One of the more intriguing things, I find at any rate, about "ill-defined problem sets" or "wicked problems", is that a large part of their definition as classes comes from the perceptions and assumptions of those defining them. For example, some of these "problems" are only "problems" because they do not fall neatly within "traditional" disciplinary boundaries, while others are only "problems" because of the definers epistemological stance. Other times, they are only "problems" because of the actions taken by the definers.

I'd like to return, for a moment, to Mike's original four "problems" and pull them apart from this angle:

1. Corrupt governance.
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

1. Corrupt governance

Governance, at least the forms and functions of it, are not universal. The example Mike quoted from me was set up in a very particular way, specifically that the form and functions of local governance did not meet local idealized expectations or satisficing levels (they're different, but that example was set to not meet either).

Now a lot of COIN / SFA / FID doctrine is based around an axiomatic assumption that actions taken in the field need to reinforce the "legitimacy" of the HN government. This "legitimacy" was under attack in the example not because of foreign or insurgent actions, but because of the actions of a legally appointed governor.

Now, I put legitimacy in quotes, because what makes actions legitimate is culture bound (even in the simplistic FM 3-24 definition of culture). Elections, "snout counting" to quote one of my favorite alternate history authors, is one particular form of legitimacy, but only one. It relies on the pre-existence of a number of factors including, but not limited to, literacy (at least amongst those holding the franchise), a "belief in the system", and an economic structure that allows people to have the leisure time to actually think about the issues.

A lot of these pre-conditions are not generally available in some of the areas where COIN / SFA / FID is taking place. So, in order to solve the "problem", at least the example problem I gave, you have to do two things. First, you have to discover what constitutes "legitimacy" at the lived, cultural level - that's why I gave the answer I gave to question #4 (here). Now, in order to discover what constitutes "legitimacy", you have to get rid of "snout counting" as an axiomatic assumption. It is not always an indicator of legitimacy. In some cases, it may well be an indicator of social theatre operating to "validate" what the actual systems of legitimacy have already decided will happen; think of it as Oberammergau on steroids .

So, that's point 1. Point 2 is that you have to figure out what is the "legitimate" way of getting rid of or modifying the behaviour of the local governor. And, as a note, you have to do this without assuming "snout counting" and its precursors as the basis for legitimacy - in effect, forget the democratic social thatre known as "mass protests" or "impeachment hearings". The Mosul Case Study had some interesting observations on culturally appropriate and legitimate ways of removing officials (basically, using personal contact networks to show how the offical was a danger to other power brokers). Basically, you have to figure out how the local political power system operates - the real system, not the formality which may have been imposed - and use it.

2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.

The scenario Mike set out is a nasty one but, again, it is making some axiomatic assumptions that may be invalid. First off, in many of the current AOs, the "traditional" structures have already been under attack for a long time. A second possibility is that the "traditional" structures have morphed in an adaptive format to mimic the insurgent structures.

Depending on what is actually going in, your tactics should vary. For example, going in to an insurgent stronghold with low troop counts and insufficient logistics will undermine your entire campaign (take a look at the British in Helmand in 2006 for an example). Go back to the basic political power dynamics operating in the culture and use that as your guide.

For example, if the insurgents are holding power by using beheadings, then they are drawing on two sources of legitimacy - strength and, if Muslim, some interpretation of Sha'ria law. In Afghanistan at any rate, this would indicate that the "traditional" balance between the sheiks and the mullahs has been vectored strongly in the mullahs favour. This type of enemy enclave is, actually, a good one to first isolte / beseige (for its value as an IO example) and then take down with a ready made civil admin plan after the kinetic attack.

If, however, the enclave is controlled by an "insurgent" group that is mimicing insurgent structures, then this could indicate the potential for a political rapproachement. Again, using Afghanistan as an example, we always have to keep in mind that "the Taliban" are, actually, a co-alition of differing groups, some of which could well be incorpated into the central government.

3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.

In general, tactics for dealing with this problem are similar to those for dealing with the first problem. The primary area of difference lies in motivation. The first thing to find out is how the individuals view their "office" - how is it connected in a semantic web of meaning, and how is this web reinforced. As a simple example, police forces in many areas of the world assume that bribery is a basic part (perq) of their office. This assumption is built in at the highest level via HR policies on remuneration and other perqs. If this is the case, then the best tactic is to attack the root cause (low/infrequent pay, poor perqs, etc.) while, at the same time, increasing the sense of professional pride. The basic idea is that you make holding the office valuable in a way that is legitimate and acceptable, and then create an organizational / professional culture that is aimed at protecting access to that office.

If we are dealing with the army officer who is using his office as an inquisitor (aka death squads), then you are back to a political solution along the lines of question #1.

4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

I already gave my answer to this, but the general rule is always ask to find out what they perceive is happening and how they would solve it. Find a local solution that meets your requirements, and then "sell it".

Cheers,

Marc