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  1. #1
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    I need this article again, but my AKO is acting squirrely and I doubt I'll get to rectifying the problem easily. Could someone pinch a copy for me? I need to get this and some good commentary from another site out to the coy cmdrs.

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    There is a time and a place for surgical, precision and hi-intensity MOUT. I have freely transitioned between the three, sometimes on the same day doing all three, depending on METT-TC.

    While some units are enamored of "the one way" and hone their skills to be perfect at one skill set, I will settle for "good enough" at a wide range of skills which will allow the tactical flexibility to prosecute targets in a variety of ways.

    The ROE is usually THE definitive variable on what is allowed, which has the unintended effect of causing escalation with regards to a situation. If others find themselves in that situation, then the transition from precision (or surgical) MOUT to hi-intensity must be trained on or else they will quickly find themselves out of their depth when that situation arises.

    With regard to the enemy, here is a little personal vignette:
    We were doing some training with a LE SWAT team (a double booked range...what are the odds!) and we watched them, and they watched us. Eventually, we started to compete, as we are wont to do...
    Long story short, they attacked we defended (10 on 10) and we defended like we were taught. Concertina in the stairs, crew served covering the avenues of approach, etc. We won. Crew served weapons vs. SWAT = dead SWAT.
    They defended, we attacked. We attacked hi-intensity (using a borrowed M-113 as cover) and using "bait" to troll for shots... Again, we won.
    There was some good natured discussion afterwards (after a full day of fun, including one night iteration) which basically boiled down to "don't attack a well defended position with SWAT tactics"

    SWAT stuff is nifty and a very acceptable TTP IF certain other criteria are met. Simply doing it because that is the only thing you know is the wrong answer.

    -STS
    Last edited by sladethesniper; 09-27-2009 at 09:13 PM.

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    Default I'm not getting exactly ...

    what you are driving at with this:

    from STS
    The ROE is usually THE definitive variable on what is allowed, which has the unintended effect of causing escalation with regards to a situation. If others find themselves in that situation, then the transition from precision (or surgical) MOUT to hi-intensity must be trained on or else they will quickly find themselves out of their depth when that situation arises.
    Could you illustrate what you mean re: ROEs in the three intensity levels, transitions, etc. Draw me a word picture - like the SWAT vs INF vignette.

    Or attach a Powerpoint

    Best

    Mike

    PS: welcome to the shop.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by sladethesniper View Post
    There was some good natured discussion afterwards (after a full day of fun, including one night iteration) which basically boiled down to "don't attack a well defended position with SWAT tactics"

    SWAT stuff is nifty and a very acceptable TTP IF certain other criteria are met. Simply doing it because that is the only thing you know is the wrong answer.
    My understanding is that SWAT = Special Weapons and Tactics, was implicitly developed for the minimum use of force, so it is ROE dependant, and that was explicit in the original concept.

    The UK developed a "Red- Amber- Green," scale to define the use of force in the Urban environment. Red was basically LE-SWAT, and Green was "ceiling hits the floor," stuff.

    For sure, all the "Shoot house," stuff is basically garbage, against someone who knows you are coming.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Stay out of the house

    Citing Wilf:
    The UK developed a "Red- Amber- Green," scale to define the use of force in the Urban environment. Red was basically LE-SWAT, and Green was "ceiling hits the floor," stuff. For sure, all the "Shoot house," stuff is basically garbage, against someone who knows you are coming.
    Some years ago I asked our local SWAT equivalent what happens if the "bad guys" do not stay still i.e. in a premises and go mobile. There was a pained reaction and invocations of "Trust us, we know they will". Bearing in mind the 24/7 capability was six firearms officers, so I asked will front and rear entrances be covered? "Trust us, we practice a lot". I assume "bad guys" have learnt, "stay still, you lose".

    Then of course along came the Mumbai attack and all the comments worldwide on whether capability matched that risk.

    davidbfpo

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    Then of course along came the Mumbai attack and all the comments worldwide on whether capability matched that risk.
    ...and remember Hungerford?
    Mumbia was nothing new, but it does show how utterly un-prepared most folks are for existing and well-understood threats.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
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    If anyone could post a copy or send it to an official email address that I can supply, that would be great.

    We've been wrestling with this stuff as well. Our Infantry School - the COE for Urban Ops - focuses on "Badgers, Panthers, and Doves" and four man stacks. End result is a confusing array of lingo and overstacking which leads to big clusters of guys. Don't get me wrong - dominating urban spaces and knowing angles is awesome small unit stuff, but when you get guys off of an Urban Operations Instructor course with "Subject Matter Expert" status it can be hard to challenge their conceptions of what is tactically sound.

    We've managed to kill the petting zoo and really have to enforce rules on having more than 2 dudes in a small space.

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    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    I can't help with a copy Infanteer, as I am on the hunt as well, but I did want to share this quote from a poster on another board. I believe he was on Takur Ghar Mt. during Operation ANACONDA, fighting to recover SEAL Neil Roberts' body.

    Your Experience is right there and spot on, its just the verbage that was getting us all tripped up.

    I didn't want your comments to get wasted because a grunt in here read them and said "What is he talking about? TL's are absolutely supposed to lead from the front"...

    ...The GWOT might have brought up everyone's game, but we are stil talking about skill level one (active duty) soldiers. After an entire rotation deployed and a 9-12 months at home station prior to their next deployment, if they were worth a sh*t, shouldn't they be getting close to becoming a TL at that point?...

    ...Since we are all disucussing MOUT TTPs. I think that you were all taught that the key to a good assault is a successful breach. If the breach and the decisions made upon entering that breach are f**ked up, the whole assault is at risk of failure...

    ...And not to get too much into the specifics of our TTPs, but Battle drill 6A is a good way to lose a lot of guys for nothing.

    Going back to Sinisters comments about having tools and not know why they were created is an absolute truth.

    I see the hours and DAYs that GPF BCTs train on this trying to get this right and it hurts me.

    Those TTPs are designed to limit loss of life of non-combatants while RAPIDLY securing a target. The lives of the assaulting element come a distant second to the above mentioned factors.

    Now take your deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Is there ANYTHING in ANY house that you ever stepped foot into that is worth dying over?

    Short of the answer "an American Hostage", your answer should be negative.

    So why in the hell are you leading with flesh? stun grenades/flash bangs...blah blah blah.

    If you are in a BCT you and I both know you don't have the assets to lead into every room with a stun grenade.

    I have literally observed THOUSANDS of entries by various units in the GWOT and the reality is that lack of munitions and a false sense of security lead to more humans going through doors than dogs, bangers, or anything else.

    So what is so important in these houses that you are unwilling to set containment and sort that sh*t out from the outside??????????????

    Callout is the future in OIF/OEF. Partner forces are the future in these places too. A house must always be cleared with boots on the ground, that does not mean that it needs to be YOU or YOUR soldiers. Its their country, make them earn their freedom, one doorway at a time.

    ... STOP trying to do CQB in a mud house on the side of a mountain! There is NOTHING inside worth losing your life over.

    Find other TTPs and enablers that are safer and more effective.
    Last edited by jcustis; 09-29-2009 at 09:40 PM.

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