El Salvador war: postscripts

[John T. Fishel]

Not only did the ESAF change over time but individuals did as well. By the time I met COL (later Gen Ponce) in 87 he was very much a pop centric believer but he had not always been so. (My source for that is a very senior US diplomat in a postion to know.) Domingo Monterrosa, who commanded the Atlacatl BIRI during the massacre at El Mozote was, by the time the FMLN assasinated him with a bomb on his helicopter, very much a believer in a pop centric strategy. (That comes from COL John Waghelstein who commanded the MILGP in 83-84 as well as other sources.) Some leaders of the ESAF changed, some stayed as hard liners, and some began as and stayed as democrats. Much was due to the constant pressure from MILGP commanders and US Ambassadors reinforced by then VP Bush reading the riot act to the High Command. For me, the traumatic event that cemented the change in the ESAF was the coming to light of the murder of the Jesuits in 89 and the choice forced on Ponce and the rest of his Academy class, the Tandona. Prior to that event the hierarchy of loyalty among ESAF officers was Tanda first, Army second, and country third. The atrocity was oredered by a member of the Tandona which forced Ponce and his classmates (who held all the key position in the ESAF) to choose where their loyalty lay. To their everlasting credit, they inverted the old loyalty pyramid and supported the prosecution of their classmate. I will be forever impressed and in awe of the American Ambassadors - Deane Hinton, Tom Pickering, Ed Corr, and Bill Walker - the MILGP Commanders - John Waghelstein, Joe Stringham, Jim Steele, and John Ellerson - and those who worked for them, and, especialy, the ESAF officers - Rene Emilio Ponce, Mauricio Vargas, Rafael Bustillo, Campos Anaya, and others - with all their faults who fought a hard war, learned and changed and adjusted to peace.

Cheers

JohnT