Providing a tardy response to some of the previous posts as I can only access this blog after work:

-- I would define an effective police force as one that has some investigative capacity to solve major crimes and also attempts to protect rather than prey on the local population

-- the figure of 50 percent drug addiction among the ANP is a conservative estimate from a Royal Canadian Mounted Police trainer in Kandahar Province in 2008.

-- the International Community has been strongly opposed to the idea of tribal militia/civil defense because of bad decisions made in the 2001-2003 time frame (about arming warlords) and because the last attempt at forming Auxiliary Afghan National Police cadres in 2007 was a failure. The idea has again been resurrected in the pilot Afghan Public Protection Program in a couple of provinces. The Afghan Government in Kabul has also been ambivalent about the idea since it conflicts with the centralization perspective of Kabul. I can't recall any open source documents that closely examine this issue since the conventional wisdom is that security needs are best addressed by training more conventional/official GIRoA military and police units.

-- Another issue that doesn't get much media attention is the Taliban's shadow government structure in some regions that allows the Taliban to provide better justice services than the government. In reality, the population probably prefers informal tribal-based reconciliation but in many areas this has broken down or been overwhelmed by Taliban justice. In contrast, the government's Western-style justice system is non-existent except in major population centers and is corrupt, tardy, and ineffective.