that out there to see if it has merit.

Best of luck.

Mike

[Michael C]

Mike F,

Totally agreed. I was in a brief today on IO and the briefer said, use this as your point: Afghanistan Police help provide law and order to the population.

I directly asked, well what if they don't? In my district we had to beg the ANP to arrest people, and all they ever arrested were two in all the months I was there! So yes, if the deeds aren't there than all the words in the world won't matter.

[Michael C]

I published an article in Infantry Magazine called "Influencing the Population" and I used the advice from some of the commenters on this debate.

Thanks all for the help, and you can find the article on my blog here.