New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

[William F. Owen]

Addressing those grievances may not eliminate the insurgency, but it can dramatically reduce the appeal of the insurgency to the populace, reducing recruitment and increasing defections.

That is all true. It is certainly relevant to the early days of Ulster, but it in no way detracts from the efficacy using force to convince the armed opponent/insurgent that he can gain nothing by using violence to gain his political objective.

... and has slowly slipped since then (largely because Hamas governance hasn't been much better, although here it could also be argued that IDF military action has had some effect).

Combine that with the fact that Hezbollah's standing in the Southern Lebanon is dropping, and it may be filtering through into the Arab and Palestinian consciousness that violence against Israel cannot bring about their desired political objectives. I think the Tamils may be coming to the same conclusion.

[William F. Owen]

Though I disagree with the backhanded slap at Clausewitz, Bob because passion, reason, and chance and the fact that war [all war] is a true chameleon is still applicable - he was not advocating how to fight using Napolenic warfare but like Sun Tzu (and I am convinced he read the 1789 French translation of the the great Master Sun) he admonishes us to understand the nature and character of the war, but I digress).

Can't argue with any of that, but Carl read Sun? Really? Any proof, or just a hunch. Sun-Tzu wrote about Strategy rather than just War. CvC only wrote about the use of armed force.

[jcustis]

Now COMISAF COIN Guidance states claims 8 years of successful kinetic actions have made the problem worse. Essentially in that killing the enemy alienates the population. So does that mean the population all support the Taliban and don't like seeing them get killed or does it mean that negligent use of fire power risks killing the population?

In fact the document explicitly states that large operations risk killing civilians.

The document also clearly states, in the third paragraph, that we will not win simply by killing insurgents.

Wilf, are you arguing that the so-called pop-centric COIN is less likely to utilize force?

I've taken it to mean that you can't rely on force alone, and that you have to get good at applying a whole range of TTPs in order to present more options, thus allowing you to focus on the population at the same time that you are continuing to target the knuckleheads. And there is nothing at all in the tactics of FID, SA, COIN, whatever, that says you have to put all of your eggs in one basket. That wasn't done when we got sharper in Iraq, and it need not be done in Afghanistan either. That's why we can employ CA as economy of force operations of a sort.

And with respect to villages and things that go bump in the night, if you are tucked in your FOB and COP and distant from the population, you can try to target the BGs and chase them all you want, but you still have to be connected to the people, in whatever massed areas they are (and the roaming Bedouin-types too). This is for the aspect of FIND, as well as anything else.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, are you arguing that the so-called POP-COIN is less likely to utilize force?

I've taken it to mean that you can't rely on force alone, and that you have to get good at applying a whole range of TTPs in order to present options, thus allowing you to focus on the population at the same time that you are continuing to target the knuckleheads.

I'm not arguing anything on behalf of POP-COIN. I am arguing that you need to go an hunt, harass, make life miserable for the bad guys, and only the bad guys Bad guys are only those trying to kill you or kill civilians.

And with respect to villages and things that go bump in the night, if you are tucked in your FOB and COP and distant from the population, you can try to target the BGs and chase them all you want, but you still have to be connected to the people, in whatever massed areas they are (and the roaming Bedouin-types too). This is for the aspect of FIND, as well as anything else.

Concur. Lots of Ambushes, lots of OPs. Lots of informer networks within the population. Find any excuse to visit villages and chat a bit to the locals. All good stuff.

The paradigm I'd want to establish is that ISAF never do any harm, to good people. The only people harming the good people are the Taliban. The people harming the Taliban are ISAF.
I don't want to promise the People I'll protect them from the Taliban (because I cannot). I will promise to avenge any deaths the Taliban cause (because I can) - and the Pashtun understand vengeance.

[Rex Brynen]

Combine that with the fact that Hezbollah's standing in the Southern Lebanon is dropping

I'm not so certain--the Amal-Hizbullah bloc received an average of 88% of the vote in the Biqa and south Lebanon in the June elections.

[William F. Owen]

I'm not so certain--the Amal-Hizbullah bloc received an average of 88% of the vote in the Biqa and south Lebanon in the June elections.

...and the Southern Lebanon as a whole? My information is that while they are still the majority, support has dropped, to less than what it was. They certainly didn't do so well at the national level.

[Bob's World]

I'm not arguing anything on behalf of POP-COIN. I am arguing that you need to go an hunt, harass, make life miserable for the bad guys, and only the bad guys Bad guys are only those trying to kill you or kill civilians.


Concur. Lots of Ambushes, lots of OPs. Lots of informer networks within the population. Find any excuse to visit villages and chat a bit to the locals. All good stuff.

The paradigm I'd want to establish is that ISAF never do any harm, to good people. The only people harming the good people are the Taliban. The people harming the Taliban are ISAF.
I don't want to promise the People I'll protect them from the Taliban (because I cannot). I will promise to avenge any deaths the Taliban cause (because I can) - and the Pashtun understand vengeance.

... and this, of course is why strategy applied the past several years has produced strategic damage out of tactical success.

As I understand the Taliban (and I am no expert, so this is intended to be a very general assessment) they are essentially a Pashto nationalist movement that is made up largely of members of the the Pashto populace living on both sides of the Afg/Pak border; that employ a fundamentalist Islamic ideology to provide the motivation for their movement.

I really see no way one can attack members of the Pashto populace that associate with the Taliban without having extremely negative effects with the larger Pashto populace from which these men originate. The tribe may well agree with the cause the Americans are supporting, yet as we have killed their kin, and likely non-Taliban members of the tribe as well in collateral damage, we have alienated the tribe as a whole. The more we engage, the stronger the Taliban become, not because more buy into their ideology, but because more are either sucked into the blood feud, or simply agree that the outsiders must be driven out.

This leads me to say that we do not simply need new ISAF COIN tactics; but rather we need a new overall strategic approach.

Most are coming on line to agree that the Westphalian construct of what a state is, or is not, is evolving. Yet few are willing to adjust how they think about dealing with such challenges to the old view of sovereignty. To this I simply suggest: "Free your mind, and your ass will follow."

How about this: We all recognize how important the Pashto populace is to both Afghanistan and Pakistan; and all should recognize by now that targeting the insurgent segment of that Pashto populace is destabilizing to BOTH of those countries; and also to the Western countries involved in the effort. Why not simply seek a new form of lesser included sovereignty that recognizes new rights for the Pashto populace without ripping apart the two states in which they reside? A form of dual-citizenship coupled with unique rights and governmental organizations that give the tribes a voice in both states.

How would this work exactly? I have no idea, this is evolving strategy in an evolving environment. Free your mind. Trust your damn parachute and go out the door.

All I know for sure is that what we are currently doing is not working, and the slight tweak of tactics proposed by ISAF is too little too late. But it is not too late to make a major change of strategy. One of my leadership sayings probably applies here:

"While it is sometimes right to do the wrong thing, it is never wrong to do the right thing."

[Surferbeetle]

...is paved with?

This leads me to say that we do not simply need new ISAF COIN tactics; but rather we need a new overall strategic approach.

This strategy is not going to spring forth fully formed; none-the-less I see the new policy as an important step on this journey. If we accept that a sustainable solution is favored, and if we are able accept that sustainable is defined as the condition in which resources used are less than or equal to resources generated, then perhaps we can be effective partners in a regional solution.

Most are coming on line to agree that the Westphalian construct of what a state is, or is not, is evolving. Yet few are willing to adjust how they think about dealing with such challenges to the old view of sovereignty. To this I simply suggest: "Free your mind, and your ass will follow."

A form of dual-citizenship coupled with unique rights and governmental organizations that give the tribes a voice in both states.

I disagree here BW, dual-citizenship is definitely a Westphalian construct...we are back to states here...and the tax-lawyers are salivating.

A trip to the US-Mexico border might be instructive with respect to examples of commonly found clashes between strategy formulated elsewhere and operational & tactical realities found on the ground...

All I know for sure is that what we are currently doing is not working, and the slight tweak of tactics proposed by ISAF is too little too late. But it is not too late to make a major change of strategy.

Elections first, then perhaps some substantive discussions among Afghanistan, Turkey, Russia, Iran, India, Pakistan, EU, China, and the US....

[William F. Owen]

I really see no way one can attack members of the Pashto populace that associate with the Taliban without having extremely negative effects with the larger Pashto populace from which these men originate. The tribe may well agree with the cause the Americans are supporting, yet as we have killed their kin, and likely non-Taliban members of the tribe as well in collateral damage, we have alienated the tribe as a whole.

No one is talking about attacking the populace. No one is talking about killing the Non-Taliban. That is exactly what we will avoid doing. We are talking about only killing the people who are killing other people.
Basically, you suggest taking no action against the Taliban because the people they are trying to kill will hate us for trying to kill them? I wonder how do their victims feel about this?

Most are coming on line to agree that the Westphalian construct of what a state is, or is not, is evolving. Yet few are willing to adjust how they think about dealing with such challenges to the old view of sovereignty. To this I simply suggest: "Free your mind, and your ass will follow."

Sorry, but valid though observations about the treaty of Westphalia may be, we now have world composed entirely of nation states, working as competing or co-operating economic and political powers. You cannot undo that. We have to deal with how people are, not how we wish them to be.

How would this work exactly? I have no idea, this is evolving strategy in an evolving environment. Free your mind. Trust your damn parachute and go out the door.

There is no such thing as an evolving strategy. Strategy can only change if changes are made to the Policy and the means by which that policy is set forth. It can't free-wheel. Strategy is instrumental. It's like surgery or construction. It's not just something that somehow happens. No policy, no strategy.

[Surferbeetle]

...is a fluid event likened to a two way street...despite one's dreams of winner-take-all.

There is no such thing as an evolving strategy. Strategy can only change if changes are made to the Policy and the means by which that policy is set forth. It can't free-wheel. Strategy is instrumental. It's like surgery or construction. It's not just something that somehow happens. No policy, no strategy.

With respect to the construction analogy consider the impact of differing site conditions, change orders and contract modifications upon the strategy...you are still going for the structure, pipeline, or levee but tactical and operational realities have just intruded into that nice plan dreamed up in the air-conditioned office far from the sound of construction machinery.

Lets consider the changes to the strategies of US, British, German, and French states pre and post WWII for our war-centric topic...

[William F. Owen]

... and this, of course is why strategy applied the past several years has produced strategic damage out of tactical success.

I thought this worthy of a separate post, because this issue of Strategy is important.
The policy is to force a Pro-US Government in A'Stan. Correct?

The Taliban wish to overthrow that Government by violent means. - that is their policy. The means they choose (their strategy) is to kill Afghans and ISAF. Their strategy is enemy centric. It is the means they use to set forth the policy.

Has ISAF had tactical success, or has it simply conducted a lot of irrelevant tactical actions?
Unless tactical success is instrumental in setting forth the policy it is tactical action separated from Strategy.
ISAF Policy is to protect the Government. ISAF strategy should be to prevent the Taliban killing Afghans and ISAF.
I submit this means, at the most basic level, killing the people who are doing the killing. That means ISAF should not kill Afghans, trying to kill Taliban.
If anyone wants to suggest an alternative, I am very willing to swayed.

[William F. Owen]

With respect to the construction analogy consider the impact of differing site conditions, change orders and contract modifications upon the strategy...you are still going for the structure, pipeline, or levee but tactical and operational realities have just intruded into that nice plan dreamed up in the air-conditioned office far from the sound of construction machinery.

Sure, you have to alter how you do something, as the conditions change, or you yourself change them. My point is that Strategy is the link between the Policy and how you use tactics to achieve them. A strategy cannot have a life of it's own. It is instrumental. It can be both good and bad.

[Infanteer]

As I understand the Taliban (and I am no expert, so this is intended to be a very general assessment) they are essentially a Pashto nationalist movement that is made up largely of members of the the Pashto populace living on both sides of the Afg/Pak border; that employ a fundamentalist Islamic ideology to provide the motivation for their movement.

I really see no way one can attack members of the Pashto populace that associate with the Taliban without having extremely negative effects with the larger Pashto populace from which these men originate. The tribe may well agree with the cause the Americans are supporting, yet as we have killed their kin, and likely non-Taliban members of the tribe as well in collateral damage, we have alienated the tribe as a whole. The more we engage, the stronger the Taliban become, not because more buy into their ideology, but because more are either sucked into the blood feud, or simply agree that the outsiders must be driven out.

No one is talking about attacking the populace. No one is talking about killing the Non-Taliban. That is exactly what we will avoid doing. We are talking about only killing the people who are killing other people.
Basically, you suggest taking no action against the Taliban because the people they are trying to kill will hate us for trying to kill them? I wonder how do their victims feel about this?

Interesting discussion, and probably one that gets the heart of the matter.

I recall something similar with Iraq that Bing West discussed - American soldiers and their presence were assumed to have brought violence with insurgents which only led to escalation. Thus the solution was to keep, as much as possible, US soldiers away from Iraqis. US forces keep to the COPs with some patrolling, things spiral out of control, a new strategy with a "surge" and soldiers reassert their presence, and now things are much better (relative to before). Is it due to the increased activities of soldier amongst the populace or is it simply a matter of a society becoming exhausted by its own internal conflict? I don't know.

It can pretty much be assumed that the presence of a Western soldier in Afghanistan will trigger some sort of violent outcome with insurgents (and the locals as onlookers caught in the middle). Is this a bad thing or a good thing?

Bob's World discussed Pashtun tribalism - how does this, which at times seems to approach the ideal of the "Noble Savage", compete with a more base human instinct? How do these "culture specific" forces (ie: "You killed my cousin, thus I am honour bound to kill you!") play against a more general human force (ie: "I want to have grandkids")? I often try to imagine a situation going on in my own neighbourhood, bearing in mind that it will be slewed, to an extent, by my neighbourhood's own cultural perceptions:

1. I'm not going to appreciate rabble rousers in the neighbourhood and I am definitely not going to like armed foreigners. Whom do I dislike more?

2. I'm not going to want rabble rousers killed in the neighbourhood but I really don't want them pushing my family and friends around. Which will I tolerate less?

3. I'm really not going to be happy if my friends or relatives are killed as a result of armed foreigners but at the same time getting more killed really doesn't support a better future for my kids. Which action do I choose?

What makes sense - I dunno? But this argument seems to be a part of process informing COMISAF's new policy.

[PhilR]

I thought this worthy of a separate post, because this issue of Strategy is important.
The policy is to force a Pro-US Government in A'Stan. Correct?

The Taliban wish to overthrow that Government by violent means. - that is their policy. The means they choose (their strategy) is to kill Afghans and ISAF. Their strategy is enemy centric. It is the means they use to set forth the policy.

Has ISAF had tactical success, or has it simply conducted a lot of irrelevant tactical actions?
Unless tactical success is instrumental in setting forth the policy it is tactical action separated from Strategy.
ISAF Policy is to protect the Government. ISAF strategy should be to prevent the Taliban killing Afghans and ISAF.
I submit this means, at the most basic level, killing the people who are doing the killing. That means ISAF should not kill Afghans, trying to kill Taliban.
If anyone wants to suggest an alternative, I am very willing to swayed.

I believe this gets at the heart of the matter with FM 3-24, or "pop-centric" COIN, as its being described. I think that FM 3-24 describes a very specific COIN operational design to result in a specific political outcome. As Ken White and Col. Maxwell have described, we ARE NOT (or should not) be doing COIN in Afghanistan, but are supporting another government's COIN effort.

The ISAF guidance, however, clouds that fundamental fact by describing ISAF's direct responsibility to the Afghan people to both develop/influence a legitimate Afghan government for them, and to protect them from Taliban insurgents. It is emphasized to more work with the Afghan government, than through them. To do this assumes that we are developing an Afghan government that will eventually govern within the ethical framework of how we are conducting this campaign--that it will be "legitimate" in how we define legitimacy. I'm not sure we can dictate/influence this with any meaningful success. (The competing model currently seems to be how the Sri Lanakan government conducted its latest phase against the LTTE--an operational design that is not in keeping with FM 3-24 appraoch, but may better fit the ultimate political solution there).

In the end, we may establish a more secure environment and better trust between ISAF and the Afghan populace, but we might do it in such a way as to develop an Afghan government that is fundamentally unsustainable over the long run and will not survive once we draw down. We will have conducted a tactically successful campaign that ultimately does not, and cannot achieve its strategic objectives.

Semper Fi,
Col. Phil Ridderhof USMC

[Surferbeetle]

Sir, greatly appreciate your willingness to engage the issues. For whatever its worth, I don't post rank as I hope that any ideas which I may or may not advocate/discuss/examine will stand or fall based solely upon their merits/lack thereof.

I believe this gets at the heart of the matter with FM 3-24, or "pop-centric" COIN, as its being described. I think that FM 3-24 describes a very specific COIN operational design to result in a specific political outcome. As Ken White and Col. Maxwell have described, we ARE NOT (or should not) be doing COIN in Afghanistan, but are supporting another government's COIN effort.

My take: technically it's FID or advising, but COIN works from a marketing standpoint...coins generally have value, etc. FM 3-24, FM 3-24-2, some of the CA FM's (CAG? ones) are important steps along the journey...

The ISAF guidance, however, clouds that fundamental fact by describing ISAF's direct responsibility to the Afghan people to both develop/influence a legitimate Afghan government for them, and to protect them from Taliban insurgents. It is emphasized to more work with the Afghan government, than through them. To do this assumes that we are developing an Afghan government that will eventually govern within the ethical framework of how we are conducting this campaign--that it will be "legitimate" in how we define legitimacy. I'm not sure we can dictate/influence this with any meaningful success. (The competing model currently seems to be how the Sri Lanakan government conducted its latest phase against the LTTE--an operational design that is not in keeping with FM 3-24 appraoch, but may better fit the ultimate political solution there).

OIF1 vet, Michael Yon reader...no Afghanistan experience, non-Dari/Pashto speaker which admittedly hobbles any insights...however...given the history of Afghanistan the possibility of a spontaneous leap into 'functional nation state status' appears to be remote from this armchair without the 'benefit' of some sort of catalytic event...

In the end, we may establish a more secure environment and better trust between ISAF and the Afghan populace, but we might do it in such a way as to develop an Afghan government that is fundamentally unsustainable over the long run and will not survive once we draw down. We will have conducted a tactically successful campaign that ultimately does not, and cannot achieve its strategic objectives.

Concur...

[max161]

Can't argue with any of that, but Carl read Sun? Really? Any proof, or just a hunch. Sun-Tzu wrote about Strategy rather than just War. CvC only wrote about the use of armed force.

It is only my hunch but we know there was a 1789 French translation of the Sun Tzu and Clausewitz read French. But the best "evidence" I have to support my hunch is Michael Handel's work Masters of War in which he compares the major points of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu (and Jomini too). The similarities are striking when you read Handel's work and either the theories that Clausewitz wrote are timeless and self-evident or he was infleunced by the Sun Tzu.

Dave

[PhilR]

While it’s always a possibility, I’d offer that Clausewitz’s writings were more drawn from his interpretation of his experiences and history as he understood it. Peter Paret’s Clausewitz and the State (1976) is a useful biography that highlights this point. This is only foremost in my mind, because I only recently read the book. In looking not only at On War, but many of his other writings, Paret really reveals how Clausewitz zero’d in on the political underpinnings of every war. This is not simply in terms of policy, but that how any entity (usually as state, but not necessarily) goes to war and conducts war is a fundamental reflection of how their society is politically and culturally organized. Clausewitz’s thoughts and experiences are broader than just the phrase “Napoleonic Wars.” He realized that the true power of the French at that time was not in tactics or organization, but in how the fundamental changing of France to a nation that could tap the energies of the whole populace enabled it to wage total war against other European monarchies who still thought in terms of the limited wars.

Clausewitz could very well recognize the wisdom of Sun Tzu, but in all likelihood (and I can’t really speak for him), he’d assert that Sun Tzu’s tenets were applicable to the social and political makeup of China at the time he wrote it. Sun Tzu’s idea of avoiding bloody war, to win without fighting, reflected the tenuous hold Chinese kings/emperors had on their kingdoms. They could not bleed their kingdom dry, nor risk all on a long war. In this way, they were similar to the European wars of the 18th century before the French Revolution came on the scene.

Clausewitz actually focused much of his writings on politics. He understood that the concept of a nation in arms could express itself through a government and army, or through guerilla war without much account to an effective government or army (like Spain). In fact, as he became frustrated with the lack of reform in Prussia, he advocated the idea of the nation resisting through guerilla warfare.

All of this comes back around to the current discussion, because I believe it highlights how our own doctrine and “way of war” must be a reflection of our own political constitution and beliefs. In this light, population-centric COIN ala FM 3-24 is appropriate. However, FM 3-24 may not be the appropriate COIN strategy for the “host” governments and societies that we are aiding. By implementing 3-24 in a FID or SFA manner, its required that we and the host government have the same concept of what a legitimate and effective government is and that it will be the ultimate goal of the conflict.

s/f
Phil Ridderhof USMC

[slapout9]

Slap, I understand what you mean when you say the Gov't is the COG, but I also understand that you are a "Wardenphile", and that fits. I would categorize the Gov't more as both a CR and CV; and the Populace as the COG. One does not necessarily try to defeat the COG, but in these internal conflicts more aptly one is out to win the support of the COG. Every populace must have a Govt of some sort, so therefore it is a CR. Failure of Govt is what gives rise to insurgency, so therefore this CR is also a CV and must be "targeted" to fix the points of poor governance.

Highlights were done by me.

Bob, Yes I am a Wardenphile or a possible ASCOPEian and your description of SBW (Systems Based Warfare) is probably what he would recomend...you want to affect a change in a failing government to achieve a certain desired effect. And that does not necessarily have to be violent. If the government is the COG or Focal point and you are successful you win the population by default, however if you don't focus on fixing the government...... how would winning the population do you any good....unless you were trying to do UW or something similar???

[slapout9]

Phil Ridderhof USMC

Are you the same Phil R. that wrote this paper?
Sorta fits New Guidance if it is the first time you have read it
http://capmarine.com/cap/thesis.htm

[PhilR]

Are you the same Phil R. that wrote this paper?
Sorta fits New Guidance if it is the first time you have read it
http://capmarine.com/cap/thesis.htm

I wrote that as an undergraduate thesis in 1986. I gave a copy to a CAP vet in 1997 and he later uploaded it to the internet.
Its been some time ago, but I don't think I'm far off my present point, in one of the paper's concluding paragraphs, however:

"Combined Action worked at providing area security. It excelled at this. It did work at pacification and Vietnamization. Pacification could only occur if the population felt that the GVN was stronger and preferable than the VC. Successful Vietnamization of the war was the only way this shift of thought could happen. No matter how effective at combating the VC the CAPs were, the CAPs were still US run units and represented foreigners who would someday leave. Unless the GVN was able to survive without US troops, it would lose the war. Combined Action could have been a positive step towards preparing the GVN to survive alone, but the effort in that direction was not there. There is also evidence that with the GVN, all the effort in the world would not have worked."

s/f
Phil Ridderhof USMC