The Afghanistan National Police (ANP)

[Jedburgh]

USIP, 10 Aug 09: Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform

Summary

• In seven years, the Afghan National Police forces have grown to 68,000 personnel, with a target end strength of 86,000. The ANP includes the uniformed police force, which is responsible for general police duties, and specialized police forces, which deal with public order, counternarcotics, terrorism, and border control.

• Despite the impressive growth in numbers, the expenditure of $10 billion in international police assistance, and the involvement of the United States, the European Union, and multiple donors, the ANP is riddled with corruption and generally unable to protect Afghan citizens, control crime, or deal with the growing insurgency.

• The European Union has replaced Germany as the lead partner for police reform, but the United States has the largest police program, which is directed by the U.S. military. Putting soldiers in charge of police training has led to militarization of the ANP and its use as a counterinsurgency force.

• Using improperly trained, equipped, and supported ANP patrol men as “little soldiers” has resulted in the police suffering three times as many casualties as the Afghan National Army. Police are assigned in small numbers to isolated posts without backup and are targeted by the insurgents.

• Beyond funding the Taliban, the explosion in Afghan narcotics production fueled widespread corruption in the Afghan government and police. Drug abuse by police officers became increasingly common as did other forms of criminal behavior.

• Challenges facing the ANP were further compounded by a proliferation of bilateral police assistance programs that reflected the policing practices of donor countries. These efforts often were not coordinated with the larger U.S. and EU programs, creating confusion for the ANP.

• The Obama administration has acknowledged the importance of the police and announced its intentions to expand and improve the ANP as a key part of its plan for stabilizing Afghanistan. It should do this as part of a broader international community approach to police assistance that embraces a comprehensive program for security sector reform and rule of law.

[IntelTrooper]

USIP, 10 Aug 09: Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform

I think this is a good summary, with some caveats:

The Obama administration’s strategy for the Afghan police is to
increase numbers, enlarge the “train and equip” program, and engage the police in the fight against the Taliban. This approach has not worked in the past, and doing more of the same will not achieve success. It is also inconsistent with the stated intention of the new U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, to make protecting Afghan civilians the first priority of American forces and to adjust U.S. military tactics accordingly. Brig. Gen. Lawrence Nicholson said his [M]arines in Helmand province would protect Afghan civilians from the Taliban and help restore government services rather than mount hunt-and-kill missions against insurgents. Certainly, the ANP should receive the same assignment.

The ANP are not "mount[ing] hunt-and-kill missions against insurgents." They're just not really doing anything in particular, and at the district level there aren't enough of them to really do anything, anyway. The ANP should have primary responsibility in developing informant networks and arresting low-level Taliban in addition to their normal law enforcement duties. Petty crime is pretty rare so if they're getting paid to carry weapons they should at least be contributing somehow.

[davidbfpo]

Not sure of the interviewee's background and this is supplied in the opening:

Lieutenant General Abdul Hadi Khalid was the Afghan first deputy minister of the interior for security from May 2006 to late June 2008. Specializing in counter-narcotics, border policing and internal security, he announced the largest drug seizure in history.

He lost his post after a dispute with President Hamid Karzai's administration last year, but remains one of Afghanistan's leading thinkers on regional ethno-political dynamics and transnational criminal networks.

Interview covers more than the ANP and is most interesting on relatiosn with Afghanistan's neighbours: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI23Df02.html . Note this appeared first two weeks ago on the Jamestown website.

davidbfpo

[IntelTrooper]

Not sure of the interviewee's background and this is supplied in the opening:



Interview covers more than the ANP and is most interesting on relatiosn with Afghanistan's neighbours: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI23Df02.html

davidbfpo

The Americans are soldiers that do not understand the fundamentals of policing communities and feel the ANP should be proper security forces. We had Germans who were training our police [the German Police Project Office] at the Kabul Police Academy several years ago but they did not do a good job because they put too many limitations on their mandate. They could train police inside the police academy but not outside of it in real situations.
He's right on about this, for sure.

[davidbfpo]

Posted on another OEF thread: A variety of links and some will be cross-posted on other threads i.e. ANA & ANP. Not in order of priority.

1) Britain calls for mini-surge in Afghanistan to help train army. Of note is the claim the UK can deploy only 3k of the 9k troops in Helmand and that the ANA now have 8k deployed in Helmand (which I simply find incredible) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6851607.ece

2) http://www.captainsjournal.com/ has some amazing reports on the ANA and ANP. This is the longest, citing many sources (many on SWC I'm sure) and covers both the ANA and ANP: http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...national-army/

3) A Canadian OMLT veteran (from Kandahar Province) on the ANA, including literacy, training and more: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/

davidbfpo