Bob:

Your point on the direct relationship between governance and conflict is right, but I take exception to the good vs. poor construct. I think the right construct is effective vs. ineffective, with the caveat that there are some very effective and stable governments that are neither good, nor just in our sense of the term.

Still, we are back to the weakest link...our civilian effort.

In Baghdad in May 2008, some of the biggest civilian noise was about "budget execution." We had worked to jam through the Iraqi local/provincial governments a raft of "projects" (schools, clinics, etc...) which the Iraqis would not execute.

In May, I attended an Iraqi national planning conference where the story was, in fact completely different, and in so many ways, logical from their perspective.

First, we brought a Div-level military governance LTC with us so that he could see the arguments and issues. They were very nice and diplomatic to him, thanking him for his service and interest, but emphatic that they could not have a uniformed soldier in the conference. They got him earphones, and set him up in the lobby of Al-Rasheed with coffee, snacks etc. He and everybody else understood, but the barrier between military and civilian self-rule has it's inherent limitations.

Second, like most conferences, the work really gets done on the formal and informal level.

On the formal level, what was going on was "reinstatement" of the well-known and well-established Iraqi process for submitting projects through ministries for national consideration based on a clear and coherent criteria, and supporting documents. If a school project was requested, it had to be supported by convincing demographics, with recommended siting, staffing and cost issues (Having spent years in state processes in the US, the process is the same as used everywhere by government professionals).

On the informal level, there were two pronounced issues. One was that the project lists flowing from the provinces were, in many instances, incompetent, unnecessary and wasteful (Sounds like the Special Investigator for Iraq's conclusion, too.) Two was that Iraq's national treasure and future should not be squandered on these projects, which, in many ways, were viewed as the locus, if not cause, of widespread corruption.

So here were listening to serious Iraqi technocrats arguing the exact defects that many understand, yet, arguing, debating and resolving a way forward, grounded in their prior formal processes for project review based on specific project justification---similar to that used in the US. The sentiment was that using these formal processes was the only way to break the back of corruption, and restore focus and sanity to a national reconstruction future.

We can continue to argue that Iraqis are corrupt and unable to execute, but there is an alternative explanation. Maybe, by ignoring their historical processes, we opened a Pandora's Box of corruption and ineffectiveness, and the bad guys (institutional forces to delay our projects) actually had some sound reasons for their actions. Better to stop or delay stupid projects to use the money later (after the American influence is gone).

Without dispute, Afghanistan's processes are totally different than Iraq's but grounded in their own well-established processes. Once you break out of them, you get either tremendous waste, fraud and ineffectiveness, or, like Iraq, you get well-intended people trying to stop them for good reasons (they are not projects consistent with "Afghan" interests and processes).

If the measure is effective governance, the question is whether we try to promote and enhance what they have and do, or whether we try to change things (nation-building?). (Recipient vs. Participant).

I get the sense that we are not, to date, effectively engaging them, but that if all of our independent "projects" played out, there would be no more effectiveness, and perhaps, less.

Whether we like it or not, it is a very big leap between ineffective and effective governance, and there is not much history of us "creating" effectiveness where it did not exist before.

But governance is a key.

Steve