Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Why? How is Recce going to work moving at anything much over 2-3 kph - unless they want to blunder into an ambush. As the Soviets found out, you can't locate the enemy by the location from the burning wrecks of your CRP or Advanced Guard.
It's in part a function of risk and different speed/tempo for different unit sizes.
1) You're able to advance with small elements if there's no continuous defended front line (enabling the use of a combat-capable recon screen or cloud as a substitute for WW infantry division lines).
2) Small elements are quicker in all regards than large ones (making large element stats irrelevant).
3) Losing small elements (or part thereof) is less a disaster than doing so with large elements. Both offer the same benefit (gaining access to territory and info) by advancing, so it follows that small elements can be ordered to advance quickly more than large ones. (no assumption of a zero casualty policy) at the same risk expectancy value.
Even if small units did not advance quicker - who cares? Many small ones advancing at 3 km/h gain way more ground and info than few large ones doing so. There's also no need to accept major battles quickly, and even 3 km/h cover a very long distance in a mere week (500 km)! Many small elements advancing at 3km/h get far behind enemy main forces in a single day.
Movement speed is no bottleneck and therefore of marginal interest (today).
What type of Brigade and what size of area? Number of routes. Recce and securing of Assembly areas? Route proving?
I'll have that nailed down in one to three years (in article or book form), it's work in progress. It's already for sure that the end result will be very different from orthodox concepts.
The concept brigades will be less unorthodox than everything else, though.
A hint: I won't assign an area or zone or phase lines or anything similar to main combat forces (combined arms brigades or similar).
The combat-capable recce by company-sized elements would own the land much like many boxers shape the fight with the quick jab(Coy+) and seek the major blows with the powerful cross (Bn+, Bde).
Have convoy speeds improved since the 1970's - 40 kph?
I don't care. Operational relocation movement of a Bde wouldn't last for longer than two or three hours anyway - often less than its preparation. There are usually enough streets for use, so that bottleneck is likely gone as well (traffic capability is proportional to average vehicle length, spacing, speed - and available roads*used lanes).
Besides, convoy speed is a function of employed tactic & terrain.
How on earth could you come up with those numbers? - and BTW, planing cycles today are 4 times what they were in 1944.
It's actually less about coming up with those numbers today. I'd rather let the units exercise for weeks in the field and push them for becoming ever quicker, removing obstacles in the process.
In the end tactics and operational concept would need to be adjusted/limited (impossible or too risky moves being cut out).
The present problem is that such figures vary a lot between units (and over time) as well as between countries. An minimum, average, median and maximum would only become useful if the room for improvement was already mostly exploited (because that would need to happen in wartime).
I don't pay much attention to today's planning cycles. I work on major conventional war theory. A major conventional war would be certainly crack down on a lot of poor habits that we developed. Units would lose officers and staffs officers would be sent as replacements, staffs would overall become much leaner in size and procedures.
Manstein wrote in a book about the huge difference between staff work in combat ops and in resting phases; the paperwork and slow stuff was done in the latter. He lead an army group (dozens of divisions) from a few railway cars.
OK, that's why you have staffs. Staffs today are -based on evidence - less effective than they were in WW2.
Bookmarks