How Operational Art Devoured Strategy

[Tom Odom]

As I said, we tend to be awfully inflexible. We say there is an Operational Level, therefor we must have one. They also mention that we, the US, do not do the political aspect of warfare at all well. True IMO and we have not since FDR. Truman never got it, nor have any subsequent Presidents other than Eisenhower who wisely stayed out of most stupidity. I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.

Again. Ken, let's define who the "we" is. The authors are taking US Army doctrine out of context and applying it in a larger sense to the entire security structure of the United States government. You just made the same leap and are like them chasing the wrong fox.

If there is a problem with strategic thought in the USG--and I agree whole heartedly there is--hardly any of the problem relates to the so called "leavenworth heresy". Their premise is both a red herring and a reductionist; it is the wrong argument and an over-simplification at that. Somehow if we just put operational-level back in the box, strategy will emerge. Bull.

The issue is much larger and it hinges on interagency--as I stated below--and one that I deal with every day of the week. We have not and I fear will not ever get a system that gets beyond the muddle through when it comes to strategy and the political. We are very much in the middle of a classic case of muddling through on strategy when it comes to Afghanistan and frankly we only reached the strategic level by default.

Creating levels of war does not help but does not necessarily create that failure. And doing so in the the Cold War as a way of clarifying an new doctrine within the Army is not the original sin that created strategic failure in the US system of waging war. That they offered MacArthur as a case in point should have clued them that their argument was off by more than three decades. On the other hand I could and I am sure you could cite numerous examples of the need for levels because they limit those who would become the epitome of the squad leader in the sky.

Again I give it a C.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Again I give it a C.

And it may merit a C. Since most of the contemporary writing on the "Operational level" may merit an F in my view, I think we might move forward on that basis. I posted the paper to provoke discussion, not applause.

I find this paper very annoying since it beat me to the punch on a whole bunch of stuff - but frankly as long as the stuff is out there, I care not who's name is on it.

My major concerns are that "some people" have elevated the idea of "The Operational level" way beyond it's originally intended purpose of delivering forces to battle, under the most advantageous conditions and then being able to effectively exploiting success as and when it occurs. EG: Napoleons failure to pursue and destroy Blucher at Ligny had very real strategic consequences, at Waterloo. Destroying Blucher was a strategic imperative. It was a failure of strategy, not operations.

I am not saying put the Operational Level back in the box. I am saying let's have a clear, simple and explicit understanding as to what it is, because at the moment current idea may be an obstacle to understanding. The understanding I am looking for is "what uses of force advances my strategy" (political aims)

[Tom Odom]

I am not saying put the Operational Level back in the box. I am saying let's have a clear, simple and explicit understanding as to what it is, because at the moment current idea may be an obstacle to understanding. The understanding I am looking for is "what uses of force advances my strategy" (political aims)

Wilf,

A noble sentiment and fine for application inside the uniformed services. But that dog simply does not hunt--or at least trail effectively--beyond the edge of the military services. He stops at the interagency boundary. You know what I do as a POLAD--I offer political advice to my commander and his staff. To do that effectively, you at least have to understand what the unit does, what its mission entails, and how it is organized.

My predecessor was an administrative type with no field experence, let alone experience with the military. That did not matter if you see the POLAD as simply an errand boy for whatever crosses the embassy's collective mind. It matters terribly if you expect a POLAD to actually advise.

We can talk this until we are blue in the face. And we can come to a complete agreement. Our agreement simply has no effect in bridging that interagency gap. The result is the constant application of "muddle through" under which the temporarary, the expeditious, and the extemporary serve as the threads of US strategy. Put another way, we don't do strategic menus; we only do tailgate parties.

Tom

[M-A Lagrange]

On Wilf advice I am copying this comment I did on the threat on Clausewitz delusion:

Definition of a decisive battle is quite loose with time. I’ll take the example of La Marne in 1914. It was merely a strategic decisive battle but was a tactical decisive battle as it was more a smart use of modern logistic technology and more or less did fix the front. But this was not the attempt or aim. (The objective was to protect Paris so the old dogma I have your capital = I won, would not happen).
But still it was a decisive battle.

I do not see too much where it falls in the discussion. This is mainly due to the fact that I did not have time to read the paper Wilf is talking about. But I did spot it when it came on the web and it is on my data bank. I am currently more occupied (for obvious professional reasons) in reading stuff on stabilisation. (SSI and US Peace Instituts (and some others) but also French and others stabilisation doctrine...).

My assumption would be that tactical decisive advantage do not give you a decisive strategic advantage as old dogma have to be review.
Iraq would be for me the case. US did take the capital but did not won the war at that very moment.

This would come in echo with the French troops return of experience from Afghanistan too.
Technology is not THE advantage for them. It is a good tool but too much technology brings new limits.
As example: the cyber trooper is now limited by the range of the network.
I believe the French are still (and I think it is quite relevant) very much in the old school "rustique" scheme. In clear: few technology (may be old) but with time and operation validation that does not impose you to compensate limits with additional troops. And new technologies that bring an added value to old onces but still allow you to perform the previous operations. (See the CESAR battery or Leclerc tank).
The old dilema of trusting/supporting the guy on the ground or the technocrate in the HQ most probably.
But still I need to read the paper first.

[William F. Owen]

On Wilf advice I am copying this comment I did on the threat on Clausewitz delusion:

Definition of a decisive battle is quite loose with time. I’ll take the example of La Marne in 1914. It was merely a strategic decisive battle but was a tactical decisive battle as it was more a smart use of modern logistic technology and more or less did fix the front. But this was not the attempt or aim. (The objective was to protect Paris so the old dogma I have your capital = I won, would not happen).
But still it was a decisive battle.

My take is that it was a battle that had strategic effect - thus decisive. It cost the Germans the War in terms of wining in 1914. The Marne does show a shortening of the gap between tactical success and strategic consequence. The operational issues, are those that enabled that tactical success. Merely example.

[Ken White]

Again. Ken, let's define who the "we" is... You just made the same leap and are like them chasing the wrong fox.

Nope. You misconstrued the initial 'we.' While I thought what I said was clear, perhaps it was not. There were two distinct items in that paragraph of mine you quoted. Here it is again:

""As I said, we tend to be awfully inflexible. We say there is an Operational Level, therefor we must have one. They also mention that we, the US, do not do the political aspect of warfare at all well. True IMO and we have not since FDR. Truman never got it, nor have any subsequent Presidents other than Eisenhower who wisely stayed out of most stupidity. I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.""(emphasis added / kw)

The items in bold apply to the US Army, those underlined to the broader US government; two separate 'we's there. I agree with you on the interagency and US strategy issue. However, I still think the Army is remiss, doctrinally rigid and has a tendency to tailor its 'doctrine' to the exigencies of the day.

If there is a problem with strategic thought in the USG--and I agree whole heartedly there is--hardly any of the problem relates to the so called "leavenworth heresy". Their premise is both a red herring and a reductionist; it is the wrong argument and an over-simplification at that.

I agree but I didn't read their paper that way. Also, this:

... Somehow if we just put operational-level back in the box, strategy will emerge. Bull.

I didn't get that from it. I did get that the operational level as the US has adapted it is a distractor -- and while you may not, I totally agree with that. As I said, we're awfully inflexible. Not least because of this:

...On the other hand I could and I am sure you could cite numerous examples of the need for levels because they limit those who would become the epitome of the squad leader in the sky.

The problem being that our adaptation of levels has not stopped the squad leaders in the sky -- it has encouraged them. Now that guy doesn't even have to leave air conditioned comfort and get in a bird that can be shot down, he can simply watch a video feed while three nations away...

Again I give it a C.

That's cool, give it a D even -- or an F -- but do realize the broad message I drew by not having anything to get defensive about may be correct-- dangerously so. ""I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.""

The Army cannot fix the strategic issue as you say -- the Army can and should fix the issues of over centralization 'squad leader in the sky;' inflexibility; and excessive orthodoxy.

[Tom Odom]

Ken

As you said,

That's cool, give it a D even -- or an F -- but do realize the broad message I drew by not having anything to get defensive about may be correct-- dangerously so.

I would have to assume that you feel my debating the clarity of these two authors' writing is defensive. Hardly the case as if one is going to write something and publish it hinged on a weak point, my criticism is neither defensive nor is ad hominem. It goes to the heart of their argument--the negative influence of the 1986 version of FM 100-5 and the term operational level of war. They state it is causal. I would argue that at best it may be symptomatic and at worst it is a red herring.

First from the authors:

More specifically, the misunderstanding of the role of operational art as proselytized in FM 100-5 and the creation of an “Operational Level of War”
have led to an independent layer of command that has usurped the role of strategy and thereby resistedthe role that the civilian leadership should play incampaign planning.

That is an interpretation stated as fact. I would say just the opposite. If encroachment has occured, it has been stimulated by a vacuum at the strategic and political level. Our national leaders have found it more convenient to contract strategy to think tanks than to actually think strategically.

Second from the authors:

In the American/NATO usage of FM-100-5, rather than meeting its original purpose of contributing to the attainment of campaign objectives laid down by strategy, operational art—practiced as a “level of war”—assumed the responsibility for campaign planning and, by reducing the political leadership to the role of “strategic sponsors,” quite specifically widened the gap between politics and warfare. The result has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles that have not always contributed to strategic success, i.e., “a way of battle rather than a way of war.”

You cannot reduce something that is not there in the first place. The lack of strategic guidance, thought, art or even just consideration is a long standing issue, one that predated both versions of 100-5 (82 and 86). If the authors had said that 100-5 did not fix the issue of winning battles versus winning wars they would have been correct. What they said, however, was that it created the problem, as in "The result has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles that have not always contributed to strategic success, i.e., “a way of battle rather than a way of war.”

In agreement on the issue, if not the cause:

Finally as for the need to fix over-centralization, no argument from me as I am firmly in that camp. I am not, however, at all sure that 100-5 added to that. Rather at the time of its publication and its implementation, the FM sought to reduce higher level meddling in favor of proper focus on relevant missions, ie deep attack and disruption of Soviet operational (there's that term again) maneuver. The only sure way to reduce (elimination is impossible) ever encroaching centralization is to limit the size and communication suite of headquarters; we are as you know doing just the opposite.

Tom

[wm]

Finally as for the need to fix over-centralization, no argument from me as I am firmly in that camp. I am not, however, at all sure that 100-5 added to that. Rather at the time of its publication and its implementation, the FM sought to reduce higher level meddling in favor of proper focus on relevant missions, ie deep attack and disruption of Soviet operational (there's that term again) maneuver. The only sure way to reduce (elimination is impossible) ever encroaching centralization is to limit the size and communication suite of headquarters; we are as you know doing just the opposite.

Tom,
FM 100-5 did not directly cause the problem, but it certainly was a significant contributor IMHO. My take on the Army's method of implementing the "deep battle" fight advocated in the 80's versions of FM 100-5 is that it had to lead to the exact opposite of what you indicate, corrrectly, is the way to reduce centralization. To be able to fight the deep battle, headquarters at brigade and above started to bloat their planning and operations staffs. They did this because, as victims of the micromanagement the Army practiced in SEA in the 60s and 70s, they also felt the need to stay abreast of the close battle. THey had learned not to be trusted as junior officers. So, as they became the Army's more senior "leaders" (starting at Battalion command level), they in turn, did not trust their subordinate leaders to do their jobs. Thus, the division of effort required to implement the "areas of interest/areas of influence" concepts effectively did not happen. Of course it didn't help matters that most CPXs and TEWTS (not to mention the environment at the NTC) had no real "deep battle" component to keep the higher headquarters ops staffs out of the knickers of the battalions and companies. Nor did it help that the only time the US Army engaged in major combat after the move to the new theory, it was the attacker and did not have to worry about finding and fixing an operational or strategic second echelon before it overwhelmed us in the main battle area.

When the only game in town is the close in fight, then of course leaders will want to watch it closely. But, because they have this manual that tells them they have to be prepared for the deep battle as well, they need to have another horde of staffers around to do that prep work too. And so grew the HQs to such a size that we now need to remove a maneuver battalion from our BCT structures to have enough folks to man the Army's staffs.

When I was an LT, I had this interesting discussion with a crusty old colonel. He told me that the Army had its leadership structure all backwards. He thought that the hardest job for an Army officer was to be a platoon leader yet the Army put the least experienced guys in that position. I suggested to him that what we had at the platoon level probably worked pretty well--the exuberance of youth could provide some "out of the box" suggestions for solving a tactical problem, but that exuberance would be tempered by the judgement and experience of a senior NCO platoon sergeant. I then suggested that maybe we ought to figure out how to get some of that youthful exuberance and willingness to try something different infused into more senior headquarters. It might break us out of being tied to mind-numbing processes rather than seeking innovative solutions. The colonel shook his head and told me I'd never make it in the Army because I had too much creative thought and the "system" broke those who tried to buck it.

[William F. Owen]

WM Excellent post!

It still leaves me confused as to see any greater point in the "Operational Level" than the manoeuvring and sustaining of forces of for tactical advantage, and that it is tactics that actually deliver the strategy.

I submit that irrelevant tactical action is only irrelevant in that it does not further strategy, and not because it does not contribute to the operation.

Where's my blind spot?

[Rob Thornton]

I've come to beleive the operational level of war is the linking of a series of objectives as they relate to a desired (strategic) end, and the arranging of resources and capabilities in time and space to achieve those objectives. The tactical actions then are those understood to be required to acheive said operational objectives, or those that occur as a result of pursuing the operational objective.

Those tactical sctions may not always be the ones you anicpated, but if there is resistance then it stands to reason that some type of tactical action will be required. I'd also note that loss of a given tactical action does not mean the end cannot be fulfilled, or even that some part of the operational objective may not be fulfilled, but tactical success does make a positive differnce (as long as it does not operationally exhaust you).

For a great example I think you could look at Grant's Wilderness campaign, and consider "Cold Harbor". Certainly a bad tactical outcome for Union Forces, however Grant was able to continue afterwards and soon secured City Point, set up a masive LOG base, and then contained Lee's Forces (as well as forcing the Confederate govt to flee Richmond. Grant also fulfilled the strategic end of destroying the Army of N. Virginia, occupying the Conf. capital and getting Lee to surrender.

If all of Grant's tactical actions had ended in failure that halted his operational momentum, or allowed Lee's army to escape, a subsequent campaign may have been required.

ref. the article Wilf brought up, I think its great for discussion. I think there can be a real danger in it happening, but historically it seems most likely when strategic concepts and defined policy end are absent or ambiguous (it could be we just don't really know what we want, or prefer to keep options open) - however, we tend to be action oriented, and there also seems to be some basis for expectations for us to be so.

Best, Rob

[Tom Odom]

Tom,
FM 100-5 did not directly cause the problem, but it certainly was a significant contributor IMHO. My take on the Army's method of implementing the "deep battle" fight advocated in the 80's versions of FM 100-5 is that it had to lead to the exact opposite of what you indicate, corrrectly, is the way to reduce centralization. To be able to fight the deep battle, headquarters at brigade and above started to bloat their planning and operations staffs. They did this because, as victims of the micromanagement the Army practiced in SEA in the 60s and 70s, they also felt the need to stay abreast of the close battle. THey had learned not to be trusted as junior officers. So, as they became the Army's more senior "leaders" (starting at Battalion command level), they in turn, did not trust their subordinate leaders to do their jobs. Thus, the division of effort required to implement the "areas of interest/areas of influence" concepts effectively did not happen. Of course it didn't help matters that most CPXs and TEWTS (not to mention the environment at the NTC) had no real "deep battle" component to keep the higher headquarters ops staffs out of the knickers of the battalions and companies. Nor did it help that the only time the US Army engaged in major combat after the move to the new theory, it was the attacker and did not have to worry about finding and fixing an operational or strategic second echelon before it overwhelmed us in the main battle area.

WM

If the issue you are describing is centralization, no issues with your points regarding the effects of 100-5 on centralization.

But if the issue is the void in strategic thought and application as was put forth in the the paper that this thread was about in the first place, then 100-5 didn't create that void, it was there before 100-5 and it is still there now.

My point to the authors is that if you want to understand a lack of strategy, don't start at the bottom (or middle) and work up. You are in essence examining the symptoms, not the cause. There is much talk of military dominence of foreign policy; that may be true, but the absence of strategic thought across the interagency gap is the cause.

Operational art devoured strategy? That would be a thin meal indeed.

And Wilf: Where's my blind spot?

That would be at the operational level

Tom

[Rob Thornton]

quote of the year.

Operational art devoured strategy? That would be a thin meal indeed.

[wm]

But if the issue is the void in strategic thought and application as was put forth in the the paper that this thread was about in the first place, then 100-5 didn't create that void, it was there before 100-5 and it is still there now.

My point to the authors is that if you want to understand a lack of strategy, don't start at the bottom (or middle) and work up. You are in essence examining the symptoms, not the cause. There is much talk of military dominence of foreign policy; that may be true, but the absence of strategic thought across the interagency gap is the cause.

I submit that it is rather hard to engage in strategic thought when a senior leader is too busy making sure the platoons and companies are minding their Ps and Qs.

Now it might well be the case that this overwatch of one's LTs/CPTs happens because the more senior folks are not capable of strategic thinking and devolve to doing what they know. It might also just so happen that they are precluded from doing strategic thinking by their own higher level leadership and fill the void by micromanaging the company grades. Or, it might be the case that in the absence of strategic thinking from their civilian seniors, military seniors try to fill the void without overstepping their legal bounds by creating something in between strategy and tactics. Enter one understanding of operational art, a poor compromise not unlike the M551 Sheridan. (But see more below in my response to Wilf.)

It still leaves me confused as to see any greater point in the "Operational Level" than the manoeuvring and sustaining of forces of for tactical advantage, and that it is tactics that actually deliver the strategy.

I submit that irrelevant tactical action is only irrelevant in that it does not further strategy, and not because it does not contribute to the operation.

Where's my blind spot?

Wilf,
First thanks for the kudos. On to your "blind spot." I think that the advent of very long range strike capability has added a wrinkle to the strategy/tactics divide. When one talks about engaging a maneuver force at distances that far exceed the normal range of the tactical commander's actions--interdicting a follow-on force as it is forming at its mobilization center for example--then one has reached a level of complexity that argues for a different point of view and may justify a slightly different consideration. While a "deep attack" still envolves maneuvering forces, which I view as largely a matter of strategy, it also contains a direct lethal strike/engagement component, which I submit is the sine qua non of tactics. Maybe not a blind spot--more a Hegelian synthesis that you, as a CvC adherent, ought to be able to appreciate

[William F. Owen]

I think that the advent of very long range strike capability has added a wrinkle to the strategy/tactics divide. When one talks about engaging a maneuver force at distances that far exceed the normal range of the tactical commander's actions--interdicting a follow-on force as it is forming at its mobilization center for example--then one has reached a level of complexity that argues for a different point of view and may justify a slightly different consideration.

Well in 1909 the British teaching of "Military Operations" considered only "Strategical Issues" and Tactics - explicitly stated . Operations were essentially how "Armies" did "stuff". _ "Advancing along a coast line." "Movement by Sea." Success in both Tactics and Strategy required competent and well planned "Operations."

I think what all the above is telling me is that the idea of an "Operational Level" - as popularly conceived, needs to be held to rigour.

[Tom Odom]

I submit that it is rather hard to engage in strategic thought when a senior leader is too busy making sure the platoons and companies are minding their Ps and Qs.

I would submit that your point is irrelevant to the discussion of a void in strategic thinking on the interagency level, the purported theme of the book under discussion. Did you read the paper?

Now it might well be the case that this overwatch of one's LTs/CPTs happens because the more senior folks are not capable of strategic thinking and devolve to doing what they know. It might also just so happen that they are precluded from doing strategic thinking by their own higher level leadership and fill the void by micromanaging the company grades.

While that might be true, it has nothing to do with the absence of strategy on the Department of State or any other national agency. You seem to be confused between tactical and strategic because all you refer to is inside the military at the operator level, none of which is discussed in the book to which this thread's title (and indeed the title of the book) refers.

Or, it might be the case that in the absence of strategic thinking from their civilian seniors, military seniors try to fill the void without overstepping their legal bounds by creating something in between strategy and tactics. Enter one understanding of operational art, a poor compromise not unlike the M551 Sheridan. (But see more below in my response to Wilf.)

Certainly military leaders fill the void; that in itself while not ideal does not mean that FM 100-5 1986 and the operational level of war instigated or justified that encroachment. Voids get filled as you say. But in the case of operational art as it was laid out in the FM 100-5 in 1986 and as it provides the theme for this monograph, it had no role in "devouring strategy." The issue predated the supposed cause.

Beyond that, roger on inherent tendencies to micro-manage. We focus on leader development and as those leaders advance in grade, many continue to believe they were the best (fill in the blank) that ever walked the earth, a belief that mandates that they micro-manage for to not do so would be a personal failure. We add to that tendency by creating C2 systems that encourage leaders to abuse the capabilities systems, and we continue to build ever larger staffs to somehow take advantage of the same "manpower" saving C2 systems.

Tom

[GI Zhou]

The paper neds a rewrite and to substantiate the argument. It fails to substantaite its claims in the introduction or even explain them.

East Timor was not a failure of military strategy, and it was too small to claim any theory of an operational art. It failed because the poltical groups in East Timor, who were split along differing lines of personalities long before independence, were usurped by Mari Alkatiri's FRETLIN group. Threw the East Timorese political parties plans into disarray. There are other reasons I am happy to explain off line.

The paper wrongly promotes Tukhachevsky as the star of the operational art, but it was Sveckhin and to a lesser extent Kamanev who started it, although Tukhachevsky put it into practice. The Operational art was based on the needs of various fronts during the Russian Civil War.

[Tukhachevskii]

...of my days at Uni came flooding back after reading some of the above posts (I had a particular fondness for Soviet Military Thought; hence my moniker). I understand, wholly, the confusion around the Operational level of war; even my lecturers had trouble defining this one. Personally, I prefer Svechin's definition because of its pragmatic rather than dogmatic/doctrinal bent;

"tactics makes the steps of which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path"

In Soviet military science and strategic thought any physical combat between units of any size was defined as a "tactical action" regarding boi (combat /fighting in the literal sense). Operations loosely refered to all the competencies, manoevres, resource allocations, planning and logistics required to get a particular unit to a particular location to secure a particular objective or acheive a particular mission. Soviet Divisional, Army, Army Group and Front level forward detachments (anything from coy to Reg/Div in size) regardless of the manourvere they were conducting (tactical forward reconnaissance, seizure of a bridge, an OMG, etc) were considered to be engaged in tactics once in actual contact with the enemy.

Confusingly, Edward Luttwak defined operational art and the operational level of war as that doman within which units tasked with strategic objectives conducted "relational manouvre" prior to their units shaking out and engaging in tactical level actions to attain their missions. (I have a pdf if anyone is interested enough to bother requesting it)

The way I figure it, Operational art, concerns the unification of tactical actions and their harmonisation with strategic requirements through the campaign. Operational art, therefore, (or, at least from what I was taught) concerns campaigns (multiple battles and objectives) whereas tactics concerns singular engagements. The old school definition for what we now call the operational level was "grand tactics". I think there's a clue in there somewhere.

Anyway, here are some other texts which may help/hinder/cloud further understanding;

David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Art of War: Part I" and "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part 2" in Parameters, 1987.

J. J. Schnieder, "Origins of Operational Art" in Parameters, 1987.

John Kiszely, "Thinking about the Operational Level", RUSI.

Col. M. R. Matheny, "The Roots of Modern American Operational Art".

See also, Martin Dunn, "Levels of War: Just a Set of Labels?", who defines operational art as ...

...The Operational level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. it is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.

This has probably confused things terribly but then again, in the spirit of my namesake, why not?

[Ken White]

I would have to assume that you feel my debating the clarity of these two authors' writing is defensive.

True -- but only in that you caught their flaw in assigning blame to 100-5 and went to work on that, thus ,IMO, missing the broader points that you acknowledge are a problem -- and the point that we have become very (dangerously???) doctrinaire.

Hardly the case as if one is going to write something and publish it hinged on a weak point, my criticism is neither defensive nor is ad hominem. It goes to the heart of their argument--the negative influence of the 1986 version of FM 100-5 and the term operational level of war. They state it is causal. I would argue that at best it may be symptomatic and at worst it is a red herring.

Herring perhaps. Sympotomatic? I'd say absolutely. We adopted 'the operational level' for a variety of reasons -- none particularly compelling, IMO (YMMV) and we tend to try to apply it where it is inappropriate because we're slaves to the book...

Our national leaders have found it more convenient to contract strategy to think tanks than to actually think strategically.

I sadly suggest that truth is partly due to the fact that the Armed Forces (as a result of mutual distaste) have not attempted (deigned?) to give strategic advice to a DoS and several Administrations who were, umm, not particularly friendly, toward the Services. I'm not sure how to fix that but I think we need to try...

In agreement on the issue, if not the cause:

Finally as for the need to fix over-centralization, no argument from me as I am firmly in that camp...we are as you know doing just the opposite.

We've beat this stud to death but I don't disagree with a thing you said -- other than your first line on the thread:

I judge such works by how the authors form their argument. They lost me with this:...

I understand that but at my age, I've found out that I neglected a lot of good ideas due to having the same attitude and I've lately become inured to putting up- with some often specious arguments to still extract some idea with a bit of merit. I even look up dumb stuff to see what people are up to. The old bit about even a stopped clock being right twice a day sort of applies.

I'd say they arrived at the right destination by the wrong route and that happens often.

Keep on pushin'

[Chris Nunn]

I thought it was an interesting argument but to me it failed to differentiate between strategic and operational. I'm just a lowly nug and may be a little slow here at ILE but what does FM 100-5 or FM 3-0 have to do with strategy--which seems to be the main issue they have. I mean, the name of the manual is "Operations." Perhaps its a definitional issue but shouldn't strategy involve more than one branch of services and possibly--probably heresy--more than one department in the executive branch? The argument the authors make that the operational level of war "operate[s] free from unwelcome interference from strategy...(67)" is, IMHO, flawed. If they truly believe this, they fail to answer the question why. If you like the DIME model, FM 100-5 and FM 3-0 are really only a subset of the M--the failue of the USG to have a true strategic (i.e. longer term that the 1 year mandate of the NSS) plan is probably a huge contributing cause. The rest of the USG is not fully integrated into the strategic plan and therefore strategy devolves into the land of operations. The authors conclusions--specifically the CvC arguments about war and politics--I think are valid, but by laying the blame at the feet of the operational level they miss the true issues in contemporary warfare linking politics, strategy, and tactics.