Not to mention the armored force was wearing black berets in the 1960s...
Actually into the late 1970s. Ft Hood was a mish mash of mult-colored berets, multi-colored baseball caps, two or three shades of CAV stetsons, and ascots over the rainbow.

But to the point on CSAs: I watched 3 from fairly close range--across a desk briefing them--and from the perspective of one of 27,000 in the Pentagon. I also am privleged to call a former SMA a close friend. They are as Rob says in a very challenging environment; central to that environment is the challenge of information. A CSA is like a king in a castle with concentric rings of moats and walls around the throne. Those moats and walls are designed as much to isolate as they are to shield. The great CSAs learn quickly how to reach over the barriers and get the information they need. When they don't they make decisions skewed by their own or their "handlers" perspective. I see Shinseki's beret decision as one of those; once announced, he had to go through with it. I also see his testimony on numbers as an opposite case: he used his staff effectively to develop accurate numbers, rather than shoot from the hip.

Best
Tom