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    Ken's argument:

    Not a frontage issue in all cases but it can be -- it is a depth issue in the sense that the Rifle Co Recon (Combat patrols are a separate animal and they belong to the Cos and not to the Scout sect) Patrols should normally go out no more than 10-15 km, max, generally less -- and METT-TC dependent -- so they run about 4 hours out and 4 back, max (with 4-6 total being better and with no overnight stays) the Scout Sec, OTOH should be prepared for three to five day patrols in bad guy territory or up to about 30 km out. Not everyone grooves on that-- or can do it. Div Recon should be used for the stuff from 30-100km out while Force Recon can do the strategic stuff beyond 100km.
    plus Wilf's patrol based infantry doctrine and I'm close to throwin word "Sniper" to dustpin

    kiwigrunt cited Spence's book missions:

    To take out high value targets
    To take out targets of opportunity
    To lay forward- or flanking screens *
    Ambush – or cut off to ambush *
    Area denial /covering terrain *
    Blocking positions *
    Harass the enemy
    Counter sniping and counter recon.
    And, if necessary, recon or assistance to recon.(asterisks added /kw)
    Fuchs added his definition:

    Meant to work in teams of two or three, usually separated from infantry (except movement to and from missions). Relies more on concealment and camouflage, less on cover or body armour for survivability than DM.
    Extreme single shot long-range capability (training+hardware) and long-range observation capability (spotting scope). Low mobility, but extraordinary patience and endurance.
    I agree with Ken White that snipers (DM's) can't accomplish those missions alone. They do need security componet close. They can act like in movie "Sniper", but in real life this is really risky (if this is even the right word) business

    If you give to soldier who is trained according to Wilf's doctrine semi-auto .338 rifle, then most of the missions should be accomplised.
    If squad DM is trained in a week to hit human targets in 500m distance with 5,56x45 ammo (without spotter, without LRF), I think this is really possible that the same soldier can hit targets with .338 in 800m (or even further) distance. If USA Army will find themselves new assault rifle via competition, maybe they should add that contenders (Colt, FN, HK etc) should add semi-auto .338 to their family of weapons. Armalite already has http://www.armalite.com/ItemForm.asp...0-49488ec48776
    If .338 is chosen, who get's those M110 rifles? Another question is on what level this DM should be located. Platoon level, like Wilf has proposed?

    Just one comment to Ken White's post:

    That crew is the squad so that's where he or she should be. The training issue in garrison is easily solved by scheduling the DM sustainment training so that they all get together under the senior Co (or Bn) DM / Sniper. In my view, you'd have two Sniper * tms at Co, a DM in every squad and the senior Sniper becomes the Co DM trainer. if there's also a Bn Sniper Tm or section, the leader becomes the Bn Master Shooter and oversees training.
    Isn't this structure close to your thought, except the "Sniper" word

    http://www.scribd.com/doc/18522946/S...nated-Marksmen
    Last edited by kaur; 08-22-2009 at 08:19 AM.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by kaur View Post
    If you give to soldier who is trained according to Wilf's doctrine semi-auto .338 rifle, then most of the missions should be accomplised.
    I suppose I had better put some meat on these bones, before others do!

    My "Long Range Rifleman" works in the Platoon as part of the fire support effort. His mission is to deliver precision fires out to X-range (800m).
    I envisage him using an 8.59mm Lapua, bolt action rifle with an scope for daylight and TI or II for night-time (300m?).

    The 2 week unit-level training course is aimed at getting him to hit a target, by correctly judging distance and environmental conditions, so that he can gain a first round hit on a man-sized target, under operational conditions.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    All that said, the skill is important and needs to be maintained because in some situations, it is extremely valuable.
    Absolutely. I fear, however, that with the likes of pre-deployment training going on, and the sense of urgency that precludes professional development training for leaders, we are doing the process an injustice. Specifically, snipers continue to be screened, selected, and trained, but we (and this includes the USMC) are probably not continuing along with good sniper EMPLOYMENT training that allows us to maximize their potential. That is the key, since (unless their commander is totally incompetent) snipers should not be writing their own mission task and moving about will-nilly with no control. Thus the need for good training in appropriate employment.

    I'll be the first to argue that you cannot get such training from the snipers themselves from within the unit. That just leads to all sorts of problems.

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    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I suppose I had better put some meat on these bones, before others do!

    My "Long Range Rifleman" works in the Platoon as part of the fire support effort. His mission is to deliver precision fires out to X-range (800m).
    I envisage him using an 8.59mm Lapua, bolt action rifle with an scope for daylight and TI or II for night-time (300m?).

    The 2 week unit-level training course is aimed at getting him to hit a target, by correctly judging distance and environmental conditions, so that he can gain a first round hit on a man-sized target, under operational conditions.
    Wilf, I agree that a "sniper" (or whatever the heck else you want to call him) does provide neccessary fire support (espicially against enemy csw), but the scout and information aspect is certainly there. You are the one that helped me verbilize my thoughts that rifle optics are valuable more as a "sensor" then as a firepower multiplier, why would the same not be true for your LRM or a sniper?
    Reed
    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post
    Wilf, I agree that a "sniper" (or whatever the heck else you want to call him) does provide neccessary fire support (espicially against enemy csw), but the scout and information aspect is certainly there. You are the one that helped me verbilize my thoughts that rifle optics are valuable more as a "sensor" then as a firepower multiplier, why would the same not be true for your LRM or a sniper?
    Reed
    Yes, a sniper, with a radio, can go and find things and conduct surveillance. That he can does not mean he should. The primary issue here is one of a division of labour, or rather tasking. I want to differentiate the "fire support task" from the STA task. They are not one and the same, even though one skill set might combine them.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I want to differentiate the "fire support task" from the STA task.
    I always thought it's common sense that all combat (sub-)units (down to squad Ldr and his 2nd) that move independently (at minimum platoon) should be able to call for fires.

    The officers of non-combat units should be able to do so as well (maybe restricted to smoke, though).

    The dedicated fire support teams / forward observers should be limited to

    - pricey dedicated equipment like powerful radars, mast-mounted thermals, counter-artillery radars (Aufklärende Artillerie, reconnoitering artillery, units in German)

    - especially important tasks to be done from dominating terrain features

    - doing the fire support coordination in open terrain (enough line of sight that a these experts can make a difference) at especially important places (CoG, river crossing / major obstacle breaching, for example)

    The differences in the ability to call for fires should be only in its scope (mortars only? smoke only? binding requirement or just a plea?)*.


    An old solution to the FO problem in Germany was that artillery battery COs were acting as FO, for their battery and for others. They ensured a high level of competence and a connection (dedication) of the artillery arm to the front.
    I think Gudmundsson mourned over the loss of this connection in "On Artillery" (I read it years ago, not sure).
    It never felt quite natural to me; more like a legacy of 19th century (and WW2 AT ambush) arty direct fire tactics.
    The Germans fixed the mortar FO problem by often attaching medium mortars to front-line units for quasi direct fire. Only heavies and some mediums were kept massed in the "rear" (actually more like in the last company defensive position, as the "rear" was even less safe).




    --------------
    *: Sorry for lots of non-standard terms. I'm not much into all those acronyms and terms, especially not as I use sources in three languages). I'm already incomprehensible to most laymen, so there's little motivation left to learn even more acronyms.

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Yes, a sniper, with a radio, can go and find things and conduct surveillance. That he can does not mean he should. The primary issue here is one of a division of labour, or rather tasking. I want to differentiate the "fire support task" from the STA task. They are not one and the same, even though one skill set might combine them.
    True! Fire Support is a different task than STA and Snipers must not be seen as former. They don't count for much impact on ops either. But the role suggests surgical action at ranges beyond matching capability, not to forget the collateral damage avoidance in Urban Warfare.
    KRSNA

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    Kiwigrunt, sorry for stretching your topic, but I think that precisely shooting men/and women have done harm to opposite side through the history of armed conflict (I don't mention javelin throwers and longbow handlers . As Ken has mentioned several times, everything depends on METT. This picture shows in a nice way different possible armed conflict modes. Your TTP depends a lot on what side you are fighting. There are myriad variations to define sniper, but for me Spicer's definition is most universal.



    Diagram source
    http://www.understandterror.com/arti...az%20Ganor.pdf

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    I hope this doesn't come across as to bold or arrogant for my first post aside from introducing myself. As always with everything opinions are like fleas and every dog has them

    Snipers are an asset that specializes in being covert. A DM in general is more of an overt role especially with the tendency towards presence patrolling. A DM can perform some of the tasks a Sniper fulfills but unless he emerged from the womb ghillied up and leopard crawled past the Doc and out the door he isn't going to have the level of field craft or self discipline required to remain covert for 24-72 hr periods. If he did chances are he has been identified and snapped up by Recon or Snipers already. The other things are a DM does not in general have the training or experience to call in accurate Mort/Arty/CAS and most importantly the ability to understand the higher commanders intent and his role in it. When everything turns pear shaped a DM will revert to his most basic role which is a rifleman with a scoped rifle, a Sniper team is an independent entity commanded by a JNCO which can react to whats going on and has been trained to hopefully be able to deal with drastic situation changes.

    Now whether or not you need this covert capability and level of independence in an asset to be deployed depends on what types of operations you are conducting.

    Recon detachments are indispensible and I don't say that just because I command one. In general rifle Platoons are noisy messy things that leave a black bin liner worth of rubbish everywhere they travel, rifle sections are not much better. Some Platoons/sections are better than others but none can ever achieve the level of noise and field discipline expected of a Recon det, if they were capable of it they would be in Recon. The discipline required in Recon is the main thing that sets them apart from the rest of the Battalion. Remaining covert for a long period of time in adverse weather conditions or when the pucker factor is high is not easy. A lot of Soldiers can't cut it which is why there are courses to assess possible candidates.

    Any rifle section is and should be capable of conducting reconnaissance type tasks but they are not ideal for that role. The size of a section hinders its ability to perform the tasks through the amount of sign it makes and amount of ground it requires when in an LUP. Cutting a section down to a det size to negate this removes a lot of the fire power the commander has until now taken for granted, unless he has spent a lot of time conducting BCDs he is going to be at a disadvantage trying to achieve a clean break. Recon dets don't have this problem they do not have to go out and conduct Sect/Pl IAs and Coy DLOC. All they practice is the different types of BCDs until they become second nature. Due to the size of a det the commander does not have the luxury of sitting back and assessing the situation, he is right there in the fight and has to rely on his teams level of training for the first few bounds until he can get them to grips and start making command decisions.

    From my own experience as a commander and DS on patrol procedures courses I would say that 10% of the Soldiers in a Battalion are capable of doing the job well. For most it is the self discipline that lets them down. Enforced discipline can be used but is hard to apply in a close prox OP. Now one could disband the RISTA elms in a Bn and hope that their experience is filtered out to the remainder but that is a pretty long shot. At the end of the day the CO is pushing his Recon assets out to find information about the En and deny the En info on FF assets. If he sends out a C/S that is compromised quickly and does not meet his CIR all that has been achieved is the exposure of his possible intent.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default How about replacing the word 'sniper' with KAUR -- Kinetic Assault Ultra Range???

    I'm still working on that acronym...
    Quote Originally Posted by kaur View Post
    ...plus Wilf's patrol based infantry doctrine and I'm close to throwin word "Sniper" to dustpin
    I'm inclined to agree on the word -- but the concept is still viable. There's a need in many circumstances, it's just important that the capabilities and limitations be understood.
    ...They do need security componet close. They can act like in movie "Sniper", but in real life this is really risky (if this is even the right word) business
    True, many times today, in US practice, a Rifle squad or more is sent with the Snipers for that reason.
    Isn't this structure close to your thought, except the "Sniper" word
    Yes -- and in fairness, the US Army essentially considers the Sniper and his Spotter as a crew and the Sniper rifle as a crew served weapon. Having done the job with no spotter, being a bit of a loner and vaguely anti-social plus believing it is easier to hide one man than two, I don't -- but then I'm not in charge.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    True, many times today, in US practice, a Rifle squad or more is sent with the Snipers for that reason.
    In the '80s the only information we really had to work with, employment wise, was the 9th Infantry Division's Vietnam experience. I never heard an instructor at the XVIII Airborne Corps AMTU school say word one about WWII, Korea, or anything the USMC was doing.

    9th ID SOP called for the sniper team to be secured by a fire team to squad size element. The SOP acually reads four to eight men. I have no idea where those exact numbers come from since they don't match any official unit size from that era. Probably the 9th's understrength rifle squads were within that number range?

    And it wasn't like the security element was in the same hide site as the sniper team. Just close enough to support by fire.

    Yes -- and in fairness, the US Army essentially considers the Sniper and his Spotter as a crew and the Sniper rifle as a crew served weapon.
    That's where I was coming from with my idea to have all company snipers/DMs in one squad in a rifle company's weapons platoon. I believe in battalion level snipers too.

    Having done the job with no spotter, being a bit of a loner and vaguely anti-social plus believing it is easier to hide one man than two, I don't -- but then I'm not in charge.
    Understood. And there's certainly advantages and disadvantages to each approach. All things considered, I believe in a spotter and I look at the team as a "crew" of sorts the same as an MG or anti-armor team.
    Last edited by Rifleman; 08-22-2009 at 08:01 PM.
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    Default JCUSTIS hit a real need...

    "Absolutely. I fear, however, that with the likes of pre-deployment training going on, and the sense of urgency that precludes professional development training for leaders, we are doing the process an injustice. Specifically, snipers continue to be screened, selected, and trained, but we (and this includes the USMC) are probably not continuing along with good sniper EMPLOYMENT training that allows us to maximize their potential. That is the key, since (unless their commander is totally incompetent) snipers should not be writing their own mission task and moving about will-nilly with no control. Thus the need for good training in appropriate employment.

    I'll be the first to argue that you cannot get such training from the snipers themselves from within the unit. That just leads to all sorts of problems. "

    I had an honest-to-God US Army school-trained sniper in one of my attached infantry platoons. He had no real advice on how to employ his capabilities. Certainly Iraq was not the best environment for their use, but a commander will have a hard time coming up with sound uses without a proper grounding in their capabilities and limitations.

    Perhaps this is then partly leading to the issue of where to locate the sniper - at battalion, where a more experienced leader can decide where/how to employ them, or at the company, where they will probably do more good? Or is this a chicken/egg problem?

    Tankersteve

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    Council Member Kiwigrunt's Avatar
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    Hmmm, good points indeed Jcustis and Tankersteve.
    That lack of direction and understanding from outside the ‘sniper community’ may be largely responsible for the myth as well….or at least for creating or allowing an environment for it….


    And on that myth and acronyms, I’m starting to get the feeling that the myth is associated more with the word ‘sniper’, rather that the job. Now what if sniper wasn’t a word but an acronym:
    SNIPER -- Special Needs Individual Precious Expert Rifleman.

    We’ve had these so far:
    BADASS -- Better than Average Destroyer And Sharp Shooter
    EDM -- Exceptional Designated Marksmen
    DIM -- Dedicated Intelligent Marksman
    DIMWITS -- Dedicated Intelligent Marksmen With Incredible Tactical Skills.
    KAUR -- Kinetic Assault Ultra Range
    Keep’m comin’


    Ken:
    True, many times today, in US practice, a Rifle squad or more is sent with the Snipers for that reason.
    Would that not negate the individual/stealth/blahblah aspect of a sniper? This seems a scenario where a DM is sufficient.


    Ken
    I'd say most Bns most of the time can get by without them but if present they provide a capability that can enhance that Bns combat power slightly in some types of warfare and significantly in stability ops.

    I carried a Scoped '03 during part of the moving war in Korea, I got some good shots and know others that did also -- but we admitted we did little real damage and had no significant effect. OTOH, a couple of years later when it was a static war of trenches and outposts, snipers had a ball and countersniping was in and some did some good stuff.

    Snipers in Viet Nam did some legendary stuff, Carlos Hathcock for example -- but they didn't really have much effect on the war.

    Thanks for all the points you made in that post Ken.
    Now this goes back to the bean counter aspect. How much effect ‘should’ a small (but relatively expensive to train) team as part of an 800 or so strong unit have to justify its existence? For instance, how much effect does a 51 mm platoon mortar man have on the overall effect of a war? (I’m not suggesting to scrap platoon mortars, and realise this is not apples/apples.)
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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Need more 900m targets...

    jcustis:
    we (and this includes the USMC) are probably not continuing along with good sniper EMPLOYMENT training that allows us to maximize their potential. That is the key, since (unless their commander is totally incompetent) snipers should not be writing their own mission task and moving about will-nilly with no control.
    I'd be willing to bet that the training of prospective commander on the Machine Gun barely scratches the surface. They teach the use of the Clinometer? I'm not at all sure that training or the employment of snipers is a glaring shortfall -- or even a minor oversight. It would seem to me that an Officer or Senior NCO would dig into the capabilities and the employment of elements he might have access to on his or her own. Many will say they should not have to do that and while there's some truth there, I doubt it's possible to adequately cover all the possibilities in any training -- and I'm probably the loudest guy on this board about more and better training...

    That said, I don't dispute the fact that some sort of capability outlay is needed but I believe it should be in the book of war (the FM / FMFM for one's particular unit type) because any School education or training is going to have a shelf life and is going to be placed in the users own priority for recall and use.

    One of the problems with snipers, discussed above, is that they have little to no value in some kinds of warfare, only moderate value in others and are a highly situational dependent asset. That leads to neglect until they appear and in a situation where the skills are pretty important.

    Rifleman:
    I never heard an instructor at the XVIII Airborne Corps AMTU school say word one about WWII, Korea, or anything the USMC was doing.
    Parochialsim is the American way. In the mid 90s, my son was doing the obligatory earthling tour in the 25th, in a Scout Platoon and was sent to the Marine Sniper School at Kaneohe (LINK). They trained Scouts as well so he came back with all sorts of good ideas (like not wearing the Kevlar on the range... ) and virtually everything he suggested that he thought the Marines were doing better was roundly rejected as not being the Army way and the rejection was usually pretty derogatory. In Germany he went to the NATO LRRS School for several courses, brought back good ideas and all were rejected because the US Army didn't do it that way. True -- and an amazing number of Armies do a lot of things better than we do...

    Earlier, I had been an Instructional Branch Chief at the Armor School. I spent a lot of Kitchen Table time developing some really good lesson plans. Not sure why I bothered because I knew at the time that all the NCO instructors would watch someone else teach a class, pattern their own class after it and would ignore the lesson plan. I even put trick sentences in a couple to see if they'd catch them. They did not. (so I had to resort to deceit and treachery to force them to think -- they mostly did pretty well but did I assist few in finding other employment. ).

    The point of all that is that your comment doesn't surprise me a bit -- and I think that all three items are a major smack at the 'selection' of instructors (there isn't any, most are pipeline feeds or self selected folks that want to hide from TOE units; curiosity about what they're going is not an issue), the training of instructors (abysmal, too much on tasks etc. and counseling) and the parochial "It wasn't invented here" syndrome (which is everywhere. Unfortunately. It is dangerous.).
    And it wasn't like the security element was in the same hide site as the sniper team. Just close enough to support by fire.
    True, many miss that aspect -- and that goes back to my comment to jcustis -- people have to think and the old METT-TC thing makes every situation different. Many want nice pat book solution -- no one on this board, of course but others -- however there aren't any that will work reliably in all situations. Life is easy if you can do what those NCO Instructors at Knox did and just follow the example of others. Those Instructors you mention should've dug a little deeper, there are some great good and bad sniper actions out of WW II and Korea. Like this: LINK. That's been here before...
    Understood. And there's certainly advantages and disadvantages to each approach. All things considered, I believe in a spotter and I look at the team as a "crew" of sorts the same as an MG or anti-armor team.
    I can take that or leave it, some people work better alone and I think if you know your people and you have one of those, he should be allowed to go out singly. Varies from unit to unit. That's with respect to the sniper -- on the DM, he's a part of a Squad, has no spotter -- and should not IMO -- so I'm inclined to make the system work rather than adjust to cope because it doesn't want to do the right thing 'cause it's too hard...

    Tankersteve:
    I had an honest-to-God US Army school-trained sniper in one of my attached infantry platoons. He had no real advice on how to employ his capabilities. Certainly Iraq was not the best environment for their use, but a commander will have a hard time coming up with sound uses without a proper grounding in their capabilities and limitations.
    Thus you'll probably disagree with my comment to jcustis above. That's fine but my observation has been that new capabilities get introduced in every war (or, like snipers, old ones are reinvented) and I'm not sure the training system can cope with every need. Some stuff you just have to pick up on the fly...

    I know no one here is guilty of it (or they wouldn't be here) but there are many out there -- and we've all known a couple -- who take the line that "Every Officer and NCO is responsible for his or her own professional development." to mean solely selecting future assignments and doing all the important things that get noticed Many forget or would like to forget that it also means they have a responsibility to spend some of their own time learning the trade and that may mean that other, more personally intiguing things have to be foregone occasionally.

    On Iraq, perhaps it depended on where one was and what was being done. I've talked to several who are convinced that the snipers in the last couple of years had a great deal to do with taking out a lot of the IED pizzazz by making planting a very risky occupation. Not to even go into the counter sniper effort.
    Perhaps this is then partly leading to the issue of where to locate the sniper - at battalion, where a more experienced leader can decide where/how to employ them, or at the company, where they will probably do more good? Or is this a chicken/egg problem?
    My perception is that they are best employed at and by the Company in most cases where they are of value but due to the points you, jon and rifleman have all mentioned, they are located Bn. That's part administrative and training ease in peacetime or garrison but mostly human factors related; the S2 or S3 should be better able to employ them; they're a body of people all in one place for training; and they don't have to cope with personalities of 1SGs who don't like 'special' people or a Co Cdr who's too busy with 180 other things to use them properly (very difficult when there may be at the time, no real employment -- which is another sniper problem). The down side of that is more reluctance to employ them occasionally as that mean placing them in some company's AO. Sometimes, that Co doesn't want the hassle of "Bn's snipers." Lot of interesting sidelights and perambulations to the issue.....

    A recurring mention or implication by many is snipers out running loose with no command supervision. Well, yes -- that sort of goes with the territory. Reluctance of some to accept that responsibility (with concurrent inability to personally affect it...) is part of the sniper problem. And the sniper myth doe not lead to dispelling that. Also mildly problematical when they're at Co level is the unit that insists on sending a support and cover party with them -- that can have an adverse affect on the sniper himself as well as the mission.

    Due to all that they're tightening the criteria for selection for the Sniper School. With the right people selected, that ''no command supervision' isn't a problem (except for the few commanders or 3s who will make it so due to a lack of self confidence -- or CSMs / 1SGs who are overprotective of their Boss...) and the problem you had in Iraq should disappear. Well, be ameliorated a bit, anyway...

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Maybe a bit war experience from wars with 'peer' powers:
    The infantry hated snipers unless they were sent to counter-snipe.
    Sniper action provoked enemy sniping and indirect counterfires, and the infantry got hit in return for the sniper's actions. Infantrymen with scope scratch marks on their rifles got killed upon capture for being alleged snipers.

    Snipers were dead if captured and really hated (even by their own infantry) in both World War's stationary phases. Exceptions prove the rule.


    There are really a lot of factors that play into the sniping issue simply because snipers usually work detached from infantry formations/positions without needing a force concentration to be effective (that's a difference to AT units, for example).

    My preference is a platoon at Bn level that trains snipers and forms sniper teams. The snipers can then be tasked with missions (support defence, support offence, surveillance, counter-sniping, free hunt). A loss of a sniper team (or something simple like sickness) wouldn't take away snipers from a Plt or Coy simply because the Bn level sniper Plt sergeant could send a ready replacement team.
    An additional need for snipers in offensive actions or to counter enemy sniping could be met as well.

  16. #16
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Depends on the war...

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Maybe a bit war experience from wars with 'peer' powers:
    Peer power has little to do with it. It's the type of warfare and the degree, if any, of hatred of the opponents.
    The infantry hated snipers unless they were sent to counter-snipe.
    Sniper action provoked enemy sniping and indirect counterfires, and the infantry got hit in return for the sniper's actions.
    In Korea, during the static phase, both the Chinese and the US were generally too smart to fall into the trap of over responding to sniper. Both tended to deploy a countersniper and not lose a lot sleep over it because only rarely did a truly deadly sniper appear. Nobody got particuarly irate at snipers because they didn't do much damage.

    US line infantry in Koreas later stages did hate Tank which would crawl up a hill, fire a couple of rounds across the valley and leave rapidly before the 82, 76, 122 and 152 rain came --as it always did.

    Minor off the wall comment; the Chinese and North Koreans could put a mortar round in your hip pocket but they were not good rifle shots. Their snipers were only so-so at best. In Viet Nam, the VC were good with neither but the North Viet Namese Army while poor with mortars, artillery and rockets were good rifle shots out to a hundred or so meters and particularly if armed with the SKS, however, their Snipers were not particularly good at any range over a couple of hundred meters.

    In the pacific in WW II both the US and the Japanese made fairly extensive use of snipers generally without the actions you note; though they all are certainly valid for Europe and particularly the Eastern Front.

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    I stand corrected. During ground intelligence officers course, our ground intel 2ndLts undergo 2 weeks of employment training. How well they recommend use of snipers when they are called on to develop R&S plans for infantry battalion ops is a different animal.

    This makes me think back to a point. I was trained as a DM by USMC school-trained snipers who held the MOS. They used the terms R&S for about everything that required effort. I realize now that they really meant more along the lines of surveillance, and less along the lines of recce, since we were never trained in any reporting techniques, learning only how to draft observation sketches. Misuse of the term indeed...

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    .....The infantry hated snipers unless they were sent to counter-snipe....Snipers were dead if captured and really hated (even by their own infantry) in both World War's stationary phases. Exceptions prove the rule....
    This was a common feeling on both sides during the War of Northern Aggression.

    One account from the war says that there was an unwritten rule that you didn't bother a man when he "goes out to do his business in the morning" but that "these sharpshooting brutes are always violating that."

    And artillery officers of that war are on record making quaint statements in their offical reports like, "We were a good deal annoyed by sharpshooters." The guncrew members worded things a little differently: one artilleryman said, "We went in a battery and came out a wreck!"
    "Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper

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    kiwigrunt said:

    And on that myth and acronyms, I’m starting to get the feeling that the myth is associated more with the word ‘sniper’, rather that the job.
    If you go back to the roots of the word "sniper", then every good shot can be sniper. You just have to be able to hit this bird called snipe



    As I understand in US SOF there is only one sniper in squad and no spotter. He should be able to accomplish following tasks.

    • Employ gas-operated sniper
    systems (SR-25/M-110 SASS), both
    day and night and in rural and urban
    environments, while engaging stationary
    targets, moving targets and targets
    with limited exposure times. (Note: the
    M-24 Sniper Weapon System is still
    the primary weapon system employed
    during SFSC.)
    • Employ the Barrett M-107 sniper
    weapon, both day and night.
    • Conduct technical-surveillance
    familiarization.
    • Familiarize students with current
    tactical reconnaissance kit.
    • Employ the tactical reconnaissance
    kit and equipment.
    • Select urban surveillance/firing
    positions and construct urban hide
    sites.
    • Conduct urban stalking.
    • Learn building-climbing techniques
    (ascending and descending).
    • Collect and manage information.
    • Operate a tactical information
    center.
    • Learn collection methods
    and techniques.
    • Conduct close-target
    reconnaissance.
    • Conduct long-range, standoff
    observation.
    • Learn vehicle-reconnaissance
    tactics, techniques and procedures, or
    TTP.
    • Learn walk-by TTP.
    • Learn to operate manned and
    unmanned remote sites.
    • Demonstrate planning considerations
    for sniper operations.
    • Plan urban and rural operations.
    • Conduct time-sensitive planning.
    • Develop target stand-alone products
    for near- and long-term use.
    • Develop RECCE concept of
    operation.
    • Learn to shoot from aerial platforms
    (familiarization only).
    • Spend two additional days of sniper
    and field-shoot marksmanship events
    in preparation for must-pass exams.
    Look at page 30 http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/08May.pdf

    As far as I understand (with my limited knowledge about topic), the only difference between sniper and scout is former's skills to shoot precisely further. SOF sniper should be able like scout infiltrate and exfiltrate. Action in final firing position is similar to observation post procedures (except shooting act). This additional skill could be really demanding for the whole team. I'm glad if Infanteer will correct me, but if I remember correctly Canadian sniper team consists already of four snipers. The reasons are security, huge load of equipment (several SWS with different ammo from 5,56 to 12,7 calibre) and possibilty to man position 24h. It seems that it's easier for organisation to train all scouts like snipers, than to add to sniper pairs just security element. USMC has choosen this path.
    Last edited by kaur; 08-23-2009 at 01:19 PM.

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