COIN -v- CT debate

[jmm99]

My reason for saying that is: a commonly-accepted definition of the tactic called "terrorism" does not exist that does not have one or more holes in it. Still, like pornography, we tend to recognize it when we see it.

1. The various small groups in the 70s that practiced "terrroism" are examples of nearly pure "terrorism", which had no clear political effort. Their apparent strategy was disruption of the existing systems of government (except for those with which they were temporarily allied), and thus, in some not clearly identified way, to result in a system acceptable to them. Of course, they also rented themselves out to other groups to do their dirty work.

2. An insugency, whether totally homegrown or whether supported or instigated by an external power (which is then waging a form of unconventional warfare), is a totally different animal, because the political effort (in effect, a populace-centric approach) is equal to or exceeds the military effort (in "best practices insurgency"). The tactic of "terrorism" is often part of that toolkit.

3. AQ is another animal, as to which COL Jones' unconventional warfare concept finds a home with me - others may not buy it. Our (US) waging counter unconventional warfare is not new. We waged it against the KGB and GRU throughout the Cold War in the many brush fires which were supported or instigated by those organizations (or by us, where the roles reversed).

The critical difference then was that they were part of a government with which we could also engage (not only using "M", but also using "DIE"). Another difference was the unwritten rule that the KGB & GRU and the CIA & US Mil would not engage directly. Because of that, we and they were forced into a series of brush fire, proxy wars (Vietnam and Astan I being the classic examples).

We do have more freedom of action with AQ because we can attack AQ directly (via a number of avenues, not necessarily kinetic); or we can engage AQ in the various brush fires that they support or instigate.

The latter can be addressd by what is primarily a military effort ("best practices COIN"); or by what is primarily a civilian effort (some form of "nation building", whether in James Dobbin's classic models, or Bob Jones' non-military solutions - which I confess to either not understanding, or by looking on them as too Utopian, where I do).

Ironically, by engaging in the brush fires, we are continuing to employ the Cold War models for "COIN" and "nation building". Are those brush fire models the better course for us to follow today ?

Regards

Mike