On Wilf advice I am copying this comment I did on the threat on Clausewitz delusion:

Definition of a decisive battle is quite loose with time. I’ll take the example of La Marne in 1914. It was merely a strategic decisive battle but was a tactical decisive battle as it was more a smart use of modern logistic technology and more or less did fix the front. But this was not the attempt or aim. (The objective was to protect Paris so the old dogma I have your capital = I won, would not happen).
But still it was a decisive battle.

I do not see too much where it falls in the discussion. This is mainly due to the fact that I did not have time to read the paper Wilf is talking about. But I did spot it when it came on the web and it is on my data bank. I am currently more occupied (for obvious professional reasons) in reading stuff on stabilisation. (SSI and US Peace Instituts (and some others) but also French and others stabilisation doctrine...).

My assumption would be that tactical decisive advantage do not give you a decisive strategic advantage as old dogma have to be review.
Iraq would be for me the case. US did take the capital but did not won the war at that very moment.

This would come in echo with the French troops return of experience from Afghanistan too.
Technology is not THE advantage for them. It is a good tool but too much technology brings new limits.
As example: the cyber trooper is now limited by the range of the network.
I believe the French are still (and I think it is quite relevant) very much in the old school "rustique" scheme. In clear: few technology (may be old) but with time and operation validation that does not impose you to compensate limits with additional troops. And new technologies that bring an added value to old onces but still allow you to perform the previous operations. (See the CESAR battery or Leclerc tank).
The old dilema of trusting/supporting the guy on the ground or the technocrate in the HQ most probably.
But still I need to read the paper first.