I concur with Entropy's statement about the neglect of strategic I&W in the COE. But ultimately, the shape of intelligence work is driven by consumer demand - Max's comment about Cold War intel reflects the perspective at the time that we had a (relatively) well understood adversary, and at the national command level consumers were focused on identifying their global strategic moves with regards to resources and positioning with enough lead time so that action could be initiated. Cold War intelligence consumers demanded accurate strategic warning intelligence.

Even then, there were often substantial issues and problems with strategic intelligence in general, and I&W in particular. Grabo's Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning remains the classic read in that context.

As you state, today's environment is very different. The focus too often tends to be down in the weeds, and everyone is a tactical analyst, looking for the next attack and the HVT of the week.

However, I don't believe it is a matter of the IC "stepping up to the challenge", but rather one of the consumer being educated on the necessity of true strategic focus. Without real consumer demand, the IC will not effectively resource or focus on strategic I&W in a manner in which we seemingly agree is a practical necessity. In this context, resource and focus also pertains to the fundamental building blocks of competence - training and mentoring analysts to effectively perform this type of task. The longer that true strategic I&W is relegated to the sidelines, the fewer people we end up with who are competent at the task and the harder it will be to rebuild the capability. This is a problem that can only be truly fixed at the most senior levels.