Light Infantry and Afghanistan

[William F. Owen]

http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/2009/09/30/...n-afghanistan/

By Sven Ortman - someone well known to most folks here. Interesting stuff and very well worth reading in my opinion.

[Wargames Mark]

I'm not familiar with Jäger tactics, but I have some thoughts on the ROE issue.

If I understand correctly, insurgents in Afghanistan are pretty good at setting up engagements to leverage ISAF constraints regarding avoidance of civilian casualties. I assume that when patrols get into firefights with insurgents in Afghanistan, that these engagements are usually insurgent ambushes of ISAF patrols. The enemy has chosen the time and place of the battle and may engage from a populated place or structure of cultural significance.

If this view is accurate, then even the use of direct fire can be expected to cause civilian casualties and destruction of civilian property. I am thinking especially of suppressive fire from automatic weapons. Since some actions are necessary even to break contact, then a certain amount of harm is unavoidable (it's a war).

If the enemy is good at setting up ambushes and understands how to take advantage of our forces' ROE, then it is generally to be expected that he will cause casualties.

While I do not subscribe to the good-deeds-über-alles school of COIN, I recognize that restrictive ROE in COIN are indeed necessary. I think I understand the point of view, strategy, and tactics of the enemy. My conclusion is that it might not be new tactics that our Infantry require, but rather a more realistic view of warfare that our civilian public requires - people are going to get hurt and killed. New technologies and adjustments to TTPs may help take the edge off. Clever officers and NCOs who can think effectively under stress are critical as well. But in the end, I think that the public just has to get it through their heads that war is war and there is price not only to freedom, but to security.

Additional:

Whether we're talking about ambushes, IEDs, or ambushes initiated with IEDs, the actions in response to contact are not where the meat is. The important thing is network defeat. Take it to the enemy - squeeze every last bit of information from every contact with him and have smart people who are trained and paying attention create the situational understanding to facilitate effective targeting of those elements that the enemy can least afford to lose.

[tequila]

I'm in agreement with Ken's prescription on American tolerance for casualties. Americans have a high tolerance for casualties when and if one can see visible progress. Americans do not like casualties in the service of what looks like "more of the same" or a long, drawn-out struggle.

[carl]

I assume that when patrols get into firefights with insurgents in Afghanistan, that these engagements are usually insurgent ambushes of ISAF patrols.

From what I have read this is mostly the case (I hope I am mistaken). It raises the question-Why are they ambushing us? Why aren't we ambushing them?

These are simple but important questions. Why is it like this?

[Ken White]

These are simple but important questions. Why is it like this?

They are ambushing us because they are patient, they know the terrain, they are hill people who were raised in and have finely honed senses of their environment, knowing the culture intimately they can hide amongst the people, they have great tactical flexibility, they are not impeded in mobility by excessive protection and creature comfort equipment, they have no media determined to point out every error or presumed error and they have a few good leaders who are well experienced and tactically competent and who are not risk averse.

We OTOH are not ambushing them as often as we should because we are too impatient, most units do not know the terrain and are not allowed to patrol adequately to learn it, we are predominately urban and have little sense of rugged rural terrain and the skills needed to survive in that environment, we are vastly different than most of the local people and do not fit in at all in most cases plus generally do not understand and, more importantly, dislike, the local culture -- and they sense this. We also do not have much tactical flexibility, are impeded in mobility by excessive protection and creature comfort equipment, have international media determined to point out every error or presumed error and even make up some errors if necessary, and have too few good leaders who are experienced, tactically competent and who are not terribly risk averse.

If you insist on simple overarching answers -- marginal training, lack of flexibility and risk aversion. Not necessarily in that order...

[carl]

Thanks Ken. I prefer the detailed explanation, and am saddened by it.

Can the situation be changed? Or, in other words, will the changes required happen, be encouraged or even thought about? Is it even viewed as important?

[Ken White]

will be changed because many in the Army and Marines sense that the goal they have been given by our political leadership (both the current and previous administrations) is not really achievable, therefor they will do their duty while trying to avoid losses which requires risk aversion. They will also try to protect their institutions from bad press, thus being even more risk averse.

Further, as you look at our adverse factors in that laundry list above, some of those cannot be changed. The theory that an organization (or any group of people) can and will do what it's told is ridiculous -- but a lot of people really seem to believe it.

We have a number of strengths but they can be and often are misapplied by trying to do the wrong thing at the wrong time in the wrong place. We do not play to our strengths and tend to misapply them. That's a macro view of the micro view that they ambush us and we don't ambush them.

The required modifications to training and TTP are highly unlikely barring two drivers; a politically directed change of mission AND a significant improvement in the way the media does business. My guess is that there will be incremental improvements by the armed forces but major change is improbable as both required drivers are unlikely. The second factor impacts the first and it is highly unlikely to change in time (if ever).

I'm sure it's been thought about and I suspect that there are many who could and would make the necessary changes on our part but the system opposes that. A bureaucracy resists change...

As for important, depends on which school of thought you ascribe to; the COIN or 'anything but COIN' variant. The former think it is important while the latter outnumber them and do not think it is important. You can see who's winning that argument. That goes back to my first comment, the sensing of an unachievable or unrealistic goal. That drives a lot of things...

People are pesky. They will insist on thinking and not receiving purported wisdom from above as divine guidance...

[carl]

"I doubt it"

I suspected that would be the answer.

I have another question. I believe we, you and your comrades, learned how to ambush them in VN. Is that widely known amongst contemporary Soldiers/Marines? If not, should it be and if it were would that make a difference now? If people now knew it could be done and has been done by Americans, would they be more inclined to aspire to doing it?

Forgive my naivete in this next comment, but as a civilian, I would have hoped people would think this important just as matter of professionalism, ie "Their infantry is doing better than our infantry in this aspect of infantry warfare. We should change that."

[Fuchs]

The identification problem (how to know they're Taliban before they open fire?) and the shadowing problem (patrols being shadowed by unarmed scouts once they leave their base) also play into the ambush problem.


I personally wouldn't worry very much about the ambush problem as long as they're poor shots, though. It's pretty much movement to contact, and the contact is very weak by European standards. A competent enemy would have crushed many platoons and companies by now.

Patrols should always do their job in packs; two or three patrol squads or platoons with some spacing (like 1 km). That enables a lot of manoeuvre even after one team got fixed. It also complicates the OPFOR's intelligence job.

[Ken White]

"Their infantry is doing better than our infantry in this aspect of infantry warfare. We should change that."

Their infantry isn't really doing better, it is just radically different. Not really asymmetrically different but systemically so (they get in as many ruts and bad habits as do we...). Some of those differences are to their advantage and some are to our advantage.

It would be great if we improved our training -- and that is happening, if slowly -- and it'd be even better if we weren't so risk averse but we come from a risk averse society so that's not likely to change. All things considered, ambushes can make a splash with our ignorant media and they have some limited propaganda value but they are not going to change the course of the effort in Afghanistan. Most of the nominal shortfalls we have are societally induced and will not likely change, others are goal and perception related and may change.

Either way, they are likely to be the initiators of contact more often than are we but that will not make much difference other than in the perceptions of some. This infantry isn't really better than ours, it's not bad at all but it's not as good as ours -- it just has some non bureaucratic and home team advantages that will not change and do not need to do so...

[carl]

Ken and Fuchs:

Do you think there is a psychological aspect to this shortfall in our ops in that because of it, people are more inclined to think that the mission given or implied is less achievable? If for the last 3 years, we had initiated most of the contacts would people, both military but maybe more importantly civilian, be less inclined to think Afghan a hopeless task? Like Ken says this may mostly be important in the perceptions of some but maybe those perceptions are more important than we think.

The other side of that coin is the perception of the Taliban. If we were the ones doing the ambushing, how much would that affect their confidence and determination? If they knew that most of the time the first indication of our presence was that "sudden burst of fire", would they be so eager?

I just thought of the local villagers too. They keep score. If they see our guys always being hit from ambush and not ambushing back, it must affect their calculations.

What do you guys think?

[Nevyan]

I assume that when patrols get into firefights with insurgents in Afghanistan, that these engagements are usually insurgent ambushes of ISAF patrols. The enemy has chosen the time and place of the battle and may engage from a populated place or structure of cultural significance.

You are slightly incorrect in your describing an ambush.

In an Ambush you set the Place and the enemy sets the Time.

In a Raid you set the Time and the enemy sets the Place.

[Ken White]

In an Ambush you set the Place and the enemy sets the Time.

Correct if "you" are executing the ambush but even then a marginally competent enemy can avoid ever setting the time...

OTOH, if the enemy sets the ambush, he has picked the place and you can and should avoid giving him the time.

Even better is to entice him to set up an ambush in a really bad location (while avoiding having that happen to you)

In a Raid you set the Time and the enemy sets the Place.

True in a sense. Then again if you raid where your enemy wishes you to do so you may encounter an ambush.

You can also raid a place where you allow the enemy to set the time -- to his disadvantage, of course...

Rules of thumb are good -- tactical flexibility and originality are better.

Here's another rule of thumb: In low intensity warfare, if the other guy initiates more contacts through whatever method than you do -- you're doing something wrong.

[carl]

Here's another rule of thumb: In low intensity warfare, if the other guy initiates more contacts through whatever method than you do -- you're doing something wrong.

Is there any information available as to who is initiating more contacts in Afghanistan, us or them?

[Chris jM]

An article that is relevant to the discussion - Application of the Classic Light Infantry Model in Afghanistan by Captain J. D. Winfrey.

It was one of the lead articles in the Dec 09 Marine Corp Gazette - for those like me without a subscription, the essay it is based upon can be found here: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

Basically, it boils down to 'more and better patrolling' using the concept of adaptable, resource-light infantry.

I did like his differentiation between 'line' and 'light' infantry which is something I have never come across before and appeals to my uneducated perception of force structures. In saying that I have always been confused between the American 'Ranger' classification and 'Light Infantry' title, never really seeing where one was different to the other.

On the same note, I saw an article on the FELIN soldier today (the French soldier modernisation programme) and there is no way you would describe them as light!

[Fuchs]

There's a long history of "light infantry".

The distinction began when body armour and discipline were introduced (especially in Greece and its cultural influence zone, including Italy).
Skirmishers were quite important in the last generations before Alexander the Great. They were elusive enough to avoid decisive close combat (few horsemen in Greece) and armed with ranged weapons (slings, javelins or bows). Such skirmishers were quite quick on their feet and thus also useful for foraging, attacking enemies on mountain peaks and pursuit.

The idea of "light" infantry has other strong examples in the 18th century; less-disciplined Austro-Hungarian border militia infantry ("Grenzer") and German Jäger ("hunters") skirmishers. The standard line infantry weapons of the time were terribly inaccurate muzzle-loaded smoothbore muskets. Muzzle-loaded rifles were slower firing (unable to stop infantry charges), expensive and required more skills.
Units with recruits of forester descent were raised and equipped with rifles in order to produce skirmishers and because they (due to an elite status and privileges) did not desert as easily as normal line infantry. Army leaders avoided to march line infantry through forest areas, sending them to forage or on picket duty because they deserted too easily (much of Germany is mostly covered by forests, though!).

Technology changed and line infantry got breech-loaded rifles that fires accurate and quick. The line infantry also got more loyal thanks to nationalism and became able to do what light infantry was able to do before.
Light infantry morphed (with breaks) to "sharpshooters" and "snipers".

It's similar with the Stoßtruppen and Arditi of WWI; innovative at their time (and nowadays labelled as "light infantry", especially the Stoßtruppen), but their advantages were either obsolete or incorporated into line infantry till mid-WW2.


To sum it up; "light" infantry was post-Renaissance pretty much the vanguard in infantry development. The line infantry absorbed light infantry traits over time (without really being "lightweight").

[Sylvan]

Are tough. We tried several different ways to get into ambush positions without being compromised. In the absence of air assault, you are really limited. Every goat herder has a cell phone and anybody leaving a FOB is instantly known. We did drive-by drop offs, dismounted humps out of the FOB, false mechanical break downs and the best results we got were meeting engagements. While the ambush position themselves were never attacked, we never made contact after getting into position. Patrolling is critical, but the integration of ISR/Air and ground is where real success lies in Afghanistan. Otherwise, you are largely wasting time from a kinetic viewpoint. The act of patrolling is still critical, however for its own COIN value.

[Ken White]

Are tough. Speaking from other wars, one without FOBs (but sometimes with, sometimes without, a MLR) and one with FOBs plus a couple of other excursions with a mixed case, the problem you're really having is the FOB concept. Same problem in Viet Nam, that's what led to the LRP development and employment and even to the development of freeze dried rations to provide lightweight sustenance for a week or two. Doubt we'll do that today for several reasons; fear of lack of control being paramount...

Ideally, you'd kick out for a couple of weeks at a time and thus, while still falling under observation, would have a better chance of a stealthy ambush placement. Can't do that because our equipment today wasn't designed for it and we haven't trained to do it -- given the risk aversion endemic in the USA today, we're not likely to do that for the GPF. The FOBs aren't going away for pretty much the same reason.

So the fact that ambushes are always tough is exacerbated by the condition of the US Armed Forces and of Afghanistan. Keep trying -- and keep your head down...

[Sylvan]

Are tough. Speaking from other wars, one without FOBs (but sometimes with, sometimes without, a MLR) and one with FOBs plus a couple of other excursions with a mixed case, the problem you're really having is the FOB concept. Same problem in Viet Nam, that's what led to the LRP development and employment and even to the development of freeze dried rations to provide lightweight sustenance for a week or two. Doubt we'll do that today for several reasons; fear of lack of control being paramount...

Ideally, you'd kick out for a couple of weeks at a time and thus, while still falling under observation, would have a better chance of a stealthy ambush placement. Can't do that because our equipment today wasn't designed for it and we haven't trained to do it -- given the risk aversion endemic in the USA today, we're not likely to do that for the GPF. The FOBs aren't going away for pretty much the same reason.

So the fact that ambushes are always tough is exacerbated by the condition of the US Armed Forces and of Afghanistan. Keep trying -- and keep your head down...

Modern communications and the wide open terrain of Afghanistan really ramp up the degree of difficulty. Vietnam at least you could manuever out of sight and every rice farmer didn't have instant world wide communication abilities.

[Ken White]

Vietnam at least you could manuever out of sight and every rice farmer didn't have instant world wide communication abilities.

Some places in VN, yes, however most, probably about 2/3 to 3/4 at that time, not so on the out of sight. Not all triple canopy and mangrove swamps. Great deal of primary rain forest and even more ag and scrub land...

Also true on the Farmers. However, in Veet Nam as is true in those parts of the 'Stan without global comm, Farmers most always have kids who are used to doing what they're told...

Every war brings its own unique problems -- and solutions.