All Clausewitz and Jomini is rooted in Napoleonic warfare. Good stuff both, but products of the era all the same. The trick is to ferret out the enduring principles and to ID what is colored the most heavily by the Westphalian system of governance it occurred within, and the European culture as well.

Also, all violence is not warfare; just as all warfare is not violent. To over simplify in the wrong areas is dangerous, not so much in others. This is a dangerous area as it can shape bad strategy, which is far more dangerous than bad tactics (for a nation, not necessarily the poor infantryman on point). There are broad categories, and sliding scales of violence within each. When does dissatisfaction become insurrection, and when does insurrection become insurgency...more importantly, do such distinctions even matter to divining and applying effective strategy (which should span all three).

Similarly, when does competition between states become rivalry, and when does rivalry become warfare, and again, as to strategy, does where you are on the scale really matter?

We tend to focus on what is in front of our face, and assess it as colored by what we know and or have experienced. Quite natural. As a strategist I believe one must be able to look beyond what is in front of their face, and similarly be able to step back from what they know to consider what others know as well. I haven't met many strategic thinkers, as like leadership, it is a talent that can be trained, but no amount of training will create it where no talent exists.

Westerners are particularly blind to perspectives of others. Look at the definition we apply to "Failed and Failing" states. We define the Westphalian system; designed by Europeans for Europeans and then exported around the globe through colonialism; and then use those criteria to call any populace that dares to reject, or simply cannot make work, that system within the borders those same colonials drew for them, to be "failed." Pure arrogance.