Looks like we have another contender a Marine LTC. Here is a link to the article through zenpundit. B/T to zenpundit....B/T is Beret Tip.
http://zenpundit.com/
Thanks guys for your helpful insights and examples. My thoughts aren't very well-formed on this, so please forgive me as a stumble along.
Assuming that anyone who agrees (or simply complies) to "take charge" also has an implicit or explicit mandate that "failure is not an option," - I wonder how one can ever determine if an effort is futile.
I would imagine, this is particularly problematic in conflicts where the objectives are not well-defined or easily definable (which seems like it will be the case throughout the world for the foreseeable future).
It seems like it might be easy, in such circumstances, for strategy to take a back seat to persistence and accumulation of action - by that, I just mean "doing more."
Whenever a force is not clearly controlling the battlespace, even if a decision is made to "dramatically" change strategy, it almost invariably leads to calls for more . More people. More resources. More activity. If things do happen to turn around, it becomes nearly impossible to determine what was attributable to the strategy, the activity, or just the volume of effort. If things don't turn around, then, predictably, it will be said that it is because we need more.
It reminds me of the research on "escalating commitment to failed courses of action."
It seems to me nearly inconceivable - understandably so - that a Nation involved in a war or intervening in an armed could ever say bluntly: "You know what, this isn't going to work." or "This is much harder and more complicated than we thought, and it won't be worth it." or "We admit it, this was a bad idea."
But it is certainly conceivable that a Nation could find itself in exactly such a position, and of course, some CDR who has dutifully saluted and agreed to take charge is on the hook.
In what circumstances might it be possible or advisable when facing a stalled or failing COA to dramatically re-define the outcomes - what it means to achieve "success" or to "win" - and call it a day rather than doing more in pursuit of ambiguously cast, potentially unachievable goals?
Randy Borum
Professor
College of Behavioral & Community Sciences
University of South Florida
Bio and Articles on SelectedWorks
Blog: Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict
Twitter: @ArmedConflict
Just one thought that I would add...
The division of powers into CinC and theater commander has not always been the norm. Don't hold me to this, but it may be a relatively new construct. I'm thinking Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Mao, etc. Was your question deliberately worded to address situations when the CinC and theater commander were two different people? I'm thinking that some leaders who wore both hats eventually came to the conclusion that things weren't working out and opted to cut their losses, though I can't think of specific instances, offhand.
Randy,If I remember I think General Patraus(cant spell) actually said that he did not know if the surge would work for sure but it was our best option. Similar to what Rob Thornton talked about. The military lays out the best COA available and the risk associated with it.
On a further note most of the questions you ask are taught in Colonel Warden's workshop SMART Wars, SMART Strategies. Most of the questions you ask would or should fall in the making the go to war decision. I think you can still order the workbook we used, you might find it pretty interesting but it is largely concerned with the national level decision followed by the military strategy to implement it. Not really at the theater commander level. But it gives a lot of insight into an alternative view of how these decisions could be made as opposed to how they are made. Not necessarily better mind you just different.
The following story may be apocryphal, but General Marshall supposedly, having lost patience with PM Winston Churchill's repeated attempts to divert Allied resources into the Balkans as a way of postponing D-Day, finally blew up when Churchill demanded an invasion of Crete and told Churchill to his face that "...no American boys are going to die on that goddamned island!".
Not quite the same as saying "Can't win, get out" of a war, though.
The Duke of Wellington told the cabinet during the War of 1812 that it would take Great Britain "fifty years" to reconquer the United States. They really didn't have "supreme commanders" back then but given the importance of the war against Napoleon at the time, Wellington was de facto calling the shots on strategic advice.
I think IF the General said "it's un-winnable" he should get sacked, and quick.
IF he said, he needed more resources, or that the Policy could not be set forth by the current strategy, then OK.
Of course some of this buys into the the limits of military power argument, but the same argument does not seem to worry the Taliban.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I guess I'm wondering if "needing more resources" is not always - or nearly always - the default response when executing a plan that doesn't seem to be working.
I didn't mean to get glitched in the discussion of the "theatre commander"-level specifically, but I have found helpful the reminders a number of you have made here about how such dilemmas are embedded within the broader civil-military decision making process.
Randy Borum
Professor
College of Behavioral & Community Sciences
University of South Florida
Bio and Articles on SelectedWorks
Blog: Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict
Twitter: @ArmedConflict
Bookmarks