How Operational Art Devoured Strategy

[wm]

Well in 1909 the British teaching of "Military Operations" considered only "Strategical Issues" and Tactics - explicitly stated . Operations were essentially how "Armies" did "stuff". _ "Advancing along a coast line." "Movement by Sea." Success in both Tactics and Strategy required competent and well planned "Operations."

I think what all the above is telling me is that the idea of an "Operational Level" - as popularly conceived, needs to be held to rigour.

I concur that some of the stuff about operational art is probably muddy thinking. We could probably make a case that it is really still just tactics--i.e., fire and movement/maneuver--but the distances are greatly expanded--not that big an issue given the improved capability to communicate over the longer distances and thereby view/direct the action.

The first part of your post however equivocates on the meaning of operations. I think the basic 1909 point is to distinguish the strategic and tactical issue in military operations from issues in support of those operations (in the manufacturing world I think the distinction is between operations, as production, and support as logistics, sales, HR and all the other stuff military folks lump under combat service support). The other sense of operations in your post applies to classes of activities used to execute a military event, such as a river crossing operation as a way of maneuvering on or near the battlefield, covering force operations as a way of hiding your tactical dispositions from an enemy and channeling its attack into a desirable (on your part) location for the defensive tactics you intend to use.