Matt86, you ain't wrong....you be jamming
Pardon my interjection, but I was under the impression that this was not correct - Grant's initial attitude towards Sherman after the latter proposed the March to the Sea was one of trepidation; that Sherman should first destroy Johnston/Hood's army before heading on his swath of destruction, or even head for Mobile. Sherman gradually convinced Grant he could not only pull this off, but the objective Grant really wanted - destruction of the Confederate Army in the West - could be done by Gen. George Thomas' Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga (as indeed happened).
I was similarly under the impression that Grant saw the destruction of Confederate armies as his goal, but that he came to see what Sherman was doing as the flip side of the same coin - that grinding Confederate armies to powder reinforced the helplessness civilians felt in the path of Sherman, and vice versa.
Aside from the torturous history lesson (my apologies if I am wrong), can I ask what is NOT Clausewitzian about Sherman's actions? Just as the Confederates targeted the Union will to continue, Sherman realized he had a golden opportunity to return the favor. His writing is littered with references to destroying the will of the enemy to resist. I feel like the calculated brutality this guy promotes is just another way of achieving victory in the competition of wills. . .he's being Clausewitzian without even realizing it.
Not to mention Sherman's March didn't kill 8-10% or whatever of the population - it burned and stole but did not often rape and murder. That was the intent. Sherman was also not one for pitched battles of annihilation as Grant was. So I don't know where this guy is getting his ideas or his facts, but the whole premise as Cavguy describes it seems absurd.
Matt
"Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall
One of the quickest things you learn in a combat zone is how much emotions effect actions. War is personal, and it cannot be reduced to a simple mathematical equation or engineering problem.
Two examples.
1. The scene in Band of Brothers the day after Echo Company discovered the concentration camp. They declare martial law and force the adjacent neighbors to clean the camp and bury the bodies. Echo Company used shame as an instrument of resolve. The other option would be to kill ever person in that town as punishment. I'm sure it crossed their minds.
2. In May 2007, after a raid, we discovered the videos of public beheadings in our town. Not knowing exactly how to react, I decided to force all the village elders to watch the video with me standing over telling them how utterly wrong and inhumane it was. I chose to use shame. In that instance, it worked. There was a lot of crying sheiks that day.
v/r
Mike
Granted Civil War history isn't my main field, but the answer isn't as simple as "Sherman had the idea and Grant resisted." And likewise the reverse isn't completely true.
Grant had learned the value, and practicality, of moving through the Southern countryside during the Vicksburg campaign. He also began to understand at that time that the Southern popular will would need to be defeated along with the field armies. But he also understood that Lee's ANV was a physical representation of that will, and that the Army of the Potomac would not likely close with and destroy that army without his physical presence. Actually, both Sherman and Grant were wary of the possibility of moving an entire army through the deep south, but over time both began to see the possibilities of that movement. Grant seems to have grasped the need to carry the war to the deep south first, but Sherman certainly came around quick enough. He was the one who was wary during the Vicksburg campaign of cutting loose from the supply lines and living off the county, but had clearly changed his tune when the Army of Tennessee cut loose through the deep south.
Both Sherman and Grant (and by extension Sheridan and many other senior Union leaders from the Western Theater) grasped the need to shatter Southern popular will and support for the cause. Such a realization seems to have come with slower speed and clarity to those Union commanders who spent most of their time fighting in Virginia.
Sherman's campaign certainly changed to a tune of punishment when they left Georgia and entered South Carolina.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
It is pretty hard to create only through Cavguy's post an sensible image of the critic of CvC offered by the lector.
His approval of Sherman and the description of his book seem to indicate that he is somehow irritated by the importance of the foreigner CvC in the military of the USA. The preview on Amazon really sounds like a personal rant, doesn't it?
Perhaps the digital ink is spent better elsewhere...In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.
This book reveals the failings of the U.S. Army in its adoption of a postmodern “Full Spectrum Operations" doctrine, which codifies Clauswitzian thinking. Such an approach, the author contends, leaves the military without the doctrine, training base, or force structure necessary to win offensive wars in our time. Instead, the author suggests, the army should adopt a new doctrinal framework based on an analysis of the historical record and previously successful American methods of war. A clear and persuasive critique of current operative ideas about warfare, The Clausewitz Delusion lays out a new explanation of victory in war, based on an analysis of wartime casualties and post-conflict governance. It is a book of critical importance to policymakers, statesmen, and military strategists at every level.
Firn
I don't think I suggested (at least I hope I didn't) that Grant opposed it and Sherman won him over - only that he showed some resistance to the grand scale of what Sherman was planning. He worried if it was feasible with Hood maneuvering in Sherman's rear - remember, during the Siege of Vicksburg, he sent Sherman to Jackson to guard against Johnston's possible relief expedition.
No argument with any of what you said, though. I wonder if the phenomenon you notice is the result of minimal contact with the Southern population by officers and men fighting with the Army of the Potomac?
Getting back to the topic at hand, Firn is probably right, it seems a bit premature to judge the entire book and argument based on these snippets, but coming from Cavguy and the publisher's own description at Amazon, it does seem highly suspect.
Matt
"Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall
Apologize I couldn't sketch the arguments in more detail. The presentation lasted an hour and I wasn't taking notes as I was processing what was being said. Some of it may or may not be in his forthcoming book.
I don't think the author is insincere or anyhow prejudiced, he sincerely believes the influence of CvC and the way it was implemented has reduced the effectiveness of the US Army. I am not enough of a CvC/Jomini student yet to really rule on what CvC meant or didn't mean and whether he adequately accounts for CvC's "intent".
My issue was the 5-18% number and the logical implication that successful pacification requires mass murder. Even if effective, it's not a COA that should be considered by the USA.
Niel
You have my respect for stressing that point during the lecture. Such a number may sound pretty understandable and agreeable on paper but as you said it will in practice be very bloody. Killing in the process of the pacification of Afghanistan up to 18% of the population or 8.600.000 humans doesn't seem to fit the purpose of the current mission.
Leaving that aside I guess we will have to wait for that book to see if it provides something useful. The perception so far is not a good one, but it might be overridden by the qualities of the book.
Firn
Last edited by Firn; 10-12-2009 at 08:59 PM.
It was a growing pain sort of thing. Both were fair Generals, neither was great. Thomas and Buford were both better, just not in the right place at the right time.
Any General that says as Grant did "I propose to fight it out on this line if it take all summer" has some problems as a tactician, particularly considering it was said immediately after he got a really bloody nose with 17,000 casualties in The Wilderness and was in process of getting zapped again at Spotsylvania with another 18,000 casualties. His claim to fame is actually that he had more troops to throw away than did his opponents-- and he surely did that.
A strategist he was not. Good writer, though...
Are you sure that is the logical implication? If it was, then okay, maybe he's crazy.
I suspect that he was looking at cases where that much of the population was killed - in large part because it was a total war - and he then drew a link between that beat down and the willingness to submit. If that was his thought process, then I don't think that the logical implication is a mass murder COA.
Seems you've been living in the deep South too long and have drank up all the Kool Aide.
Grant knew that he had to hit Lee again and again since the ANV was the CoG, not so much Richmond. So he hit him hard at the Wilderness. When the Federals broke off the attack Lee (and many Federal officers) was sure Grant would withdraw. He didn't, he moved to his left. This threw Lee off his game a bit but he rallied well to block Grant at Spotsylvania. So it went until U.S. stole a march on Bobby and crossed the James, but his Corps were slow in taking Petersburg and so the siege began. Grant lost about 55,000 (which were fewer men than the Federals had lost in the three previous years trying to do the same thing) to Lee's 33,000, the key being the Union casualties were a smaller % of overall forces. Since Sherman at the same time was “making Georgia howl” there could be no shifting of Confederate forces between the theaters. Also, when Early threatened Washington Grant failed to react as previous commanders had; which was to withdraw and rush north. He kept focused on Lee.
Grant formulated his strategy based on his greater manpower to make his flanking movements and keeping his supply lines secure. Lee was able to counter since he had the advantage of interior lines, but only because he was obliged to defend Richmond and his supply line to the southwest. Grant had considered going west of Richmond with the same strategy but it would have unacceptably lengthen his supply line. He also factored in the desire that one of his attacks might break through to Richmond. Both Grant and Lee knew that a prolonged siege (whether around Richmond or Petersburg) would end the war in favor of the North.
Agree that neither Grant nor Sherman was a “great captain” per say, but neither was Lee (he was too Virginia centric and at times overly aggressive for the resources available to the CSA). In the aggregate, when one totals Grant's losses from Beaumont to Appomattox he lost fewer men numerically (and effectively won the war in the western theater in 1863) than Lee incurred from Seven Pines to Appomattox. Grant used his obvious superiority in manpower and resources to defeat Lee, like that's a bad thing. Was he supposed to just sit back like all the other AotP commanders before him?
"What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."
Nah, your aim's off -- if you aimed...
I probably woulda fit for the Union. However, I don't drink Kool Aid; that's sugary stuff for all you kids...True -- Grant wasted him away and continually slipped to the SE. No great strategy but an admittedly effective one.Grant formulated his strategy based on his greater manpower to make his flanking movements and keeping his supply lines secure. Lee was able to counter since he had the advantage of interior lines, but only because he was obliged to defend Richmond and his supply line to the southwest...Nor did I say he was -- I cited Thomas and Buford, both Union. Only Jackson whom I did not mention comes close to being great for the South. He was better than any of the others save possibly Buford and both of them died too young. John Gordon and Forrest may have become great with more experience; they didn't get it so they don't make it to greatness (whatever that is)...neither was LeeI hope not, that's the American way; has been in every war we've won and the two we lost (both due to really bad Generals; one northerner, one southerner). In any event, I didn't say it was bad, just that it was what he did -- which you corroborate.Grant used his obvious superiority in manpower and resources to defeat Lee, like that's a bad thing.No, nor did I say he should have -- I just said he wasn't a particularly great General and named two northerners (one from Kentucky, one from Virgina )who were better. I think you're picking a fight where none need exist -- that ain't good Generalship.Was he supposed to just sit back like all the other AotP commanders before him?
than to pick a fight with you...didn't you actually serve in the late unpleasantness?
Buford probably would have proven to be great, he was far and away the best cavalry commander on either side. Thomas was solid, and shrewd since he deftly avoided taking a major command. It would have been interesting how things would have played out if the roles of Thomas and Sherman had been reversed.
Other picks would be Reynolds and Cleburne who, like Buford, were also cut down before their time.
My aim is poor, at least that's what my wife says when she's cleaning up the head.
I too gave up Kool Aid quite some time ago having acquired a taste for Glenmorangie and Dalwhinnie.
"What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."
Alas no, then in my 61st reincarnation, I was advising Wu Wen Chen, late Warlord and ruler of Guiyang at the time. Pity, I could've had fun ragging G.A. Custer...Hmm. Sounds like yours and mine been communicatin' somehow...My aim is poor, at least that's what my wife says when she's cleaning up the head.Good stuff, I'm told, can't do Scotch. Results of a weekend foray in Oceanside in 1951 which entailed quantities of White Horse (I know, I know - but on a Corporal's pay back then, choice was limited... ) and did not end well; there was minor illness involved. Haven't much desire for it since.I too gave up Kool Aid quite some time ago having acquired a taste for Glenmorangie and Dalwhinnie.
Fortunately, there is bourbon.
As you work on that project don't forget that the plains tribes were largely subjugated because the buffalo were eliminated. The buffalo gave them everything they needed: food, shelter, clothing, even a theology. When the buffalo was gone they got in line fast for blankets and beef.
It's enough to make a body think that the buffalo was one of them there Clauswitzian centers of gravity that I keep hearing about.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
Well, here we have a dialectic/translation problem. I was not talking about THE decisive battle but using the as in French where “the” would mean “a”.Clausewitz did not say talk about THE decisive battle. He talked about the need for Decisive battles that gained you benefit in terms of strategy.
Also, I believe this could be debated but I did not read CvC in German.
But I have to admit that benefits from Waterloo were longer term than Austerlitz on the political side. But the benefits from Austerlitz were larger at its time. (more countries involved, larger impact in European powers…).
Just to add some spices to the discussion. Definition of a decisive battle is quite loose with time. I’ll take the example of La Marne in 1914. It was merely a strategic decisive battle but was a tactical decisive battle as it was more a smart use of modern logistic technology and more or less did fix the front. But this was not the attempt or aim. (The objective was to protect Paris so the old dogma I have your capital = I won, would not happen).
But still it was a decisive battle.
Closer from us, I can see where such statement that “mass killings benefits” could come from.
I will take the example of last Israel operations. (No critics, no offense, no judgment, please. Take it as an intellectual exercise).
The 2006 summer war was a defeat and Israel needed to reaffirm its military supremacy. So they did conduct Castle Lead.
I have no idea of the ratio of population killed among Palestinian. But IDF maintained a 1/10 ratio if you melt civilian+armed population for the Palestinian. (Roughly 1 IDF for 10 Palestinian). And, as you said, Israel gained some time.
Was it a decisive battle? Personally I would not go that way. The Rand studies about Israel cycle of violence have shown that basically Israel is buying 11 month of peace between each round of terror/war.
On a regional scale? Well, that can be debate also since Iran has shown capacity to produce continental range weapons.
On the hostage scene? Yes most probably.
But does that really balance the bad image that Israel did built during the operation? Did that worst the lost of credit among the international opinion (even in West)? That is not that clear. Just for this I would say that the statement of killing plenty, even combatants, would be somehow fault. It just shows a theoretical understanding of war. Also, CvC did not write about stabilization and stabilization was much easier at his time. Well may be not in Spain.
In war among the people and with the increase of education of the population (civilian + military + international opinion) such assumption based on terror is almost an immediate political loss. So the benefits from an operation or war that kills many civilian (the figure should not be count in %) has more disadvantages than advantages.
Or the guy is just crazy.
...so you might want to point that out on this thread here, because this is very relevant! - http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8647
Good luck with that. Ever met an Israeli?I will take the example of last Israel operations. (No critics, no offense, no judgment, please. Take it as an intellectual exercise).
Joking aside, Israel has a very simple view of strategy. It is the use of force to maintain the state, at all and any cost. It does not have to be perfect or even good. It just has to work, and it does. No one expects "Peace" anytime soon. Relative security is good enough.
Economy growing, population growing, and 3 years since a serious war = all good.
The Israeli population (as opposed to political elite) also cares very little for what others think. The only condemnation that had any impact at all during Cast Lead was that from the Turkish Islamist Party!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Granted we're diverting from topic here, but I do understand that. But it also varies from tribe to tribe. The groups most impacted by the demise of the buffalo were the Plains tribes...the loss of buffalo didn't do squat to the social support systems of the Southwestern tribes (Navajo, Apache, Yavapai, and so on). And some of the tribes had their resistance broken before the buffalo were removed from the equation (the Comanche are a good example, as are the Kiowa).
I'll hush now....the Indian Wars are one of my main focal areas, so I could bore folks to death with tons of trivia.....
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Maybe it's been too many months that I read Clausewitz for the last time, but I'm sure that he wrote in German. So he wasn't using the word "decisive", and that eliminates my problems with the fuzzy definition.
The German words "Entscheidung" (decision) and ("entscheidend" (supposedly "decisive") may have evolved over 170 years, adding another potential problem.
Nevertheless, I can assure you that modern Germans would not use these words for battles like the Marne battle, except ex ante.
So despite I didn't read his book recently I'm quite confident that he wouldn't have called the battle of the Marne a Entscheidungsschlacht (ex post) - except maybe ex ante (then still only being potentially entscheidend).
The same applies to the Tannenberg battle (Eastern Prussia 1914), of course.
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