Why would you want to do that?
That's the point -- those were missions made necessary more by the existing and available force structure and the focus of military (mostly) and civilian (influenced by the military) leaders. Both Afghanistan and the Middle East needed military attention, that was IMO a strategic necessity. Neither mission as actually performed was IMO strategically desirable in virtually any respect.Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman
In the first place we didn't have 10K SF. In the second, why would you want to do that? Foment a rebellion and you have no idea how that might end.If, rather than invading Iraq, we had just sent in 10,000 (arbitrarily chosen number) SF soldiers, and they had fomented rebellion amongst hoi polloi, then we certainly would have destabilized Iraq, but I am not sure that the same 10,000 would have been able to stabilize it again.
We should have in Afghanistan have known the location of all AQ assets and simply have gone in an destroyed them and left. In the ME, the issue was not Saddam but to send a message to the ME that attacks on American interests were no longer going to be tolerated as they had been for the past 22 years with either no response or a tepid one; rather with a full bore slam. Iraq was as good a place as any as it was effectively a pariah state with a roundly disliked Dictator but there were other more directly related targets. Problem is that our Foreign Policy in the region (and elsewhere) for many years has been directed at a course which made the course taken almost inevitable -- and the fact that so few options were available is an indication of major errors in foreign policy as well as military policy.
The more salient fact that four Presidents over the period 1979-2001 failed to properly respond to a series of provocations and probes from the Middle East which almost certainly led us to 2001 and later should not be forgotten...I totally agree. Very much so. I'd also suggest that employing a sledgehammer in building is not a common thing for a good reason.I am willing to be convinced, but breaking things is easy; building things is hard, and it is in the building that the world gets shaped.
Here's what the Wiki says about sledgehammers: "Sledgehammers are often used in construction work, for breaking through drywall or masonry walls. Sledgehammers are also used when substantial force is necessary to dislodge a trapped object (often in farm or oil field work), or for fracturing stone or concrete." Not a good tool for building; better one of these; LINK.
The GPF is a sledgehammer. It should be used for its designed purpose -- to break things -- you can use it for other things to be sure but it will not be nearly as effective as the proper tool.
Building things take time and preparation, it helps to use the right tools -- and those are intelligence, diplomacy and properly applied foreign aid plus a little very low key police and / or military assistance -- with emphasis on the low key. Once you expand the military presence, you're creating targets (everyone loves to snipe at the 800 pound Gorilla); you're usually creating a need for further commitment and you are undertaking an effort that will almost certainly be time consuming, expensive in many terms and with an uncertain end state almost guaranteed.
So I again ask -- why would you do that mindlessly without even investigating other options?
The answer is, of course that our previous decisions both on diplomacy and force structure put us where we were in 2001. We now have an opportunity to be bit smarter and, I believe, an obligation to be a bit tougher. Domestically and overseas. We can and should nip a lot of this stuff in the bud and forestall any more Afghan or Iraq like commitments which are generally not worth the costs. Perhaps really never worth them. We certainly need to be prepared to do them but we equally certainly should do our level best to avoid them. Whether we will or not, I can't say. Your generation needs to work on that...
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