Was the LSW a Bren?
In a 4-man fire team, you were supposed to carry 4 x 30-round magazines for your IW, plus 2 x 30 round magazines for the LSW. So every man carried 6 magazines, plus a 150-round bandolier. - so 24 magazines in total, of which 12 were supposed to be dedicated to/support the LSW.
The real world reality was each man just carried 6 mags.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Was the LSW a Bren?
No, just the SA80 L86.
That's the silly thing with these classifications. The Brits adopted the L86 as their LSW. The Anzacs and Canadians adopted the Minimi as our LSW. When the Brits added a Minimi they had to re-introduce the term LMG, because the LSW slot was taken. Would of course be too confusing to have two LSWs.
The Bren in WWII era (one per section) actually had 25 magazines allocated, spread across the whole section.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
About mech infantry squad sizes.
http://www.casr.ca/ft-editorial-cv90...purchase-2.htm
To me it doesn't seem sensible to try and keep a traditional squad organization and size in units with vehicles designed for six or seven dismounts.
This is where some version of Wilf's fire team group platoon would seem to shine; three to five vehicles in a platoon each carrying a robust fire team, not part of a squad looking to find it's other half.
But I'm speculating. I've never spent a day in a mech unit.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
and I'm trying to forget it. Shudder...
Bad, bad things. Smell. Clank, clank...
But I think you're correct on the Wilf Platoon for Mech, to get enough people and for vehicle combat redundancy (PC/AFVs do not have a great shelf life in MCO -- or even in mid intensity stuff...) you need Eight vehicles per Platoon with three man crews and five, not seven, dismounts each. Having some of the gear in follow on trucks will not work in mid level or greater. That gives you six 5 man Teams and a seventh team of Dismount Honcho (PSG /PL) plus two Medics, FO and RTO plus an eighth team with 60 mortar (.50 cal to 30mm on the vehicle does not replace indirect fire) or two GPMG.
Though why anyonewould want to stop being a light infantryman to ride on those things I'll never know...
With any of these organizations centered on vehicles, the mission is the key. Are they recce troops, mechanized infantry, or something else? Do they support the vehicles, or is it the other way around?
In my community (light armored reconnaissance), the 3-man scout team has a tm ldr, AR man, and scout. The scout is templated to be the grenadier, but the M203 almost always resides on the TL's weapon. Among the four vehicles within a platoon, there is a senior (at times referred to as "chief") scout TL who can lead the other three teams during dismounted operations.
Massing of scouts for dismounted work has seen a variety of concepts come and go over the years, but our 25mm chain gun has some significant capabilities. I don't know what the CCV's gun is designed to shoot in terms of rounds, but I would hope it has the ability to select from dual feed for AP and HE with a switch adjustment.
I have to admit that even given a prescribed mission, even our boys perform tasks that are clearly outside the realm of recce. The same goes for a vehicle employment. It often seems as though we are willing for take on a much bigger opponent when we should in fact be sicking bigger dogs on it.
Leather Personnel Carriers.
Don't the Brits have a term for the action we call "humping." Something like "tabbing."
I like that term because it makes a good acromym: Tactical Advance By Boot.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
The Brit Para's use 'tabbing', the Marine Commandos use 'Yomping'.
You were close. It stands for Tactical Advance to Battle.Originally Posted by Rifleman
I like that term because it makes a good acromym: Tactical Advance By Boot.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
kind that accompany Tank units. Mounted Infantry with no tanks is a different ball game, Recon is yet again different.
Recon requires different vehicles than than Mech Infantry. Some will say that's incorrect as the same type vehicles will confuse the evil enema. Any opponent worth worrying about isn't going to be fooled long enough for it to matter. That's usually just an excuse to avoid spending money on the right equipment.
Scouts need a small, highly mobile minimally protected vehicle to force them to use good TTP and not just go charging down the road until they get hit. We haven't had a good Scout vehicle since the M-114 died a too early death -- because the leadership wouldn't support Reconnaissance as a mission (when you don't know how to use something, you tend to think it's unnecessary... ).
You want me to Scout; I can do that -- and will take my time to do it right. You want me to move at a set speed, I can do that -- two different vehicle requirements. I can do the first with a 1/4ton (not a HMMWV, too big), for the second a LAV isn't well enough armored. Thus, if you have to balance those competing requirements, the LAV will work though it will have obvious problems at each end of the job. Still, all things considered, it will do the job -- and it was available. That's a lot better than an ideal vehicle that is not available.Always true and too often due to faulty employment. Goes with the territory, though. I've done 'economy of force missions' that should've had three times as many troops. Hmmm. since I got 'em done, maybe not. Great job, though, lot of fun...I have to admit that even given a prescribed mission, even our boys perform tasks that are clearly outside the realm of recce. The same goes for a vehicle employment. It often seems as though we are willing for take on a much bigger opponent when we should in fact be sicking bigger dogs on it.
Actually, I'd want the Platoon/Company/Unit organisation to be vehicle blind. Yes, 30 men can be 5 x 6 man teams in an MICV or use 4 x 8 man APCs/MICV.
The article Fuchs posted suggested that Fire Teams a primarily for reconnaissance. I agree with that. Then you need to be explicit about the roles of the platoon, and company.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The British Infantry is beginning to go down the path of a vehicle blind organisation - quite possibly because we have run out of vehicles!!
Light role battalions are beginning to look more like Mech and Armoured Infantry battalions in terms of their manning establishment. The underlying reason behind this is that in Iraq and more so, in Afghanistan, light role battalions are more realistically 'protected mobility' battalions possessing large numbers of vehicle variants.
The end result is that we amend the establishment, train on whatever vehicles are available (using them as Protected Mobility) and look forward when we get the proper vehicle fleet for pre-deployment training.
Redrat,
NW Germany? Frankonia, Coberg Castle and Swienfurt?
I think that the Afgan War will be more about Infantry than Mech Infantry!
It is at least 110-degrees away from the Iraq situation.
Gents,
I had a electronic copy of Wigram's notes/observation regarding battle drill, but it went adrift when I restored my hard drive in the wake of a malicious software attack. I'd like to get it back so that I can produce a hardcopy. Does anyone have a lead on this? IIRC, it was a few pages of a word document, but might be .pdf for all I know .
Jon,
It was so fascinating I kept a copy on file.
davidbfpo
Once again, you are a superstar David!
It truly is...certainly more insightful than anything I have read from any number of more widely-published analysts from that era.It was so fascinating I kept a copy on file.
Last edited by jcustis; 09-12-2009 at 08:08 PM.
Having been away from the internet for a few weeks, it's taken a few hours to get through the points/ links posted - but it was well worth it. Thanks for the Wavell article davidbfpo - it links together a lot of what I read a month back in 'On Infantry'... and serves to confuse me that much more! I always thought that tactics came down to a choice between left flank, right flank or up-the-guts
One question I wanted to raise with the community here (I don't think this is side-tracking the issue, apologies if it is): the value of a 7.62 support wpn in the sect/ squad. If the individual wpn remains at 5.56 mm is it worthwhile keeping the Light Spt Weapon at that cal or is it worth going for the bigger round?
This relates to a number of discussions I've had within my unit, each of us with different views.
The LSW is not intended to replace a GPMG and that will still serve the role of fire spt/ veh mtd and as a crew served wpn in spt. Rather, I'm weighing up the merits behind replacing a 5.56mm Minimi with a 7.62 Minimi as the std issue LSW.
While I don't have data to hand I've heard reliable anecdotes that, while the larger Minimi doesn't have the heavier barrel of the GPMG (therefore reducing the ballistic capabilities slightly), the 7.62 Minimi is reliable and packs a greater punch than it's 5.56 brethren.
The cons (as I see it) are reduced quantity of belt that can be carried at the same weight/ volume and the inability to quickly relink or delink a universal round to either create more belt or more loose for the riflemen. I don't know if this is a tactical consideration, but I've done it A LOT in trg and consider it a definite 'nice to have'.
While I would say the information points to the 7.62 having more going for it, my personal view is more a from-the-guts feeling that figures if you want a 7.62 mm MG, then that's what the GPMG is for (and should be able to be sourced as a task specific wpn or carried if the threat/ theater situation demands it) and the LSW should match the riflemen's round. Interestingly most officer-level discussions tend to agree with the above, while most JNCOs I've tossed the issue to err to the 7.62 LSW option.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
I've read the Wigram piece several times and come away with a nodding head that he had really gotten it right.
Does anyone know what the response was from the Brigadier whom he addressed the correspondence to? In his closing, he asks for comment on his observations, and it would be beneficial to know if there were any.
Also, does anyone within the ranks have a copy of this: Lionel Wigram, Battle Drill and the British Army in the Second World War by Tim Harrison Place and published in War in History, Vol. 7, No. 4, 442-462 (2000)? It has got to be a gem, but Sage Journals Online requires $25.00 for a day's access.
Thanks in advance.
Last edited by jcustis; 10-13-2009 at 12:42 AM.
...and the UK have still never put his work into effective practice! Having said that, the former Sgt Major ( now Major Gerry Long) of the Seniors Wing at Brecon, erected a Plaque to Wigram in the Sergeants mess, a couple of years back.
The long and the short, is that the letter, and some of his other comments were made known to Montgomery and it lead to Wigram getting sacked and demoted.Does anyone know what the response was from the Brigadier whom he addressed the correspondence to? In his closing, he ask for comment on his observations, and it would be beneficial to know if there were any.
I have the book and have corresponded at length with the author. I can send you the article I wrote on Wigram for the British Army Review, if you wish? It covers everything (and more?) that the book does.Also, does anyone within the ranks have a copy of this: Lionel Wigram, Battle Drill and the British Army in the Second World War by Tim Harrison Place and published in War in History, Vol. 7, No. 4, 442-462 (2000)? It has got to be a gem, but Sage Journals Online requires $25.00 for a day's access.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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