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  1. #11
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    Default Nation building for professionals ...

    The WP article has this:

    McChrystal's 66-page confidential assessment makes the case for a far more expansive counterinsurgency mission, one that would involve sending more troops and civilian reconstruction personnel to Kandahar and other key population centers to improve security, governance and economic opportunities for Afghans. Although the general never used the term in the assessment, his strategy amounts to a comprehensive nation-building endeavor.

    He wants U.S. and NATO personnel to expand training programs for Afghan soldiers and policemen, reform the justice system, promote more effective local administration and ramp up reconstruction. If that occurs, he and other counterinsurgency experts contend, then Afghans who have sided with the Taliban out of fear or necessity will eventually switch sides and support the government. Building an effective state, in McChrystal's view, is the only way to defeat the insurgency.
    I don't necessarily see the GEN's report as a call for "a comprehensive nation-building endeavor"; but as more of a call for enhancing the security sector according to what are presently considered "best COIN practices". That will be difficult enough.

    For those who accept the WP's author's view of the report - "a comprehensive nation-building endeavor" - they should plow through James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Beth Cole DeGrasse, The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (2007) - RAND download here. They should pay particular attention to the (other than military) constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission: police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. And, those should be considered in light of the size, topography and population of Astan.

    To conclude, I steal a thought from Taiko (in another thread and in another context):

    I think that's worth repeating, without a viable and functioning 'state' there is no security. South Vietman during the late 60's-70's perfect example. Again, this is CvC's paradoxical trinity at work. You can surge all you want, 100 000-200 000 soilders but it is important to remember that the military is only one side of the trinity, there is also the people and the government. At the end of the day if you do not have a stable government as the head of state then you are heading into a protracted war which will cost blood and treasure without a necessarily beneficial outcome for the people.
    Regards to all

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 09-28-2009 at 12:52 AM.

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