How Operational Art Devoured Strategy

[Tom Odom]

Tom,
FM 100-5 did not directly cause the problem, but it certainly was a significant contributor IMHO. My take on the Army's method of implementing the "deep battle" fight advocated in the 80's versions of FM 100-5 is that it had to lead to the exact opposite of what you indicate, corrrectly, is the way to reduce centralization. To be able to fight the deep battle, headquarters at brigade and above started to bloat their planning and operations staffs. They did this because, as victims of the micromanagement the Army practiced in SEA in the 60s and 70s, they also felt the need to stay abreast of the close battle. THey had learned not to be trusted as junior officers. So, as they became the Army's more senior "leaders" (starting at Battalion command level), they in turn, did not trust their subordinate leaders to do their jobs. Thus, the division of effort required to implement the "areas of interest/areas of influence" concepts effectively did not happen. Of course it didn't help matters that most CPXs and TEWTS (not to mention the environment at the NTC) had no real "deep battle" component to keep the higher headquarters ops staffs out of the knickers of the battalions and companies. Nor did it help that the only time the US Army engaged in major combat after the move to the new theory, it was the attacker and did not have to worry about finding and fixing an operational or strategic second echelon before it overwhelmed us in the main battle area.

WM

If the issue you are describing is centralization, no issues with your points regarding the effects of 100-5 on centralization.

But if the issue is the void in strategic thought and application as was put forth in the the paper that this thread was about in the first place, then 100-5 didn't create that void, it was there before 100-5 and it is still there now.

My point to the authors is that if you want to understand a lack of strategy, don't start at the bottom (or middle) and work up. You are in essence examining the symptoms, not the cause. There is much talk of military dominence of foreign policy; that may be true, but the absence of strategic thought across the interagency gap is the cause.

Operational art devoured strategy? That would be a thin meal indeed.

And Wilf: Where's my blind spot?

That would be at the operational level

Tom