Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
Yet that's irrelevant and was therefore not considered by me; such work does only provide hints and rumours, not evidence. The discussion was all about evidence.

I've got to disagree to some extent as well; it's usually possible to confirm true rumours in a few years' time.
Well, you are simply wrong on both counts. On the first, take, for instance, signal intercepts of Iraqi military personnel discussing WMD and, specifically, orders to ensure that facilities did not have any WMD before inspectors arrived. This intercept could be interpreted in two ways: 1) An effort to hide evidence of elicit activity or 2) an effort to ensure compliance and ensure there were no unforeseen surprises during the inspection. The interpretation depends on an analysis of other evidence and various contexts. Just a couple of examples: One context was the indisputable Iraqi efforts to deceive inspectors after the war in 1991, which led analysts to conclude the first interpretation was more likely. A second context was the unilateral destruction of weapons (done contrary to the cease-fire) which could not be independently verified. That also biased analysts toward the first interpretation.

Most of the information on Iraq's programs was similar in nature to that intercept in that it was ambiguous and could potentially support differing conclusions. That does not make that evidence mere "rumor" or "hints" that can simply be discarded. Ambiguous evidence is allowed in courtrooms around the world every single day.

Take another case - intelligence assessments of Iraq's nuclear program before the 1991 Gulf War which greatly underestimated Iraq's nuclear capabilities. There was evidence that Iraq was developing an advanced EMISS enrichment program, yet that evidence was misinterpreted or discounted. It turned out there was an advanced EMISS program, one that wasn't confirmed until inspectors got to the sites, saw it for themselves and, eventually, chased down all the documentation about it.

In that case, just like the failure on Iraqi WMD before OIF, there was sufficient evidence beforehand to make the right conclusion but the evidence was misinterpreted. Poor analysis and misinterpretation may be a sign of negligence or incompetence or an honest mistake, but it is not conclusively a sign of lying or deception.

The fact remains that most of the US and Western intelligence communities and national security policymakers thought Iraq retained weapons long before former VP Cheney entered the White House. The Bush WH intelligence conclusions were not substantially different from the Clinton WH conclusions (the exceptions being the bio and nuclear programs). The difference was policy. You should go back and read the op-eds of former Clinton officials prior to OIF. They did not, for the most part, dispute the intelligence conclusions - they disputed the Bush administration policy of going to war. Were those who believed the intelligence yet opposed the policy liars too?