Leading scouting/counter-scouting theorists

[Fuchs]

I think the problem you will find is a complete lack of relevant material, plus as you have indicated, a poor use of language.

My thoughts in this area is that it is that Land Warfare Reconnaissance is writ large with fuzzy logic and some very bizarre assumptions. Finding the enemy is a simple and useful guide to action. Strange that many have made it so difficult.

Screening is a useful term if applied to giving early warning, to prevent surprise. Scouting is somewhat less useful, because it is far less well defined

Well, a way out of the trouble is to invent something new; the inventor can define its name.

scouting
screening
security
infiltration
skirmishing
reconnaissance

All these terms are close to my idea, but none is perfect.
"Reconnaissance" is too general, especially as it's in great part an air power job and it doesn't hint at small combat actions at all.

My present working title is "heavy skirmishers", but maybe I'll settle on "heavy low force density unit" as my concept is very much about filling the gaps left by friendly and enemy combat brigades with few resources and executing the aforementioned tasks.
It's very different from my rather static idea for the "light" counterpart (working title "light skirmishers").


It was difficult to get sufficient accounts about historical armoured recce ops (the Eastern Front accounts were most inspiring, but they're obsolete), and I haven't found any real modern theory about it yet.
I assume that the modern "swarming" theory and the theory that led to the U.S. CavRgt of the 80's and 90's may be useful to some degree.

As usual, secrecy slows down progress.

About "Strange that many have made it so difficult."

The amount of pre-planning demanded in U.S. FMs on mobile ground war is unrealistic anyway. Recce is an art form for daring characters, not management science.
U.S. doctrine for mobile warfare looks at times like American Football.
Planning - action - planning - action - planning - action.
Wait, that's inaccurate. In theory it looks more like planning - action - victory.

The German FM on armoured recce looks like WW2 doctrine plus sensors minus combat capability. It's incredibly inadequate.

I don't have more manuals on armoured recce. Maybe a translated Russian one may be available somehow? Their OPSEC doesn't bother us, right?