COIN case: LRA Lords Resistance Army

[Michael F]

Well 2011 referendum seems a very long term target. 2010 elections could be a more archivable objective as LRA has no logistical support.
Also, despite percistent rumours of guns flying all over the place, there has been light hard evidence of Khartum involvement in it, even of the happening of such thing. The one I know is tanks flying from Kenya to Rumbek for GoSS. But still does not mean it does not exist. Bad people even say that it is GoSS that is arming the place to undermine coming referundum...

Also take in consideration coming DDR schedule in South Sudan. That will ease Kony job to come in and out South Sudan.

Other thing to take in account is that burning the land for food supply works when you have food coming. LRA favorite target always has been humanitarian programs. For the moment, WFP pockets are dry and donors are reluctant to fund, this is a secret for no one. according to FAO, the coming season is hunger...

I do not know about Kony meeting in CAR but in DRC, he was still capable to coordinate multy target attacks while his groups were splited all over the place.

Some interesting thoughts,indeed.
If i may add mine.

Khartoum has been providing weapons to multiple groups in Southern Sudan across history and according to unconfirmed sources, is currently increasing the weapon flow.
About the areas bordering CAR, there are many strong ethnic and commercial links between local pro-Karthoum Sudanese and CAR groups and so between them and the CAR rebels.

Is Karthoum directly dealing with the LRA in CAR ? still unproven. Is Karthoum arming sudanese and CAR rebells along this border and indirectly the LRA ? It's not proven. Actually, proving it is impossible..... the deniability is too easy.

I've got my own opinion (Katrhoum has the motives, the means and the recklessness to do it so why shouldn't they ???)

[Tom Odom]

They certainly have played a role whenever the opportunity to stick a needle in Museveni presents itself. They played a role arming the ex-FAR while they were still in the main camps outside Goma. I sent the serial numbers of various US munitions and weapons that we found on Iwawa Island in 1995. They had made the circuit from Saudi Arabia to Sudan and then into the weapons smuggling that was arranged via the Egyptians and the Sudanese. So it would surprise me in the least to see they were supporting the LRA with munitions and weapons.

Tom

[davidbfpo]

Taken from FP:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...truct_in_sudan

Foreign proxies are also up to no good. The notorious Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), originally from Uganda, has stepped up its attacks in South Sudan. Bashir has a long history of using the LRA as his cat's paw in exchange for weapons, money, and political support. And though it's too early to tell if he is doing so again, Khartoum certainly does have every incentive to use violence in an effort to derail the independence referendum -- or at least seize substantial chunks of territory (some of which is oil-laden) from a newly independent South.

Only a sub-story within a warning on Sudan splitting and the likely mayhem before and after.

davidbfpo

[M-A Lagrange]

There is one question I never had good answer to concerning LRA. When they were moved from Sudan to DRC, it is said it was without weaponery. The fact that they used mainly machettes in a first time, after failed attack during peace negociations, would go that way.
But now, they seems to have gain fire power again. Where they were in DRC is far from Khartoum roads for smuggling. And building an airstrip is not that easy.
I know FARDC are loose on keeping weapons in their hands but still.
Answering to that question would probably help in responding to the question what is their logistic support.

[Tom Odom]

There is one question I never had good answer to concerning LRA. When they were moved from Sudan to DRC, it is said it was without weaponery. The fact that they used mainly machettes in a first time, after failed attack during peace negociations, would go that way.
But now, they seems to have gain fire power again. Where they were in DRC is far from Khartoum roads for smuggling. And building an airstrip is not that easy.
I know FARDC are loose on keeping weapons in their hands but still.
Answering to that question would probably help in responding to the question what is their logistic support.

It is like the movie field of dreams:

If you have cash, the weapons will come

And someone in the FADRC will bring them...

[Michael F]

The LRA, off course, had weapons when they entered the Garamba in 2005. They just did not launch any attack for a long time.
"From mid-2005, when the LRA began to prepare for the
peace process that was to become the Juba talks, its fighters and high command moved towards the border of the DRC in Western Equatoria. On their way west, some of the fiercest fighting with the SPLA occurred in areas that had previously been untouched by the LRA, such as the road between Yei and Juba (BBC News, 2005). However, the LRA has denied that these attacks were carried out by their troops"

The Karthum supply actually must have stopped (temporarily) for logistical reasons while the LRA was in the Garamba. "While civilian and military interviewees say that Khartoum supplied equipment to the Ugandan rebels well into 2006, the LRA says that such supplies ceased long before then.36 Others have reported that supplies stopped in November 2005, when the LRA crossed into Garamba National Park in DRC."

The surge in firepower actually comes from a different "timing". The LRA, as a tactic, is used to leave arm caches in strategic areas. With the Karthum supplied weapons in the past, it was easy to build multiple caches in Southern Sudan and North Congo and to reuse those weapons as soon as they were hunted down.

I don't think they bought those weapons from the FARDC as the FARDC presence in the area was small during a long time and many other weapon salors were available (Mbororos, Equatorian, GoSS corrupt, Ituri militias,...). The LRA never worked with a lot of cash (they are out of the monetary system) and more by extorsion or support.

Quotes from the very interesting @small arms survey report@ http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files...%208%20LRA.pdf

[M-A Lagrange]

Some interresting developments are happening with our beloved Kony.
Populations in Sudan start to complain that the GoSS and UPDF are unable to protect them...
Seems that Kony has already won the psychological war.
That defenitively serves Khartoum, but looks more like an unattended side effect.

[carl]

Today's BBC story

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8243829.stm

stating that Ugandan troops are in the C.A.R. chasing the LRA and have been for month. Interesting in that the C.A.R. is rather a ways away from Uganda.

[Michael F]

New development:

THE army has captured another senior LRA commander in the on-going military push against the rebels in the DR Congo and the Central African Republic.

Mickman Opuk, who was close to LRA leader Joseph Kony, was captured from the jungles of the Central African Republic a fortnight ago as the joint military offensive pursued a group of rebels.

“We picked him like a grasshopper and he is intact,” said army spokesperson Lt. Col. Felix Kulayigye yesterday. “Our forces had been in hot pursuit of Kony’s group which he was part of.”

Four other LRA junior commanders have been killed and 98 abductees rescued since the army entered the Central Africa Republic to hunt down the rebels, Kulayigye added.

Opuk is one of the most notorious rebel commanders. According to the army, he participated in the 1995 Atiak massacre of over 200 civilians.

Asked when Opuk would be flown to Uganda, Kulayigye said he was being kept in the field to assist the joint forces with information.

“Slowly by slowly we are harvesting them. The fact that we have been allowed in the Central African Republic shows that Kony is not safe anywhere.”

He said the chief of defence forces of Uganda, the Central African Republic and Southern Sudan met in Kampala on Friday to review the progress of the anti-LRA operations.

Officials from the four affected countries met a month ago and agreed to allow Ugandan army units into the Central African Republic, Kulayigye told Reuters earlier.

“(Ugandan army) squads entered Central African Republic under the auspices of the joint security meeting.

“It was agreed that since Kony is a regional problem, he should be pursued into the Central African Republic.”
He, however, suspected that Kony was heading for Sudan's western Darfur region.

The joint military offensive was launched on December 15, 2008 after Kony refused to sign the final peace agreement.

The operation, codenamed Operation Lightning Thunder, involving ground troops and jet-fighters, pounded LRA bases in Garamba forest in eastern Congo, killing some rebels and sending others in disarray.

The UPDF withdrew from Congo at the end of March when the time-frame given by the Khartoum government elapsed.

It, however, maintained intelligence officers to help the Congolese army flush out the remaining rebels. The UPDF returned to the war-front when the rebels sneaked into the Central African Republic.


http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/694012

[Michael F]

Might sound crazy (600 miles from Uganda) but the guy is and :
* It's safe of SPLA, CAR, FARDC, UPDF forces (and US allies),
* The NCP is present in Southern Darfur and can provide a secure environement,
* The LRA forces may stay spread between Western Bahr El Ghazal, CAR and DRC (300 miles) while Kony is safe north in Darfur.
* There is little chance the NCP will hand Kony over to anyone.
* UNAMIS and UNAMID are not present in those regions.


LRA moving north - S. Sudan army official
Friday 18 September 2009 05:00. Printer-Friendly version Comments...

By Manyang Mayom
September 17, 2009 (JUBA) – Southern Sudan Military Intelligence have determined that the Lord’s Resistance Army leader is moving toward Chad, according to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Spokesperson Major General Kuol Diem Kuol. He further affirmed that the LRA has now become powerless.

LRA troops march towards an the assembly point in Owiny Ki Bul, 160km (100 miles) south of Juba, Sudan September 20, 2006 (Reuters)
Maj. Gen. Kuol announced this on Wednesday night, claiming that Joseph Kony and his deputy are moving toward Darfur and that an attack is expected in Western Bahr El Ghazal.
Over 80,000 people have fled from their homes in Western Equatoria and Central Equatoria this year, according to a report released this month by the World Health Organization. The LRA guerrillas are implicated in a recent wave of massacres and killings in DRC, Sudan and CAR, with upwards of 1,000 killed since December 2008.
Ugandan army forces are pursuing LRA in the Central African Republic, according to recent media reports.
Kuol noted that particularly in Tumburia County of Western Equatoria on September 11, 2009, SPLA military intelligence found fresh footprints of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from Central African Republic heading toward Raja County of Western Bahr-El-Ghazal state. "According to the intelligence we have, LRA leader Joseph Kony and his deputy Okot Ozimo, they are heading toward Darfur; some of his forces will remain in DRC and some of the troops’ lives have become difficult for Kony to operate in Southern Sudan."
He went on to insinuate that paramilitary forces aligned with the Government of Sudan would orchestrate a military action or threat that would allow Kony to escape: "For Mr. Kony to move away from South Sudan, the National Congress Party (NCP) in Darfur are now threatening our forces in the North of Raja County in such a places like Timza, Karita, and Kitkit … – there is a big threat that Murahileen militias are threatening our forces of SPLA and the objective of NCP behind this threat is to let Joseph Kony with his deputy move freely to reach Darfur and then to Chad without facing a military offensive."
"All our forces in Raja area… are now put on maximum alert," affirmed Kuol. "I want to make use of your Sudan Tribune media to inform our civilians not to be surprised by this notorious LRA attack," he concluded.

[M-A Lagrange]

As far as I know, this is not confirmed.
Does not mean it is false.
But what about what is going on in DRC?

[M-A Lagrange]

Ugandan rebels have reportedly killed about two dozen villagers in an attack in the Democratic Republic of Congo's troubled northeast Orientale Province.
On Tuesday, the AFP news agency quoted a local association as saying that the deadly attack was carried out on September 25th in an area where no Congolese military force is present. "The inhabitants were surprised in the morning by about 40 members of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from neighboring Uganda. Twenty-two people were killed with machetes and knives," said the chairman of the Dungu Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission, Father Benoit Kilalegu.
http://www.indymedia-letzebuerg.net/...2155&Itemid=28

Khony is may be no more in South Sudan but they’re still killing…

[M-A Lagrange]

I found that on the net. The figures are quiete impressive but could be real. Does someone have more details on it?

On 6 October, Uganda's Daily Monitor quoted Congolese officials reporting that some 3000 LRA soldiers, wearing new uniforms and carrying new weapons, have crossed from CAR into northern Congo and are now advancing towards Sudan. Father Benoit Kilalegu reported from Congo that the LRA attacked Digba on 25 September, killing 22 people with machetes.

http://www.assistnews.net/Stories/2009/s09100045.htm

I know Uganda's Daily monitor is not the best source and FARDC even worst. And the net source... But still, even 10 times less would be a major pb.

[Michael F]

http://petereichstaedt.blogspot.com/

After predicting more than a year ago that the now rebels-for-hire of the Lord's Resistance Army, led by their maniacal leader, Joseph Kony, eventually could be used against Darfur rebels, it appears to be coming a reality.

In a story published this Saturday in The Independent, and featuring the above photo by Reuters, Africa Correspondent Daniel Howden quotes a South Sudan military man as saying that LRA has entered South Darfur.

We have confirmed that the LRA are there and they have clashed with the local population

said Major-General Kuol Deim Kuol.

South Sudanese officials are prone to saying such things based on extremely flimsy evidence. They eagerly make statements that call attention to the nefarious and always duplicitous dealings of the Sudan government in Khartoum.

That said, South Sudan knows what it's talking about since the south battled Sudan for more than 20 years. They know well that Sudan loves to use proxy militias, such as the janjaweed, to fight its bloody battles against defenseless civilian populations.

The LRA fits the Sudan ideal since it specializes in attacking, mutilating, raping and destroying the softest of civilian targets, just as it has done for 20 years in northern Uganda and for the past three years in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, two of which were during the farcical peace talks in with Uganda, held in Juba, South Sudan.

While I remain skeptical that the LRA will be actively involved in what remains of the war in Darfur, I think the LRA is being positioned for that possibility by the Sudan government, which may again be arming and supplying the LRA.

The region south and west of Nyala, south Darfur's largest town, and extending into southeastern Chad, has been the province of Darfur rebel groups such as the Justice and Equality Movement. The JEM remains a strong threat to the Sudan government, having conducted the wild raid on Omdurman in February 2008, an attack that shocked Khartoum and revealed its glaring vulnerabilities.

With Kony's militia-for-hire in the area, Sudan has a perfect foil to conduct attacks on civilian targets in south Darfur and southeastern Chad, which is where Darfur rebels have found refuge for regrouping and resupply.

This will allow Sudan to tell the world that the war in Darfur is over, when in truth it is not.

My stronger sense is that Kony's move into the Darfur region is more for him to obtain the weaponry and supplies he will need for Sudan's likely efforts to disrupt the coming elections in South Sudan in 2010.

This will be a prelude to what could be an all-out civil war with horrendous civilian casualties as South Sudan moves to its independence vote in 2011, as called for in Sudan's 2005 peace agreement.

Sudan has used the LRA like this before, having given the LRA aid and comfort in South Sudan during the long 20-year war with Uganda. Sudan used the LRA also to fight south Sudan's army, which to the delight of Khartoum, made the region a veritable hell-on-earth where four armies fought: the LRA, the Ugandan army, the Sudan army and the South Sudan army.

Likewise, a consensus is growing that the recent fighting in the eastern South Sudan province of Jonglei is much more than bloody ethnic clashes over cows that it is portrayed to be. Rather, it is part of a calculated effort by the Sudan government to destabilize the region and prevent the development of the region's oil, which South Sudan needs desperately.

While this is speculative, it is based on well-established patterns by Sudan and the horrific history of the LRA. One can only hope that people like the U.S.'s envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration, is cognizant of all of this as he flies around the world trying to negotiate a "deal" with Sudan.

The sad reality is that while the world knows all too well the death and destruction that follows that LRA wherever it goes, nothing is being done about the LRA other than a lot of deep sighing and muttering.

As the numbers of dead and mutilated and raped continue to grow and as the LRA continues to grow increasingly malignant, those among the international community, such as the Dutch, the Danes, Scandinavians, and others who supplied the LRA from 2006 to 2008, saying that it was necessary for peace, should think again about the blood of innocent people that now covers their hands.

[M-A Lagrange]

Sorry, I did a bad manip. Was looking at something else. Can someone erase the previous post?
Thanks.

Concerning LRA: DRC is facing now a problem of copycat from LRA. This shows how bad this country has fallen down. People are crazy enought to use the LRA M.O.

Also, the Human Rights special envoy in DRC relieased a report (the one I cannot find and wanted to attach) which points out the incapacity of MONUC to do its job. As an example he points out that reports on Human Rights abuse by LRA from Feb/March 2008 are still not available.

Reality, harsh reality...

[carl]

I have two questions.

The first is, has anyone heard more about the UPDF ops against the LRA in the CAR?

Second, if the LRA is or will be in Darfur, how will the terrain there affect their operations and effectiveness? I have to read more but I am under the impression the LRA does most everything afoot. In that part of the world, everything seems to be done mounted, either on a Toyota or a horse.

[Michael F]

LRA kill five people in South Sudan’s Raja County
Friday 23 October 2009 02:30. Printer-Friendly version Comments...

By Manyang Mayom

October 22, 2009 (WAU) - The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) official spokesman Major General Kuol Deim Kuol, said five people were killed during an attack by Ugandan rebels on a village in Western Bahr-El-Ghazal State.


Joseph Kony, leader of the rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (AFP) On Saturday October 21, 2009, at around 11pm, Lord Resistant Army (LRA) rebels attacked a camp of Darfur Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) at the village of "Kor-Al-Madina" in Western Bahr-El-Ghazal State killing three elements of southern Sudan Police (SSP) and two civilians on the spot.

Kor-Al-Madina is a small village at 24 miles away from Raja County of Wau, the capital of Western Bahr-El-Ghazal state.

The LRA rebels runaway with three rifles belonging to the killed three policemen. They also abducted unspecific number of displaced people, Deim said. He pointed out that LRA is moving toward southeast of Raja county with abducted people.

This LRA attack had overwhelm civilian in this camps of Raja county, so when SPLA heard gunfire exchange between police and rebel, then our battalion of 333 rush to rescue the situation.

"The LRA is now heading with abducted people to southeast of Kor-Al-Madina toward the Sudan and the Central Republic of Congo border."

As it has become difficult for Joseph Kony rebels to operate in southern Sudan, since last September the SPLA s military intelligence found fresh footprints of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from Central African Republic heading toward Raja County of Western Bahr-El-Ghazal state. At the time the SPLA spokesperson said the Ugandan rebels are heading to Darfur.

"In September, we said that LRA is moving toward Darfur and might have links with Khartoum; this attack in Raja County has confirmed today that LRA is seriously moving to Darfur with backup from Sudan Arm Forces (SAF)," he said.

Raja commissioner Mr. Luwis Ramadan has also confirmed the report saying that three policemen and two civilian have been killed in the hottest attack by the LRA in Western Bahr-El-Ghazal State territory.

The Commissioner further added that on Wednesday attack the LRA has kidnapped about twenty one people and LRA rebel but he failed to determine the direction of the group saying they headed to unknown direction with the abducted people.

The Sudanese government denied SPLA claims that the leader of Uganda Lord Resistance Army (LRA) Joseph Kony relocated to the western region of Darfur.

Salah Gosh, the adviser to the Sudanese president and former director of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) said that the SPLA claim is untrue.

He said that the SPLA is resorting to "fabrications" and "political maneuvers" to "distort the image of the Sudanese army".

(ST)

[Michael F]

I have two questions.

The first is, has anyone heard more about the UPDF ops against the LRA in the CAR?

Second, if the LRA is or will be in Darfur, how will the terrain there affect their operations and effectiveness? I have to read more but I am under the impression the LRA does most everything afoot. In that part of the world, everything seems to be done mounted, either on a Toyota or a horse.

I'm not a specialist but i'll try to give answers that maybe will lead some "wiser" contributors to add their contribution.....

First, the UPDF has made some progress in CAR (where apparently their presence has been reported on several occasions) but the new operational environment, the presence of pro-Karthoum rogue groups,...surely will require the UPDF to get some adaptation time. The LRA is also known to refrain from attacking local populations when settling in an area (it's only after a certain time and under pressure that they will attack villages in the proximity of their CoG). So both the LRA and UPDF activities are going under the radar in CAR.

Second, the "LRA", IMO, is not in Darfur. Some advanced elements of the LRA are close to Darfur. The LRA CoG is in CAR. The region of Raja and Southern Darfur is geographically different from what we use to see on telly about Darfur. It's greener,...more Elephant grass/low forrest like in the Doruma area or Yambio area. The LRA troops there are so in a known tactical environment in what relates to forrest cover,... The LRA can move quite a distance on foot (50 Km a day).

Any additional thoughts ???????

[carl]

We have a lot of Ugandan guards here and i like to ask them about the LRA. One told me tonight that the UPDF has people continuously in the DRC, South Sudan and CAR gathering intel on the LRA. When they get a good location, UPDF forces are dispatched as a strike force to hit them. The biggest problem is, the guard says, that there are people in the UPDF who tip off the LRA because of tribal sympathies. The LRA is so foot mobile that they don't need much of a warning to be well out of the area when the strike force hits.

If true, I infer that UPDF units are not continuously on the trail of LRA groups. This is disappointing to me. I don't see how any info can stay good long enough to get a strike force there in time, especially given how fast the LRA can move. I was also surprised that tribal loyalty could play a part in this.

I don't know how much if any the guard said was true but that is what he told me.

[Michael F]

.... The biggest problem is, the guard says, that there are people in the UPDF who tip off the LRA because of tribal sympathies. The LRA is so foot mobile that they don't need much of a warning to be well out of the area when the strike force hits.

If true, I infer that UPDF units are not continuously on the trail of LRA groups. This is disappointing to me. I don't see how any info can stay good long enough to get a strike force there in time, especially given how fast the LRA can move. I was also surprised that tribal loyalty could play a part in this.

I don't know how much if any the guard said was true but that is what he told me.

This would be surprising to me.

Just imagine the UPDF is tipped off about the position of a group...
Where does this kind of info comes from ? Informants inside the LRA...doubtfull (because of Kony's paranoia), Witnesses...doubtfull as there is no communication network that would allow the info to be passed in a matter of a few minutes to the UPDF (CAR, GARAMBA and Southern Sudan are not "communication and IT" areas). Even so, it would take a 1 to 2 hours to move a UPDF strike force (even with their very few helicopters).
I guess INT collection is mostly done by tracking and scouting on the ground.
The same UPDF small units does both the INT collection and the strike action before the opportunity vanishes, i guess.

About sources inside the UPDF, it seems dubious. First, as explained above, with small search & destroy UPDF squads, the LRA can not have an informant in each one. Second, these sources would have little time to inform the LRA.

I do believe that exLRA troops are involved in the hunt against the LRA (In UPDF's 105th Bn). These know the LRA tactics, habits, acholli languageand the terrain better than most UPDF troops. They are perfect to track down their former kidnappers and most probably would not cooperate with them at all cost...but the very existence of this unit makes it an easy scapegoat if operations fails...("there was an acholli mole").

Only guessing...