So, here we are at the decision-point.
On the military side:
Is it a Counter-Intelligence Operation? COIN, Population-focused, troop-intensive, expensive, fraught with risk of appearance of foreign occupation, offset by substantial civilian engagement (nation-building?), including rapid and intensive Afghan forces training and build-up
Is it a limited Counter-Terrorist Operation? Bomb the bad guys if and when you see them. Limited population outreach or engagement, focus from defensible bases, but with limited access to the population, local knowledge, and increased risks of collateral damage, rely on rapidly expended Afghan forces for regional and national defense
On the civilian side:
In accordance with COIN, establish and maintain a high tempo and profile for national, regional, and local reconstruction, training, government support (vs. insurgents)
In accordance with limited Counter-Terrorism Operations, initiate local/regional projects in order to maintain security around bases, or (the opposite) redouble civil engagement (either/or at national/regional/local levels despite that this field may be the weakest link in the US arsenal, and fraught with substantial risks (fraud, waste, factionalism, and limited security/visibility to issues
In that consideration, the points raised by Pol-Mil, and others here, are critical dimensions.
I guess we all just wait for the shoes to drop...
Steve
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