Pakistani internal security (catch all)

**slapout9** · 10-15-2009

Originally Posted by omarali50

If I was not from Lahore, I would sit back with my bag of popcorn and my diet coke and watch this #### go down on live TV. But I cant. I am afraid that a situation worse than Algeria might be coming down the pike, and we are less prepared for it than the Algerians were. Some of the pathologies are similar (corrupt elite, unjust system, post-colonial schizophrenic culture, rebels who have picked a particularly vicious ideology to express their hatred of this awful elite) and some are even worse (no history of common liberation struggle, greater penetration of Saudi influence, partition and its unique pathologies, much larger population, more ungoverned areas, lack of credible political leadership). This is not looking good.

Omarali, keep us up to date I enjoy reading your reports. I saw a TV news report tonight about Lahore and 2 other attacks they were supposedly conducted all at about the same time. If that is correct that shows a high degree of coordination for all the attacks. What is your opinion on this?

**omarali50** · 10-16-2009

These are well trained terrorists. I am sure you have studied the operation they launched against Mumbai. And they have these things written down in manuals. When you join LET, you first go for a basic course (a few weeks) learning to shoot and stuff. Then some go on to more advanced courses. They keep diaries, they get homework. They are highly motivated. I am not surprised at the level of coordination. But all of this requires safe houses and training centers. Unless the army decides to go after those, there is no way you can protect every possible target. There are literally thousands of targets.

**davidbfpo** · 10-22-2009

Stephen Tankel has added a trenchant comment on the situation in Pakistan: http://www.icsr.info/blog/Jumping-the-Shark and asks at the end:

For starters, I'm curious if anyone out there knows of improvements or planned improvements in terms of a) better inter-agency intelligence sharing; b) increased funding and training for Pakistani police; or c) increasing capacity within intelligence agencies that are not the ISI.

I know there is a thread on the ANP, but I cannot immediately recall one on the police in Pakistan (although ISI do crop up irregularly - in a thread?).

Another day I shall search around for articles on the Pakistan police. There is a ICG report on: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5737 (July 2008).

davibfpo

**Dayuhan** · 10-24-2009

Very interesting situation... the Pakistani Taliban seem to be gambling that this string of attacks will break the political will behind action against them and their sanctuaries. That seems a bit of a risk; the attacks could have the opposite effect. I don't know enough about Pakistan to have an opinion on how the government and the populace will respond, but it certainly bears watching.

**Bill Moore** · 10-24-2009

No fiction writer could ever have written this and got away with it. Indeed, truth is stranger than fiction.

The above statement is so true. If I wrote a fiction book in 1999 and the tale basically went that some master mind in Afghanistan launched a few dedicated terrorists to the U.S. to crash planes into the WTC and the Pentagon most analysts would have fell on the floor laughing. Then assuming our response was to send in a few brave souls from the CIA and Special Operations to oust this evil force, and just to add some more spice I might write that a few Special Forces teams on horse back were directing deadly fires from our air assets to support their Northern Alliance partners that they were fighting side by side with any so called serious military analyst would wonder just what the hell I was smoking when I wrote this. If I then wrote that in response to the 9/11 attacks we invaded Iraq the diplomatic community would say no way, that's stupid, but nevermind them, back to the conflict. I would write that our mighty armed forces were challenged by 4GW irregular forces, but that our forces eventually eventually got the upper hand after re-learning how to defeat irregular threats. Those military analysts who thought if we had the ability to defeat the Soviets in the Fulda Gap, then we obviously had the ability to defeat a few irregulars or dead enders, are still scratching their heads. There is no way that an irregular force could have seriously challenged their armor and firepower formations, so my book would go in the trash can. If I wrote book three of this saga and indicated that a nuclear power nation-state was facing the possibility of state failure due to irregular threats that are connected to global non-state movement I would have been thrown into the nut house.

Our failure to stop 9/11 according to the 9/11 commission was a lack of imagination. What a difference a day makes.

**omarali50** · 10-24-2009

cross posting from abumuqawama, here is my take on this offensive:
Based purely on public information about the terrain, the military operation and what we know of the insurgents, plus what the refugees are saying: the army has advanced a short distance into the Islamic emirate. They captured and then lost Hakeemullah's home village and have not managed to get it back yet. The taliban are willing to stand and fight in at least some locations and the army is very loath to close and fight hand to hand. The army is shelling and strafing villages and compounds with abandon. Those places are mostly empty, so casualties on all sides are low. My guess is that until now the army has suffered more casualties than the taliban. That is because the individual talib soldiers are better trained and motivated than the army. The army has a huge edge in firepower but that is not enough to dislodge them from where they are prepared to stand and fight. The army's hope is that massive use of artillery and airpower and a general show of force will convince the talibs to melt away rather than stand and fight. The taliban are willing to go along with that in many places, but are not willing to just withdraw from everywhere and allow the army to claim victory. At some point, the army will have to fight up close, at which point casualties will rise dramatically. To avoid such casualties the army is willing to go slow and hope that the good taliban can convince the evil taliban not to be stubborn and to let the army have its way (in return the talibs get to stay alive and concentrate on Afghanistan). But the bad taliban are not willing to follow the script. THEIR hope is that their campaign of terrorism will cause the people of Pakistan to press the army to stop. What I cannot figure out is what is the army's plan if they continue terrorism and DON'T melt away? Taking Waziristan ridge by ridge is not going to be a picnic. MAYBE the army is determined to do that if they have to, but I dont see convincing evidence of that as yet...I look forward to your report....