Hi Marc,

For the most part, I agreed with your last comments, specifically on our pre-conditioned values, beliefs, and norms that we all must learn to relax when dealing with a foreign indigenous population. I find myself constantly struggling to remember that normal for me is not normal for others. I will take issue with one and use a current example to try and articulate.

Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
One of the more intriguing things, I find at any rate, about "ill-defined problem sets" or "wicked problems", is that a large part of their definition as classes comes from the perceptions and assumptions of those defining them. For example, some of these "problems" are only "problems" because they do not fall neatly within "traditional" disciplinary boundaries, while others are only "problems" because of the definers epistemological stance. Other times, they are only "problems" because of the actions taken by the definers.

I'd like to return, for a moment, to Mike's original four "problems" and pull them apart from this angle:

2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.

The scenario Mike set out is a nasty one but, again, it is making some axiomatic assumptions that may be invalid. First off, in many of the current AOs, the "traditional" structures have already been under attack for a long time. A second possibility is that the "traditional" structures have morphed in an adaptive format to mimic the insurgent structures.

Depending on what is actually going in, your tactics should vary. For example, going in to an insurgent stronghold with low troop counts and insufficient logistics will undermine your entire campaign (take a look at the British in Helmand in 2006 for an example). Go back to the basic political power dynamics operating in the culture and use that as your guide.

For example, if the insurgents are holding power by using beheadings, then they are drawing on two sources of legitimacy - strength and, if Muslim, some interpretation of Sha'ria law. In Afghanistan at any rate, this would indicate that the "traditional" balance between the sheiks and the mullahs has been vectored strongly in the mullahs favour. This type of enemy enclave is, actually, a good one to first isolte / beseige (for its value as an IO example) and then take down with a ready made civil admin plan after the kinetic attack.

If, however, the enclave is controlled by an "insurgent" group that is mimicing insurgent structures, then this could indicate the potential for a political rapproachement. Again, using Afghanistan as an example, we always have to keep in mind that "the Taliban" are, actually, a co-alition of differing groups, some of which could well be incorpated into the central government.
My example was harsh, but that is the environment that the military must work in. As much as we wish to allow the society to work issues out own their own, the military must make jugement calls as to what is acceptable. The following example may show a striking contrast in the roles of the military and the anthropologists. Back in Diyala circa 2006, AQI was cutting locals hands off for mixing male and female vegetables. Here is what the boys on the ground are dealing with today.

Taliban threaten to chop off voters' fingers in Afghan election

Ben Farmer
The Guardian

Insurgents in southern Afghanistan told locals that fingers found bearing the indelible ink used to mark voters would be removed.

"We will know those who cast a vote from the ink, and his finger will be cut off," a commander warned villagers in the south of the country, the New York Times reported.

The Taliban ruling council led by Mullah Omar has called on Afghans to boycott the election, described them as an American sham and told its fighters to block roads to polling stations.

The new threat of mutilation appeared to rule out hopes that lower level Taliban leaders would call a temporary ceasefire to allow the vote to proceed without violence.
To the rational western actor, we would assume that the Taliban would simply allow the people to vote. If the Taliban won, then we would be in a difficult conundrum. Instead, the Taliban is using another measure of coersion to control the populace through fear.

Just another example of what the boys are dealing with.

v/r

Mike