Slapout:

"In the South it was called Reconstruction and because Lincoln still had the power to create Greenbacks it was not going to cost the American taxpayer one red cent.....just like he financed the Civil War. That was the greatest lesson of all that has been completely passed over by so called Historians and Ph'd types. In fact it was an Army Colonel that showed him how to do it and it was so successful that some say Lincoln was assassinated for it."

The problem in Afghanistan arises out of the constitution which, arguably applies.

If the elections are, at the least, "challenged" to the extent that no clear winner is yet certifiable, then who sits at the head of Afghanistan's government?

As I understand it, past President Kharzai is likely to achieve, in the end, a fractious, but minimal victory, while his challengers can not must a majority.

On the table is the theory of a Unity Government, but putting that in practice is a whole different matter.

The UN, as I understand it, has the authority to decertify the election and move for "something else." Thus, the big portent of Eide and Galbraith.

The implicit suggestion, at present, is that (1) the present constitutional and national structure, whether as adopted or as applied, will not produce a positive result for Afghan's as a whole, nor further NATO/US objectives in stability; and (2) it may be time for a revisit to the structure, whether styled as a constitutional convention, national debate, loya jirga, or whatever.

What lessons, if any, have Afghans learned from the recent experience, and how would they propose to address it?

If, in order to answer that question, an Interim Government needs to be put in place, I believe the UN mandate provides for that radical surgery. Is it necessary?