I judge such works by how the authors form their argument. They lost me with this:

Recent western military exploits in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and EastTimor, all represent, if not strategic failure, at least failures of strategy.
Rwanda was not a failure of strategy. It was a failure of moral courage. Period.

As for the "Leavenworth Heresy", I differ on what the authors purport to have happened at CGSC. I happened to be there in Bell Hall when the discussions were underway. The 1986 version of 100-5 and the use of the operational level of war was to embed and expand the role of the Corps as a military formation.

Same for the description of the end of Gulf War I. Was there confusion? Certainly. Did the overall objective get lost in the muddle? Perhaps but not in theater; the drift into quasi-support for the southern uprising.

My bottom line: if you believe that CvC is the military oracle, you will probably like the monograph. But the use of history is weak and slanted to begin with; I give it a C.

Tom