is Steve Coll and on the mark IMO.
Cheers
JohnT
A good review article by Steve Coll, on why Afghanistan is important: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...tml#entry-more
Grand Strategy no less: reduce AQ's threat and keep South Asia from war.In this war, we have two important interests: One is largely uncontroversial: The reduction of Al Qaeda to a nuisance or less. The second American interest in the war, however, is by some margin the more important and enduring one. Yet it is also a more complex subject...The United States has a deep interest in the emergence of a stable, modernizing, economically integrated, peaceful South Asia....Why does the Afghan war figure in this assessment today? The Taliban are a backward-looking threat to the near-term stability of South Asia—in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, and, as the Mumbai attacks demonstrated, occasionally in India..... these regional American interests at issue in the Afghan war are very powerful; to confirm this, consider the alternative of Pakistan’s failure at the Taliban’s hands.
davidbfpo
is Steve Coll and on the mark IMO.
Cheers
JohnT
Hi Carl, sorry for responding late. Once a parasite attach's itself to the host you have to get it off or the host will begin a slow decline or submit to regulation or control by the parasite. A very bad situation in nature with animals including people. If AQ becomes the regulator of the Talliban you can not save them by making them stronger.....you will end killing the host to get to the parasite.
Last edited by slapout9; 09-24-2009 at 12:00 AM. Reason: spell stuff
The thing that so many folks seem to overlook is that Pakistan is just one piece of the puzzle.
India, for itself, has direct reasons to actively engaged in the Taliban threat, as do other neighbors (China).
But Coll's pointing to India and other nations on the path to modernization highlights the fact that these movements were internally driven, and are inter-generational endeavors.
Steve
I'm sure they want to become more dangerous but the truth is they're becoming less dangerous.
Check the LINK. The boys in AQ are only number 30 on a list of terrorist organizations in India. The Assamese and the Communists do far more damage. The Mumbai attack was not AQ but another Muslim fundamentalist crew from Pakistan.
A somewhat tardy post related to Dr. Fishel's El Salvador comments:
In a 1988 visit to eastern El Salvador, I accompanied Ambassador Walker as a junior officer horse holder. In San Miguel, we heard 3d Brigade Commander Colonel Ponce tell us that he was more interested in protecting the population than killing guerrillas, and that he preferred turning a guerrilla to killing him. We saw this policy in action when we flew up to San Francisco Gotera, the capital of Morazan Department. Colonel Barrera, the Military Detachment Commander in Morazan, showed us a FMLN fighter who had surrendered to ESAF troops. Colonel Barrera told us that that the fighter had been a guest at the cuartel for a week and had been receiving food and shelter with no attempt at interrogation. They were waiting for the fighter to cooperate, something that they predicted would happen soon, given the good treatment and the fact that his ex-companeros were convinced that he had gone over to the other side.
It may be a somewhat simplistic formulation, but it seems to me that the ESAF COIN strategy evolved from killing the villagers whom they believed to support the guerrillas in the early 1980's, to chasing guerrillas during the middle 1980's, to considering the population as the center of gravity in the late 1980's.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 09-24-2009 at 11:44 AM. Reason: Copied to new thread on El Salvador and left here as discussion of topics is relevant
Of Ken's signs, I like this one (attached) - modified by some shooping artistry to show the order of magnitude difference between policy and strategy; and that policy can drive a diametrically opposed exit state from that suggested by the best strategy.
Where Steve Coll will end up with his series and his "yes or no" answer, I don't know. But, if we (US, and for that matter the various ISAF partners) are indeed considering the best policy; and, as a smaller part, a strategy for the Indian Ocean littorals; and, as a smaller part of that, a strategy for Astan, we should look to the map and the nations that have interests in that region.
I see at least a dozen regional powers on those littorals and the associated continental land masses - some are genuine global powers. I will agree with Coll that the US and the ISAF partners have "interests" in the Indian Ocean region. Labelling them "vital, deep, etc." is not especially helpful.
My take: The salient question is what are the relative interests of the countries we can see on the map - and the relative interests of those countries that do not appear on the map. To turn Marx on his head, from each according to his interests; to each according to his interests.
How do others here see the relative interests of the countries on the map - and the relative interests of those countries that do not appear on the map (e.g., the US and the ISAF partners) ?
Not only did the ESAF change over time but individuals did as well. I will be forever impressed and in awe of the American Ambassadors. the MILGP Commanders and those who worked for them, and, especially, the ESAF officers who with all their faults who fought a hard war, learned and changed and adjusted to peace.
Are there comparable military and civilian leaders in Afghanistan?
Cheers
JohnT
Last edited by davidbfpo; 09-24-2009 at 11:48 AM. Reason: Most text removed to El Salvador thread and this part left as discussion flows
Good point, the List of terrorist organisations in India. It illustrates the deficiency, if practice were applied to the rhetoric, of the term "GWOT".
As to AQ as a "nuisance", I suppose I agree based on a totally rational analysis from both the military and law enforcement standpoint. But, let us have one successful attack by AQ directly, or via an AQ-supported group, and the public perception will not regard "nuisance" as an appropriate term. I prefer the wording that AQ is a "threat".
Certainly, it is far from a threat to the nation's existence. By comparison, the US suffered over 113,000 accidental deaths in 2005. Those dwarfed the 9/11 totals. The folks' reactions to what is considered "normal" (accidental deaths) and what is considered "abnormal" (terrorist attacks) are quite different. And the folks' and their politicians' reactions are what drives policy.
Regards to all
Mike
And Ken, I missed your smiling persona for a few days. Thought I'd have to send out the St. Bernard (with brandy - yum, yum to me) or the Kentucky bloodhound (with I. W. Harper - also OK).
Not long ago, Steve (Surferbeetle) assigned me the task of looking at Astan governance and Rule of Law. As part of that task, I looked at a number of reports and assessments (most of which are pure agitprop, IMHO).
The Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) issued three assessment reports on the justice systems in four fairly secure provinces in 2007:
Assessment of the Justice Sector in Kunduz Province, Oct 2007 (37 pages)
The State of Regional Justice Systems in Balkh, Herat and Nangarhar, Dec 2006 (79 pages)
Assessment of Provincial Defense Capabilities, Sept 2007 (70 pages)
The reports (which primarily focused on criminal justice - judges, prosecutors & police) were bleak. Since then, the JSSP has not updated the assessments; although it has released a number of PR "shorts".
The criminal portion of a justice system is important; but in the long term, the civil portion of the system is more important because it directly or indirectly affects far more people. Astan's 4 provinces in their formal justice system in 2007 flunked the criminal justice tests; the civil justice system seemed non-existent in any formal sense.
The ability of the two sheep barterers to resolve the "defective sheep" issue, or the issue of which rock marks the property line, is but a minor blip in the geo-political issues which are the major foci of interest. The comment by GEN McChrystal that the Taliban have set up "Shadow Governments" is not encouraging. If the Taliban can provide acceptable justice to the little sheepherders and property owners, it will go a long way to preempt the role of the national government.
So, in answer to JTF's question:
Not in the four provinces studied by JSSP.Are there comparable military and civilian leaders in Afghanistan?
No cheers about this, but it seems to be factual.
Mike
Last edited by jmm99; 09-24-2009 at 02:36 AM.
Except the Taliban has never attacked an Indian target. Frankly I have my doubts about their responsibility for the Indian embassy bombing --- the Pak security services (through the Haqqanis, perhaps?) are my bet, and they, not the Taliban or the Afghan war, are the key barrier to Coll's vision IMO.John, David,take a look at all the attacks that he says AQ was resonsible for including the recent attack in India, that dosen't seem like an organization that is just a nusance. Seems like one that is becoming far more dangerous.
Coll's article is a bit Pollyannish for my liking. Yes, economic growth and modernization in India is a wonderful thing, and bringing millions out of poverty. But India is a huge place, and growth is very unevenly distributed even there. Growth alone cannot bring peace --- at its worst, it can sometimes harden sectarian and class lines if not equitably distributed. Witness the spread of the violent Naxalite movement in India's rural areas even as India has grown more prosperous.
A more prosperous and powerful India has the potential to bring South Asia forward --- it could also spark an ever more paranoid and militant response from Pakistan's military elites, already aware of the quite substantial gap between their own capability and India's. Moreover the conflicts Coll describes were accelerated and made more violent by the Cold War, and its end deflated them especially in Central and South America --- the India/Pakistan divide is entirely homegrown, and more deeply entrenched in the mindset of its elites. There is no equivalent in sight to the Berlin Wall coming down on the subcontinent, and there won't be as long as a significant wing of the Pakistani security services engages in spoiler attacks such as the Kargil War, the attack on the Indian parliament, the Mumbai attacks, etc.
India and elsewhere.
India was not attacked by Taliban, but it still has to concern itself with them---as they relate to the region in general and Pakistan in particular (not to mention Kashmir, and, perhaps some crazy Samarra-inspired attack on somewhere like Amritsar). Still, they have more immediate and domestic fish to fry, of which AQ is just one.
China has the more direct concerns with Afghanistan & the Taliban both to the South where the new China-financed port is going to be closely related to everything in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to the North where its border provinces abut Taliban areas (talk about formidable geography though).
As much as anything, the boundary disputes for India are with China, as shown on the Kashmir map.
http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/c...shmirprint.htm
The only Afghan leader with whom I had sufficient interaction to form any evidence-based opinions was the former governor of Kandahar Province, Assadullah Khalid. Although I am in the minority, I liked the guy and thought he turned in a creditable performance in an impossible job. He certainly was better than the two persons who have held the job since he was replaced (due to pressure from the international community).
Last edited by davidbfpo; 09-24-2009 at 11:47 AM. Reason: Edited down to Afghan comment and remainder on new El Salvador thread.
From June 24 Wall Street Journal (The China-India Border Brawl) re the constant squabbles over borders (including Kashmir) :
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124578881101543463.html"But what riles India most is China's incursion into its backyard and the belief China is surrounding the subcontinent with its "string of pearls" -- Chinese "investments" in naval bases, commercial ports and listening posts along the southern coast of Asia. There are port facilities in Bangladesh and radar and refueling stations in Burma. Thailand, Cambodia and Pakistan now all host Chinese "projects;" China's crown jewel is the Pakistani deepwater port of Gwadar."
And we think the only problems are in AfPak. As jmm notes, it is a big interconnected region. There are long-standing historical conflicts completely unrelated to immediate US interests in that region.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 09-24-2009 at 10:38 AM. Reason: Add quote marks
Sep 22 WSJ
India's Minister Urges Political Settlement in Afghanistan
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1253...&mod=sphere_wd
"If there are internal differences within Afghanistan I think the people of Afghanistan, the leaders of Afghanistan, will sort it out by themselves," Mr. Krishna said.
India is heavily invested in Afghanistan, particularly infrastructure projects such as roads, hospitals, schools and the new parliament building in Kabul. In all, Indian reconstruction aid totals $1.2 billion. Mr. Krishna said the investment was worth the risk despite the continued conflict.
"Afghanistan as a nation has to grow," he said. "They have come through a process of holding elections. Giving democracy a try, they have succeeded."
He downplayed the findings of electoral fraud, noting the U.S. election fracas in Florida in 2000. "It happens in every election, [that results are] questioned," Mr. Krishna said.
Mr. Krishna dismissed suggestions that India's growing involvement in Afghanistan is intended to encircle Pakistan, a fear prevalent in some circles in Pakistan. "I think that is a baseless allegation," he said.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 09-24-2009 at 10:38 AM. Reason: Add quote marks
Per Pepe Escabar
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