Winning the War in Afghanistan

[davidbfpo]

Via an IT security blogsite ( http://www.schneier.com/blog/ ) an article on terrorist havens in US strategy: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...src=newsletter The author Paul Pillar is ex-CIA.

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

Via an IT security blogsite ( http://www.schneier.com/blog/ ) an article on terrorist havens in US strategy: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...src=newsletter The author Paul Pillar is ex-CIA.

davidbfpo

Yep, good article. Like I said one of the capabilities of AQ is that it is Terrain Independent. At the Strategy level we have never dealt with that and figured out how to counter it. We can't go around and invade every country in the world just because they have a group that is operating there. Only one thing left to do.....hire some more PhD's and pay them a few million dolllars to study it for a few years

[davidbfpo]

Accoring to this odd article: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/...es-aid//print/ these warlords are offering their help against the Taliban. Rhetoric aside - is this a "quick fix" to the lack of Afghan troops i.e. ANA?

I can hear the critics already on relying once more on the warlords, let alone the Northern Alliance and it's human rights record. Plus the presentation aspect of non-Pashtuns campaigning in the south and east.

Could a re-mobilised "temporary ANA" deployed in the north, even around Kabul, enable ANA units re-deployment and enable R&R for those in the south? Not a "quick fix", but IMHO a good fix.

On reflection and assuming Karzai retains the presidency, which Dostum supported, could Karzai use that re-mobilisation himself and show NATO / ISAF that he can provide more ANA troops.(Note I am aware that the ANA is a mixture, but has a large core fom the North and few Pashtuns).

davidbfpo

[Old Eagle]

When we originally tried to develop a comprehensive and cohesive Ministry of Defense, one of the aims was to work the warlords out of job. Amb (then MG) Eikenberry was one of the major forces in this attempt. Recall that the 1990's success of the Taliban was due in large part to a de facto civil war among feuding warlords. Dostum himself was a large contributor to the destruction of Kabul and the surrounding areas. Returning to that model IMHO does not offer much chance of long term success. Thousands killed, millions of refugees. (Although there remains the populist argument that those killed and displaced are only little brown people.) There was and probably still is enough popular Afghan support to make some sort of civil government system work.

"I have not failed. I have discovered 10,000 ways that don't work."
Thomas Edison

[omarali50]

Empowering the warlords sounds like a very bad idea. The people who need to be empowered are the ANA. Seriously committing to training, arming and supporting the ANA is the way to go, but it doesnt look like there is any clarity about this in the US command (in fact, it increasingly looks like the US is flailing about without a strategy). Fixing Karzai's regime is the other priority. Even using less than perfect means to do so. But first you have to know what you want. I am having some doubts about this part and if those doubts are correct, that means everything else will fail. I hope to be proved wrong...

[tequila]

Agree with both Old Eagle and omarali that re-empowering the warlords is a terrible idea and probably unworkable at this point.

Empowering a Karzai government at this point, however, doesn't look a lot more feasible, unfortunately. The election's ugly results have, I fear, crippled its image in the international community, while the government's corruption and incompetence has wrecked much of its reputation amongst the Afghan population.

A runoff or new elections entirely are the best temporary route out of this morass, but Karzai's intransigence may lose us everything.

Combined, these factors are probably why the President is hesitating to commit to McChrystal's full COIN option --- COIN doesn't work if the host government is seen as illegitimate by the population.

[Steve the Planner]

I keep looking for some convincing way to punch holes in Rory Stewart's arguments, but I'm still waiting to hear it. Lots of ways, means, sub-ways, and sub-means.

Isn't targeting UBL a mission, not a war?

Steve

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01_.html