Quote Originally Posted by tankersteve View Post
And I agree that we probably don't have any patience for real stealthy reconnaissance work.
I agree as well but do believe that's partly a poor quality training induced habit that can be corrected. That does not mean I think we will correct it...
One example that I remember...This was despite the fact that every tank had an IVIS and GPS. And this was back in the day of a 10-truck scout platoon and a 4 line company battalion.
That mirrors far more of my observations than I'd like. Distrust of subordinates due too rapid turnover and known marginal training leads to ad hoc solutions like that -- most of which have about an equal chance of producing bad results as not applying them in the first place.
But why don't we get it? Is it because real recon work is not readily quantifiable, compared to a tank gunnery? It is hard to train well, or even know if we are training it well, so why bother?
My belief is that you've nailed it. In trying to push tactical training in my Cav and Mech days, I continually pointed out that I'd seen very few if any US vehicles outperformed and destroyed by enemy gunnery but a bunch destroyed by poor US tactics.

Armor, Cavalry and Mech Infantry Gunnery and Maintenance are tremendously important -- to HRC. They provide concrete numbers, 'metrics,' to promotion and command slate boards. Congress continually pings DoD for 'unfairness' in promotions; Congress insists on 'objective' data (read: numbers -- no matter if they're flaky as long as they look good and can be backed up with 'data.). Thus those units who do gunnery and have OR Rates for something more than small arms and VS 17 panels are loved by HRC because the boards can have 'data.' Thus mounted units emphasize gunnery and maintenance over tactical training even though the latter is IMO more important to success and survival.

For the real Recon effort and for most infantry stuff, it's tactical application that counts and judging that in peacetime is -- and always will be -- subjective. A lot of people hate that, they are uncomfortable telling others they aren't competent based only on skills and knowledge with no hard numbers for backup -- it's easier to let the numbers be tha bad guy.

One of the designers of the ARTEP back in the early 70s told me that one goal was to eliminate having to do that, to force the unit commander to 'self assess.' This primarily to save senior officers the need to 'grade' subordinates or penalize them for failure but the sales rationale was to be 'making the Commander master of his own training.' Dumbbb with three 'b's...

I've seen half a dozen attempts to provide 'objective' analysis of training and tactical evolutions -- all simply traded macro subjectivity for micro subjectivity, all failed to convince anyone of note of their value.

Good Recon work is not hard to train but it is quite hard to evaluate (in that it is a lot of work to properly evaluate, it's not difficult to do it on a 'Go-No go' basis). It also entails trusting low ranking people doing things when and where they cannot be properly supervised. It is more risky than traveling in large armored herds...

The patience factor also contributes, as does time and space -- bottom line is we do not do it well.
All these RSTA squadrons need to be revamped... 2/3ds of the RSTA squadron, with their tiny formations.
Totally agree; my sensing is that TOE was not well thought out. My Son was in one Sqn at Bragg and they had some major training and employment problems; it was getting sorted by the time they deployed but that showed other flaws.

I think the entire Recon and Surveillance (two separate functions requiring two different sets of training and concentration) functional area needs an in depth look.