The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

I see no gross oversimplification. Maybe useful reductionism?

That's an interesting, and probably very useful, distinction IFF the difference were spelled out in the document . For example, the "term "adaption" (and its variants "adaptive", "adaptability", etc.) are used fairly often in the ACC, but there is no specific definition for what that is supposed to mean. Now, I happen to use both the term and concept fairly often ('sides that, I spend a fair bit of time drinking with biologists and occasionally lecture in Biotechnology classes), so I know what the term means in biology as well as in sociology / anthropology.

While the term isn't defined, the "meaning" that can be ascribed to it based on both immediate and total context is closer to a Spencerian idea of the concept (he's the dude who coined the phrase "Survival of the Fittest" with all of the Eugenicist implications). However, as the term is used by people who have been in the field, the implied meaning is much closer to that of Darwin's concept, i.e. the ability to sort through multiple options quickly and select one that should work and, if that fails, to create one on the spot.

In Spencer's version of the concept, there is an implied teleology of "this is the best", while in Darwin's concept, it's closer to "it works and didn't cause a catastrophic failure" (no implied teleology).

So, what does this have to do with "gross oversimplification" vs "useful reductionism"? Well, a gross oversimplification leaves implied meaning wide open to interpretation, while a useful reductionism restricts interpretation of key characteristics (NB: usually by pointing towards an expansion of them in other documents). In the case of "adaption" in the ACC, we have a case of gross oversimplification, since the teleological implications of the two main interpretations have radically different implications for training and organization.

Does this speak to an inability to be able to write short, clear and concise Concepts and Doctrine notes? - in that long, turgid, complex document are perceived to be more insightful that 3 page of clearly expressed ideas?

I'm not sure that it is an "inability" in the classic sense of "they don't know how to do it", so much as "they are structurally unable to do it" because of the functional requirements for the document. From what I can gather, the ACC is not only supposed to be a model of how the US Army currently views future warfare, it is also a PR piece in budget negotiations, a guideline for future training / mobilization requirements, and a venue for politically powerful factions to argue for their pet projects. In short, it is written by a committee that does not have either a single goal or a single vision.

Personally, I think they are making a critical error in the way it is written. I would argue that they could still achieve their PR (and budgetary) goals while writing a concise, if not short, document. I think we can certainly see that some of the people are trying to do just that, while others are obfuscating parts of the document and still others are attaching "earmarks" to it.

Does describing your future enemies as "hybrid," make you seem more accepting of challenge, and thus able to ask for more money?

As far as I can see, the term is a mere buzz word to increase the fear reaction in political readers and with the public. Analytically, it is silly since I can't think of a fight in the past millennium (at least!) that didn't involve "hybrid" factors (including Frederick the Great).

[Dr. C]

...but that's the whole problem! - Most Armies do not use "examples of what worked well in the past could guide the future concepts and provide more support for the “solutions” presented." because they are generally oblivious of what worked well in the past or even how it worked.

Using military history to find out what worked and what did is extremely problematic - It's what I do - and the current "COIN debate" is writ large with folks ignoring uncomfortable historical facts.

Additionally folks make fraudulent use of "positive examples" to prove what they want to prove.

In the Appreciative Inquiry (AI) mode, I would get a core group representative of the Army community from all ranks, and have them interview each other with questions like:

"What makes us successful when we are at our best working with other agencies?"

"Imagine the Army fifteen years from now as the best organization. What does it look like? What are we doing more of? What are we doing less of? What are we doing that is completely new?"

"If you could develop or transform the Army in any way to advance fully the Army's objectives (as stated in the capstone), what three wishes in order of priority, would you make to contribute to its excellence?"

From there, the core group can also explore the Army's "peak performance" from the past, and identify the ways of doing things that are valued so strongly they should be sustained.

Again, I'm not sure if the capstone was meant to be a visionary document, so maybe that's why the authors took a problem-solution approach. There are other approaches available, like AI. Our default is usually from a deficit-base, looking at the Army as a machine that can be broken apart, analyzed, fixed, and put back together, with the final ideal product already in mind. Instead of the machine metaphor, to me a flowing river metaphor may be more useful.

[William F. Owen]

In the Appreciative Inquiry (AI) mode, I would get a core group representative of the Army community from all ranks, and have them interview each other with questions like:

1. "What makes us successful when we are at our best working with other agencies?"
2. "Imagine the Army fifteen years from now as the best organization. What does it look like? What are we doing more of? What are we doing less of? What are we doing that is completely new?"
3. "If you could develop or transform the Army in any way to advance fully the Army's objectives (as stated in the capstone), what three wishes in order of priority, would you make to contribute to its excellence?"

None of those questions forces anyone to examine what best practice looks like. What you'll get is data free opinion, which is the primary source of most of the problem.
Moreover your questions supposes that most soldiers/officers actually know what best practice looks like. I submit history shows us that this is extremely unlikely.

From there, the core group can also explore the Army's "peak performance" from the past, and identify the ways of doing things that are valued so strongly they should be sustained.

Again this assumes they know and that what the value is actually important. A British Officer might tell you that it is all to do with Foot Drill and Marching Bands - which has always been counter-productive, yet the UK persists with it for purely emotional reasons.

[Ken White]

will be picked in any Armed force at the direction of a senior person -- that person is highly likely to have some biases that will be introduced into the selection process in some way. Even with a totally unbiased group, their recollections will be situationally dependent; i.e. what worked for them at one time in one place in certain circumstances. Introduce a different locale, different players on both sides -- even different weather or time of day -- and the likelihood of a similar result is reduced; the more variables, the greater the probability of a totally different result.

There are three potential solutions. The first is to cull AARs in exhaustive detail and compile a list of best practices (I emphasize own AND others, including opponents). The second is to conduct tests and experiments. The third is to select proven competent practitioners and have them train future performers. Most Armed Forces, including those in the US, use an amalgam of all three of those, some with locally added fillips and that's about as good as you can get...

It is far from perfect but it is adequate most of the time. Soldiering is one trade where one truly learns by doing; thus the more training and the more realistic that training is, the better will be performance. There are simply too many variables in combat (all the factors of METT-TC routinely vary, that's why the acronym exists) for that not to be true.

Malcolm Gladwell's work has many flaws but his 10,000 hours for expertise in most fields where physical action is entailed is essentially accurate and is derived from the research of others. Figuring twelve hour combat days, that equates to about two and a third years -- IMO, that's about right at the current wars level of intensity; other, more intense wars went to 24 hour days and thus down to about a years experience. Even more intensity can accelerate the learning curve.

The rub comes from the fact that would be true for A job. Get promoted, move up to another level and the learning curve starts all over. Thus if you accept, say five echelons from individual Tanker, Scout, Rifleman or Gunner to Battalion (the real maneuver and combat focusing level -- Regiment / Brigade and above are semi superfluous to ground combat in many senses) then at two years plus per echelon, it would take about 10 years of combat to produce a truly competent Battalion Commander. Not adequate, truly competent in all aspects with an acknowledgment that a small percentage of persons are naturals and can do it in far less time. Note the small before 'percentage' -- and that applies at all levels.

I'm aware that we start Officers at the third echelon up and that most do that fairly well. That compresses the first three echelons for them which may not be doing them or the echelons below a favor -- but that's the way we do it. What that does is add to their learning curve time at each of the higher echelons so even though there's a head start at the third level, it balances out over the five echelons. That is in part engendered by the fact that we have too many Officers and thus, many are put in jobs that do not add value to their combat skills so about half or more of their service time is wasted in that respect.

I'm also aware that adequate performers can be trained in less time. I'd only suggest that 'adequate' may be necessary in some wars, particularly existential ones but it is not at all desirable in a professional Army that is required to perform in the full spectrum of combat. You get what you pay for...

Substitute good training on a ratio of 1.5 or 2:1 and that would be two to three peacetime years for a good rifleman or tanker and fifteen to 20 years for the Bn Cdr -- which about tracks with reality. IF your training is good. Ours is not that good. Then consider that we drag Officers and even NCOs (to a lesser extent) away from learning environment for much of their service...

A British Officer might tell you that it is all to do with Foot Drill and Marching Bands - which has always been counter-productive, yet the UK persists with it for purely emotional reasons.

Sadly, the British Army is not alone in this stupidity. I've heard senior people in the US and other Armies also tout the 'benefit' of close order drill and even of bands. Asinine -- and then we wonder why people get killed unnecessarily...

[marct]

A British Officer might tell you that it is all to do with Foot Drill and Marching Bands - which has always been counter-productive, yet the UK persists with it for purely emotional reasons.

Sadly, the British Army is not alone in this stupidity. I've heard senior people in the US and other Armies also tout the 'benefit' of close order drill and even of bands. Asinine -- and then we wonder why people get killed unnecessarily...

While i will certainly agree that close order drill is pretty useless at present (it actually was useful in the 16th-early 19th centuries), I totally disagree on bands! (Okay, bias time here - my father played in the CF band in Korea).

First, they are actually pretty good for morale and, let's face, why contract out what you can have internally ?

Second, a really, REALLY good band means pipers.... lots and LOTS of pipers... a WMD (Weapon of Mass Deafness) that has never been outlawed by the Geneva Conventions and can (and has) been put to use with great effect in a number of both riot and battlefield conditions.

[J Wolfsberger]

Second, a really, REALLY good band means pipers.... lots and LOTS of pipers... a WMD (Weapon of Mass Deafness) that has never been outlawed by the Geneva Conventions and can (and has) been put to use with great effect in a number of both riot and battlefield conditions.

I agree. Emphatically and completely.

[slapout9]

It doesn't matter they are after our precious bodily fluids


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4Xhh...eature=related

[Ken White]

(it actually was useful in the 16th-early 19th centuries),

As were the Elephants some time before...

It's probably noteworthy that your forebears and mind pioneered (pun intended) the lack of necessity for close order drill in the early and mid 18th Century as wrestling to determine your southern border took place.

Who said armies were slow to adapt?

I totally disagree on bands! (Okay, bias time here - my father played in the CF band in Korea)...Second, a really, REALLY good band means pipers.... lots and LOTS of pipers... a WMD (Weapon of Mass Deafness) that has never been outlawed by the Geneva Conventions and can (and has) been put to use with great effect in a number of both riot and battlefield conditions.

I may have heard him play. Seriously. Joint Dominion Day / 4th of July (1952) soireee near Chorwon on a Wedensday, either the 2d or 3d as I recall (something about a war on , i think...)...

Ah, I said Bands, NOT Pipes and Drums.

[ How's that for a weasel out... It's probably fair to note that some form of drill is necessary but that performing it to develop discipline and response to orders is (a) a myth; and (b) not desirable. Joe is too conformist already without trying to force him to be more so. It's equally fair to note that I have arrayed in front of me about 14 CDs -- all Pipes (some with accompaniment by a Band ). Hyperbole is my middle name... ]

[Dr. C]

None of those questions forces anyone to examine what best practice looks like. What you'll get is data free opinion, which is the primary source of most of the problem.
Moreover your questions supposes that most soldiers/officers actually know what best practice looks like. I submit history shows us that this is extremely unlikely.

The purpose of the inquiry to a core group isn't to discover "best practices" but to articulate ideas about the future. Collison and Parcell (2004) in their knowledge management book, Learning to Fly, regard best practices as commonly "not transferable and slavishly adopting that practice could, and has lead to, worse results" (p. 99).

The purpose of an Appreciative Inquiry approach is to appreciate and value the best of what is instead of identifying a problem. This is done through interviews and developing a protocol of questions, like the ones I listed. The approach involves envisioning what might be, instead of analyzing causes of the problems. It includes dialogue about what could be, instead of an analysis of possible solutions. It means innovating what will be, instead of just action planning. Those are some of the differences between AI and problem solving.

I can only speak to the written framework approach of the capstone. The rest of you are more subject matter experts on the content. I wouldn't attempt to provide feedback on the content.

I'm not sure what is meant by "data free opinion," since data also comes in the form of stories, which may include opinion.

[Schmedlap]

Collison and Parcell (2004) in their knowledge management book, Learning to Fly, regard best practices as commonly "not transferable and slavishly adopting that practice could, and has lead to, worse results" (p. 99).

I haven't read the book, so maybe I'm way off here, but I'm guessing that the reason that most "best practices" do not transfer well is because the people attempting to apply them do not understand the rationale behind them. A best practice generally works when the people applying it have the professional knowledge and skill to apply it to other situations.

Example: In 2005, in Iraq, one of my Soldiers asked me why we were doing "stand-to" at 0400. I responded, tongue-in-cheek "because that is when the French and Indians attack." Indeed, that is where the practice originates - at least in the US Army. My Soldier wisely pointed out two things: 1) we were not fighting the French or the Indians (so far as we know) and 2) the people whom we were fighting tended to attack at around 0600 or 0700, perhaps reflecting the Arab cultural aversion to punctuality. I had the same complaint, for the same reasons. Eventually, the chain of command went ahead and moved the stand-to time to 0600. It worked like a charm when the largest complex attack on our patrol base of the entire deployment occurred at around 0630 one day. By 0700 of that morning, our patrol base was littered with debris from VBIEDs, body parts of expended mujahideen, and brass casings, and there were no friendly casualties. Stand to - a best practice - worked. It transferred well because we knew how to apply it. Had we continued to apply it improperly, at 0400, then it would have done nothing for us.

[slapout9]

The purpose of an Appreciative Inquiry approach is to appreciate and value the best of what is instead of identifying a problem. This is done through interviews and developing a protocol of questions, like the ones I listed. The approach involves envisioning what might be, instead of analyzing causes of the problems. It includes dialogue about what could be, instead of an analysis of possible solutions. It means innovating what will be, instead of just action planning. Those are some of the differences between AI and problem solving.

Dr. C, some Strategic thinking going on here.....good job. Some times it is best to not solve problems but vigorously pursue opportunities and just starve the problem to death.

[William F. Owen]

The purpose of the inquiry to a core group isn't to discover "best practices" but to articulate ideas about the future. Collison and Parcell (2004) in their knowledge management book, Learning to Fly, regard best practices as commonly "not transferable and slavishly adopting that practice could, and has lead to, worse results" (p. 99).

Well my take on "best practice," is "stuff known to work". Vauban gathered and wrote down "best practice" in Siege Warfare. Given circumstances we can give specific advice. Given general conditions we can also give general advice as to successful approaches. Most/Some Armies seem to have emotional and cultural needs that prevent them capturing that. If the AI approach can identify the reasons why folks cannot solve the problem, I'm all for it.

I'm not sure what is meant by "data free opinion," since data also comes in the form of stories, which may include opinion.

Well if stories and opinions counts as data, that maybe part of the problem! . Does evidence free sound better?
Example: "Foot Drill creates discipline and teamwork" is often stated as fact, in the face of very little actual evidence.

[slapout9]

Well my take on "best practice," is "stuff known to work". Vauban gathered and wrote down "best practice" in Siege Warfare. Given circumstances we can give specific advice. Given general conditions we can also give general advice as to successful approaches. Most/Some Armies seem to have emotional and cultural needs that prevent them capturing that. If the AI approach can identify the reasons why folks cannot solve the problem, I'm all for it.

Because it is known is why it has little Strategic value. What were the best practices to build the Atom bomb? What were the best practices to build the first ICBM? What were the best practices for the Internet? There weren't any, they were invented first.....In short we seized the initiative and didn't worry about solving problems.

[jmm99]

there was a lot of problem solving in making the Atom Bomb, both in nuclear engineering and in machine shop techniques. So, initiative + problem solving was the general key to success.

Wilf's example intrigues some thoughts:

Example: "Foot Drill creates discipline and teamwork" is often stated as fact, in the face of very little actual evidence.

The sentence would be more true if one said "Foot Drill creates discipline and teamwork in Foot Drill" - or more generally, "A Drill creates discipline and teamwork in that Drill". But, what of "A Drill creates discipline and teamwork which is transferrable to a very similar drill." Probably true, but you'd have do some experimenting, with trial and error, to know why that is true. Similar to the first Atom Bomb.

I suppose the scientific and engineering process is useful in preparation for war, but will the "Drill" work in combat ? The first Atom Bomb could have been a fizzle rather than a mushroom.

[slapout9]

there was a lot of problem solving in making the Atom Bomb, both in nuclear engineering and in machine shop techniques. So, initiative + problem solving was the general key to success.

jmm, I disagree they were not solving problems with best practices they were inventing solutions.......they were creating/inventing knowlege.

[William F. Owen]

Because it is known is why it has little Strategic value. What were the best practices to build the Atom bomb? What were the best practices to build the first ICBM? What were the best practices for the Internet? There weren't any, they were invented first.....In short we seized the initiative and didn't worry about solving problems.

Err... not sure what you mean. Best practice is highly context specific. It merely refers to the use of ways and means to gain ends. That is an enduring phenomenon in Warfare. That has nothing/little to do with technological innovation. Actually, most technology does build on existing knowledge of how to do things, even if that existing knowledge comes from experimentation.

The sentence would be more true if one said "Foot Drill creates discipline and teamwork in Foot Drill" - or more generally, "A Drill creates discipline and teamwork in that Drill". But, what of "A Drill creates discipline and teamwork which is transferrable to a very similar drill."

Heresy! Heresy! Foot drill is sacred and we must maketh up much sayings and twaddle to support it!! Doth thou want to just create orderly movement of men in it's place? Heresy I say!

....and in 1917, German recruit instruction specified that only as much foot drill as was necessary to march from "the rail head to the support trench," was to be taught.

[Fuchs]

....and in 1917, German recruit instruction specified that only as much foot drill as was necessary to march from "the rail head to the support trench," was to be taught.

Orderly lock step marches had the purpose of improving road capacity for foot marches. That was an obsolete function in Europe by 1944 (automotive transport and aerial threat against tightly packed march columns).

[Tom Odom]

Err... not sure what you mean. Best practice is highly context specific. It merely refers to the use of ways and means to gain ends. That is an enduring phenomenon in Warfare. That has nothing/little to do with technological innovation. Actually, most technology does build on existing knowledge of how to do things, even if that existing knowledge comes from experimentation.

Agree somewhat as a historian and a lessons learned guy. The which comes first, doctrine or technology, question is a favorite for orals at CGSC. It is deliberately a chicken or egg question, the real point of which is that one without the other is an incomplete solution.

Heresy! Heresy! Foot drill is sacred and we must maketh up much sayings and twaddle to support it!! Doth thou want to just create orderly movement of men in it's place? Heresy I say!

Agreed but add that foot drill as we know it and you as a Brit refer to it was originally a battle drill, rendered tactically obsolete by advances in technology and accompanying doctrine.

....and in 1917, German recruit instruction specified that only as much foot drill as was necessary to march from "the rail head to the support trench," was to be taught.

Yes because at that stage, the habits ingrained in standard drill were guaranteed to get you killed.

The US Army in WWII went in with an infantry doctrine that stilll in its roots adhered to linear battle drills. The infantry paid a heavy price. An excellent analysis of all of this is on CSI's web page at

Secret of Future Victories, Paul F. Gorman, General, U.S. Army, Retired.

We have by no means cured ourselves of this phenomenon; it is rather like tactical kudzoo, choking thought with ever-tightening sinews. I have seen it when units go into a "stack" and then move down a street at a the CTC. You also see it downrange as whatever gets by in training gets imprinted like a baby duck following a dog it sees as its Momma.

My comment on this capstone document is but one:

I don't really care about the buzzwords, fuziness, or even the art of predicting the future. As long as the center-piece of the doctrine is thinking adaptation, the soldiers and the leaders will get it right when the time comes. As soon as someone says doctrine requires rigid application, the soldier and the leader alike get screwed.

Best
Tom

[William F. Owen]

Hey Tom,

I don't really care about the buzzwords, fuziness, or even the art of predicting the future. As long as the center-piece of the doctrine is thinking adaptation, the soldiers and the leaders will get it right when the time comes. As soon as someone says doctrine requires rigid application, the soldier and the leader alike get screwed.

Agreed, and my point would be that Doctrine has to have the central tenet to teach "Why" and not "how". To some extent, "How" does have to be set up as the Thesis, but it must be held to rigour with WHY.

How something is done, rapidly becomes THE WAY to do things - and that is important IF the context of it being done is very well understood. Context usually provides a very good insight into WHY.

I know I sound like stuck record on this, but WHY is mostly missing in this stuff. - WHY have a Capstone Concept?

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

Well if stories and opinions counts as data, that maybe part of the problem! . Does evidence free sound better?
Example: "Foot Drill creates discipline and teamwork" is often stated as fact, in the face of very little actual evidence.

LOL - one of the things that most people forget, if they ever knew , is that the word "fact" comes from the Latin factum - "made" or "created". "Facts" are constructs; abstracted sensory data where "meaning" is latter applied based on interpretation via some type of model (theory, culture, etc.).

Both stories and opinions count as fact. On the latter, that is a large part of what constructs the entire area of market research. As to the former, that's folklore, mythology, organizational symbolism, etc.... aka, my field. The "problem" isn't that they count as facts, the problem is that they are mistaken for "Truth" (in a transcendent sense) because an inappropriate model is used to interpret them.

Let's take your foot drill example....

We know where it comes from (tactical necessities from ~1585 to, roughly 1865 or so. In order to communicate it to new members of the military as a survival trait, it was hammered in as "Truth". Those same people, however, lasted long after foot drill was rendered pretty much useless, and it survived as a meme (saying, cultural "truth") long after.

So, how to interpret it? Well, it gives us some insights into how "rigid" an organizational culture is. Also, exactly how it is talked about gives us some insights into the organizational meaning structures that will be applied elsewhere. For example, if "foot drill" is used to describe "building teamwork" by a lot of people in the organization (it's a frequency distribution sort of thing), then the organization will tend to conceive of "teamwork" in a fairly rigid form that is based on predictability of actions. It will also tend to privilege "the Book" over the actual effect. as such, we could predict, with a lesser degree of accuracy, that the field movements of members of that organization are predictable and, hence, their own manuals can be used for targeting information and setting up ambushes.

Notice how I am using that meme of "Foot Drill creates discipline and teamwork". I am not accepting the actual statement as "True", I am accepting it as indicative of an organizational cultural attitude.