New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

[jcustis]

POP-COIN reasons that killing the enemy means killing the population - which is essentially assuming folks are stupid and changing the means to account for it.

No Wilf, you have it all wrong on this statement.

If you spend all your time trying to kill the enemy, you stand to lose sight of many things concerning the population, like whether or not the enemy is slipping into his villages and towns at night to deliver mischief and mayhem.

We should do our best to avoid killing civilians...and that's about the gist of it. You talk a lot about concepts and ideas standing up to rigor. Please show the council where anyone advocating a effort that focuses on the population (or even just looks to pay attention to the population), actually said that killing the enemy mens kills the population.

That is not an equation I have seen anyone make.

[Fuchs]

I think he aimed at the accidental guerrilla aspect that insurgents are a part of the population and linked to it.

[William F. Owen]

No Wilf, you have it all wrong on this statement.

If you spend all your time trying to kill the enemy, you stand to lose sight of many things concerning the population, like whether or not the enemy is slipping into his villages and towns at night to deliver mischief and mayhem

.
How does any intelligent application of force against the enemy, allow them to freely move in and out of villages? That is precisely what focussing on the enemy would aim to prevent. 1st Core Function is FIND.

We should do our best to avoid killing civilians...and that's about the gist of it. You talk a lot about concepts and ideas standing up to rigor. Please show the council where anyone advocating a effort that focuses on the population (or even just looks to pay attention to the population), actually said that killing the enemy mens kills the population.

I have long said that the application of force should be intelligently applied. - EG - not killing civilians. The New ROE for A'STAN explicitly talk about restricting the use of force to prevent civilian casualties, as part of POP CENTRIC COIN do they not.

My reasoning is same, if not tighter ROE, should be applied as part of going after the enemy.

Now COMISAF COIN Guidance states claims 8 years of successful kinetic actions have made the problem worse. Essentially in that killing the enemy alienates the population. So does that mean the population all support the Taliban and don't like seeing them get killed or does it mean that negligent use of fire power risks killing the population?

In fact the document explicitly states that large operations risk killing civilians.

To logically extrapolate from the COMISAF, it basically says that you can't kill the Taliban because it will make them want to kill you. This logic does not seem to extend to what happens when you have to kill them, when they try and attack the civilians you are trying to protect.

[Ursus horribilis toklat]

I suggest COMISAF's guidance for COIN is a good example of tight writing and appropriate use of vignettes to drive home a point. Alarmingly the current trend in draft revisions of Army doctrinal manuals is not to include such vignettes (see the posts on Army Doctrine Reengineering on the TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference thread). As you well know by now I think this is a mistake. In writing doctrine we should follow GEN McC's lead rather than sacrificing the inclusion of any historical perspective in doctrinal manuals on the altar of brevity (as we are apparently about to do).

[h2harris]

A possible addition to the discussion would be Peter Hopkirk's "The Great Game - The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia". It is the story of a small military force controlling a sub continent with northern extensions. It can be said that the English having practiced on the tribal peoples of Scotland, Ireland and Wales decided to turn to the sub continent of India.

From Hopkirk's "Prologue"

"If this narrative tells us nothing else, it at least shows that not much has changed in the last hundred years. The storming of embassies by frenzied mobs, the murder of diplomats and the dispatch of warships to the Persian Gulf..."

"Had the Russians in December 1979 remembered Britain's unhappy experiences in Afghanistan in 1842... then they may not have fallen into the same terrible trap.."

"The Afghans, Moscow found too late, were an unbeatable foe. Not only had they lost none of their formidable fighting ability, especially in terrain of their own choosing, but they were quick to embrace the latest techniques of warfare..." "...their modern counterparts the heat-seeking Stinger, which proved so lethal againist Russian helicopter-gunships"

[Michael C]

The issue in population-centric COIN versus anything else, or even just itself as a term is percentage of operations. At its core, in irregular or counter-insurgency warfare there are different types of missions. On one hand you can conduct actions against the enemy, counter-force. On the other, you can conduct security operations to prevent the enemy, or insurgent from influencing the population either through persuasion or coercion. The key is that they are not the same mission. Logistics, intelligence, information operations, governance development, and economic/infrastructure development.

That being said, the US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq were primarily conducting counter-force operations. You are right Wilf, we were not very effective and we caused civilian casualties. However, the solution is not better counter-force operations it is more security patrols. Security leads to every other aspect of COIN. And, yes they mix up so improved security leads to improved governance which creates better security. There is no simple if this then that, but changing the bulk of our patrols will lead to a more empowered government.

[MikeF]

There is no simple if this then that, but changing the bulk of our patrols will lead to a more empowered government.

Maybe it will; maybe it won't. Empowered, better governance is up to the host nation. We can secure areas, build infrastructure, advise the government and military apparatus forever, but in the end, it is up to the populace and governing bodies to determine how they are going to live. I believe that this never-ending tactical debate on kinetic versus non-kinetic actions in war distracts our thinking on the real debate.

I would suggest, as currently constructed, a population-centric COIN model applied to the coalition efforts in Afghanistan may allow the Governent of Afghanistan to secure large portions of territory. That is it. It will not solve the illiteracy problem, the unemployment problem, the drug problem, the ethnic divisions, nor will it end radical Islamic terrorism. So, what should we be doing? This answer is something that has been perculating for a while...Maybe this thread is a good place to explore.

I think we need to relook our assumptions. Here's some that I've started.

1. We don't do COIN outside US borders. Ken White restated this again earlier this morning, but it is true. COIN is something that a Host Nation (HN) does. When we conduct operations inside someone elses borders, we are playing the role of a partisan force or International Community. Some examples of intervention include:

A. Occupation. We take over. Germany and Japan after WWII.
B. Security Force Assistance. Combination of military and political ASSISTANCE throughout the world. (Phillipines, Colombia).
C. Peace-keeping. Bosnia/Kosovo.
D. Regime Change (For lack of a better term.) Iraq (2003), Afghanistan (2001).

2. The military is best equipped to conduct security operations. We have several approaches to accompish security. It appears that a combination is currently being used in Afghanistan.

A. Mentoring. Typical MiTT teams. Small groups of advisors focus on training military staffs.
B. Advice/Assist. Traditional Foreign Internal Defense. Small groups of advisors work directly with a larger combat unit.
C. Partnering. GPF forces pair up with HN companies on a 1:1 or 1:2 ratio.
D. Unilateral. We do it ourselves, and hope that the HN military catches up.


3. There are other alternatives to nation/state-building than military options.

A. One understudied approach is the use of non-state actors to tackle non-state symptoms. Greg Mortenson's work in building schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan is a great example of a social entrepeneur creating real progress WITHOUT security.

B. Another approach is soft-power or indirect approach. Plan Colombia is a great example where State Department leads the effort to assist the government with a small military presence as advisors.

Long post, but a culmination of my thoughts for the week. Looking foward to hearing others comments/criticisms.

v/r

Mike

[Tom Odom]

1. We don't do COIN outside US borders. Ken White restated this again earlier this morning, but it is true. COIN is something that a Host Nation (HN) does. When we conduct operations inside someone elses borders, we are playing the role of a partisan force or International Community. Some examples of intervention include:

True but we support COIN ops by those host nations as part of FID, SFA or whatever we call it.

Tom

[MikeF]

True but we support COIN ops by those host nations as part of FID, SFA or whatever we call it. Tom

Tom,

You aptly described what we are doing (Oxford and Princeton version),; I am attempting to reframe the conversation towards what should we be doing not monday-morning quarterback the boys on the ground.

I am simply trying to shift this debate from tactical towards strategic and policy. If I was a commander on the ground in Afghanistan right now, I would follow McChrystal's words verbatem.

There is simply a huge gap between clear and build, between COIN theory and nation-building. If anything, your time in Africa can attest to that.

Overall, my thoughts are the tactical debate (Nagl v/s Gentile, kinetic v/s non-kinetic, those that get "it" v/s those that don't) is irrelevant in the strategic sphere of transnational terrorism, limitations of democratization, and constraints of globalization coupled in the age old mantras of tribes, ethnicity, and religion.

I wish I had simple answers. I do not.


v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Overall, my thoughts are the tactical debate (Nagl v/s Gentile, kinetic v/s non-kinetic, those that get "it" v/s those that don't) is irrelevant in the strategic sphere of transnational terrorism, limitations of democratization, and constraints of globalization coupled in the age old mantras of tribes, ethnicity, and religion.

I wish I had simple answers. I do not.

OK, all good points, but what do you mean "Strategic?" Strategy and policy are not the same things. Tactics (Operations?) is how you apply strategy. Strategy should set forth the policy.

The Policy in Iraq/A'Stan is to force Pro-US Governments upon the population of each nation. Anti-US Governments are unacceptable.
That, simply stated is the aim. In this case, the "Strategy" is how you use specific actions and effects (Tactics) to make that happen. That may include violent (military) and non-violent (diplomacy) means. Military means require the use or the threatened use of force.

Overall my thoughts are that the COIN/FID/Peacekeeping debate is irrelevant in that it always manages to frame the problem, and thus solution, in the terms the observer finds most appealing to their political inclination and not in terms of what the evidence suggests.

The issue you are trying to force in irregular warfare is almost always that the irregulars (insurgents?) cannot win by violent means. They must surrender/disband and/or negotiate a settlement beneficial to you, the Government. Unless the enemy is being convinced of that, all else is frankly rubbish.

What ever you want to call it, the reason the US Armed Forces are in Iraq and A'Stan is there is a need to conduct warfare. Warfare requires will and skill, regardless of the type being conducted. Any policy or idea that detracts from that simple truth is extremely risky and historically likely to fail.

[William F. Owen]

On one hand you can conduct actions against the enemy, counter-force. On the other, you can conduct security operations to prevent the enemy, or insurgent from influencing the population either through persuasion or coercion.

....and there's the rub. How many platoons or squads do you want to put in how many villages? 24 Hour security requires 2-3 shifts. What size of population is worth a platoon? Do you protect every compound?
Are you being successful if the Taliban can only kill 30 civilians a month?
The real problem with the "POP-COIN" approach is that you are making a promise you can't keep. The Taliban can far more easily keep their promise to go on killing he infidels.
You require massive logistic support for those operations, there is the risk that the Taliban roam free interdicting your supply routes. More over the static security approach does defeat the Taliban. They merely go on existing.

That being said, the US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq were primarily conducting counter-force operations. You are right Wilf, we were not very effective and we caused civilian casualties. However, the solution is not better counter-force operations it is more security patrols. Security leads to every other aspect of COIN.

Sorry, I disagree. Patrolling is an aid to fixing the enemy. It reduces their freedom of action. Yes, security operations are vital, but not to the degree where the enemy has less to fear.
The solution is better "counter-force" operations. That requires a solid approach to ENDS, WAYS and MEANS. US Forces should be better trained, better commanded and better equipped than the Taliban. Security is always traded against Activity, and it is very time dependent.
Intelligence is the key. All efforts should be harnessed in that direction. Nothing here is new. The entire first chapter of Callwell's Small Wars devotes an entire chapter to it. Kitson talks about it at great length. In fact, if you wanted to drift out on another definition of "Irregular Warfare," then the primacy of tactical intelligence would be a not all-wrong start.
So, given that you can successfully and consistently locate the enemy and or predict his activity, why would you not harness that towards killing/capturing him?

Another sad fact that POP-COIN refuses to recognise is that Afghan civilian deaths are almost entirely politically irrelevant. US/UK deaths are vastly more politically significant in terms of sustaining the political will to remain committed.

[Fuchs]

....and there's the rub. How many platoons or squads do you want to put in how many villages? 24 Hour security requires 2-3 shifts. What size of population is worth a platoon? Do you protect every compound? Are you being successful if the Taliban can only kill 30 civilians a month? The real problem with the "POP-COIN" approach is that you are making a promise you can't keep. The Taliban can far more easily keep their promise to go on killing he infidels.

I keep telling that to people for maybe two years now.

My interpretation of the whole affair is that the "establish security" crowd thinks of magic, for there's a huge black box in their reasoning.

Problem - black box - security established

It's the old rule; those who attempt to defend everything defend nothing. Old Frederick already knew that 250 years ago, why is it so difficult to grasp today? Ego?

The Spanish cannot prevent bomb strikes of ETA in their own country for decades. How should that work in Afghanistan? What's the troopsopulation ratio? One soldier who leaves the fortified bases per village?

ISAF will never manage to do the equivalent of the police of Naples providing a witness-protection programme for the whole population of Southern Italy.

Maybe the problem is simply that ego prevents people from accepting their lack of power, so they adopt an illusion and follow a route that at least promises them to be powerful enough to handle their problem.