Are snipers and recon still valid in infantry battalions?

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Average and median are really of little interest.

A WW2 armoured corps with 40 km/h tanks* advanced 400 km in quite exactly four days- against the opposition of several conventional divisions in suboptimal tank terrain (Manstein's Corps to Vilnius)

So that figure is a sound basis for discussion, based on the fact it happened once?

Advance through defence is of little interest today in general. There are enough gaps for advance, and no continuous line of defence. You don't need to advance through deep defensive positions in most conventional warfare scenarios.

On what do you base that assertion. You are stating a fact?
How do you know where the enemy defence is? Finding the defence is the problem we are discussing.

You can - if you prepare well for it - rather go back to an extremely accelerated version of Central European 18th century army maneuvers (Wars of Silesia as examples).
Speed of advanced in defended terrain was irrelevant then and it is (almost) today.

So how do we do this? What do you suggest as useful data sets around which to base a discussion?

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

So that figure is a sound basis for discussion, based on the fact it happened once?

It shows the possible. Much more should be possible today. Maybe 400 km in three days. I'd certainly not call a 350 km "dash" in two weeks against marginal and demoralized opposition "fast" or "lightning fast" nowadays.

The Armor Journal (Magazine?) had an article on historic advance speeds in a late 90's issue and found relatively modest differences between horse and mech advance speeds, though (yet we know how fast horse would advance against defences today).

On what do you base that assertion. You are stating a fact?
I consider recce and combat team movements two different things. It makes no sense to speak of advance speeds if we're talking about recce. Speed of advance always means the arrival of the main force (or at most its powerful spearhead) afaik.

How do you know where the enemy defence is? Finding the defence is the problem we are discussing.

Recce and non-main force combat elements do the "finding", and their movements shouldn't be measured like the main body's movements.
Recce is about smaller unit movements (squad to reinforced battalion), and we know that the smaller units of the main body move many times (IIRC x2, x5 or even more) faster than the "advance speed" (moving back, sideways etc).

It is a widely acknowledged opinion that there's little reason to expect continuous front lines in modern conventional war. Lebanon (a hilly terrain that doesn't suggest high speed advances anyway),a hypothetical continental front between Greece and Turkey and some other examples like an opposed amphibious landing on Taiwan's shores are the few examples that still promise continuous fronts.

There's no need and not enough force density to maintain continuous, defensible fronts in other scenarios, though.
*Opinion* I do expect lines or rather clouds of screening forces with very low force density in most places as a substitute for the classic WWI-Korean War infantry division front line.

So how do we do this?

I'm working on that answer - it's exactly my area of research. Few parts of it are (anywhere near) ready to be published.

What do you suggest as useful data sets around which to base a discussion?
The answer is basically

We should exploit this great time of no pressing conventional threats for experiments!
Large-scale experiments can clarify much about the organisational, technical, mental and logistical challenges.

Instead, we're discussing how to succeed against tribal warband warfare.
Those warbands won't overrun any of our today's formal allies, ever. <- more than just opinion. This was a prediction.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

We should exploit this great time of no pressing conventional threats for experiments!
Large-scale experiments can clarify much about the organisational, technical, mental and logistical challenges.

You may want to look at the Biddle's Military Power - it has extremely good data on modern rates of advance.

Personally I use the following figures, based on the historical data I have to hand.
March = 40 km/h (convoy) - with obvious road, route and configuration modifications.
Advance to contact = 2-3 km/h - with obvious terrain modifications.

Point being, you do have to come up figures in talk about t he organisational, technical, mental and logistical challenges. - so means and averages do have place.

Instead, we're discussing how to succeed against tribal warband warfare.
Those warbands won't overrun any of our today's formal allies, ever. <- more than just opinion. This was a prediction.

Small Wars? Hmmm... go figure, but as a British Captain writing in 1905 warned loosing battles against "savages" could not loose them the Empire. Loosing a war with a European power could them the Empire and the Country.

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Personally I use the following figures, based on the historical data I have to hand.
March = 40 km/h (convoy) - with obvious road, route and configuration modifications.
Advance to contact = 2-3 km/h - with obvious terrain modifications.

Point being, you do have to come up figures in talk about t he organisational, technical, mental and logistical challenges. - so means and averages do have place.

I do partially disagree.

Historical info is valuable in pointing out the impossible under certain conditions and it's a rich source, but it's not very useful if you want to develop something new, different. History is poor at prediction.
The old data doesn't apply then - and you can simply use the status quo knowledge for the non-innovative parts of your idea.

Variable values are important, averages and medians not so much.


Average advance speeds are especially uninteresting to me because I separate the recce and main combat elements.


The speed of modern, unopposed units is so high that the movement speed isn't really of interest anymore anyway. It's quick. So quick that it becomes quite uninteresting in comparison to the other variables. Look at a Bde; it could easily cross its area of operation in less than an hour if we look at its average march speed.

I'm much more interested in very different time info:
- time for maintenance (h/100 km, h/day)
- time between Bde issuing warning order and reinforced Bn on the march
- time a reinforced Bn needs to deploy from marching column to battle formations
- time needed for a reinforced Bn to disengage (break contact), move 30-50 km and re-engage in battle formation

Simple movement is 'lightning' quick - the average speed is therefore uninteresting, it's not the bottleneck. The other processes that cannot be expressed in km/h are the bottlenecks.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Historical info is valuable in pointing out the impossible under certain conditions and it's a rich source, but it's not very useful if you want to develop something new, different. History is poor at prediction.
The old data doesn't apply then - and you can simply use the status quo knowledge for the non-innovative parts of your idea.

So does experimentation or recent experience suggest?

Average advance speeds are especially uninteresting to me because I separate the recce and main combat elements.

Why? How is Recce going to work moving at anything much over 2-3 kph - unless they want to blunder into an ambush. As the Soviets found out, you can't locate the enemy by the location from the burning wrecks of your CRP or Advanced Guard.

The speed of modern, unopposed units is so high that the movement speed isn't really of interest anymore anyway. It's quick. So quick that it becomes quite uninteresting in comparison to the other variables. Look at a Bde; it could easily cross its area of operation in less than an hour if we look at its average march speed.

What type of Brigade and what size of area? Number of routes. Recce and securing of Assembly areas? Route proving?
Have convoy speeds improved since the 1970's - 40 kph?

I'm much more interested in very different time info:
- time for maintenance (h/100 km, h/day)
- time between Bde issuing warning order and reinforced Bn on the march
- time a reinforced Bn needs to deploy from marching column to battle formations
- time needed for a reinforced Bn to disengage (break contact), move 30-50 km and re-engage in battle formation

How on earth could you come up with those numbers? - and BTW, planing cycles today are 4 times what they were in 1944.

Simple movement is 'lightning' quick - the average speed is therefore uninteresting, it's not the bottleneck. The other processes that cannot be expressed in km/h are the bottlenecks.

OK, that's why you have staffs. Staffs today are -based on evidence - less effective than they were in WW2.

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Why? How is Recce going to work moving at anything much over 2-3 kph - unless they want to blunder into an ambush. As the Soviets found out, you can't locate the enemy by the location from the burning wrecks of your CRP or Advanced Guard.

It's in part a function of risk and different speed/tempo for different unit sizes.
1) You're able to advance with small elements if there's no continuous defended front line (enabling the use of a combat-capable recon screen or cloud as a substitute for WW infantry division lines).
2) Small elements are quicker in all regards than large ones (making large element stats irrelevant).
3) Losing small elements (or part thereof) is less a disaster than doing so with large elements. Both offer the same benefit (gaining access to territory and info) by advancing, so it follows that small elements can be ordered to advance quickly more than large ones. (no assumption of a zero casualty policy) at the same risk expectancy value.

Even if small units did not advance quicker - who cares? Many small ones advancing at 3 km/h gain way more ground and info than few large ones doing so. There's also no need to accept major battles quickly, and even 3 km/h cover a very long distance in a mere week (500 km)! Many small elements advancing at 3km/h get far behind enemy main forces in a single day.
Movement speed is no bottleneck and therefore of marginal interest (today).


What type of Brigade and what size of area? Number of routes. Recce and securing of Assembly areas? Route proving?

I'll have that nailed down in one to three years (in article or book form), it's work in progress. It's already for sure that the end result will be very different from orthodox concepts.
The concept brigades will be less unorthodox than everything else, though.

A hint: I won't assign an area or zone or phase lines or anything similar to main combat forces (combined arms brigades or similar).
The combat-capable recce by company-sized elements would own the land much like many boxers shape the fight with the quick jab(Coy+) and seek the major blows with the powerful cross (Bn+, Bde).

Have convoy speeds improved since the 1970's - 40 kph?

I don't care. Operational relocation movement of a Bde wouldn't last for longer than two or three hours anyway - often less than its preparation. There are usually enough streets for use, so that bottleneck is likely gone as well (traffic capability is proportional to average vehicle length, spacing, speed - and available roads*used lanes).
Besides, convoy speed is a function of employed tactic & terrain.

How on earth could you come up with those numbers? - and BTW, planing cycles today are 4 times what they were in 1944.

It's actually less about coming up with those numbers today. I'd rather let the units exercise for weeks in the field and push them for becoming ever quicker, removing obstacles in the process.
In the end tactics and operational concept would need to be adjusted/limited (impossible or too risky moves being cut out).

The present problem is that such figures vary a lot between units (and over time) as well as between countries. An minimum, average, median and maximum would only become useful if the room for improvement was already mostly exploited (because that would need to happen in wartime).

I don't pay much attention to today's planning cycles. I work on major conventional war theory. A major conventional war would be certainly crack down on a lot of poor habits that we developed. Units would lose officers and staffs officers would be sent as replacements, staffs would overall become much leaner in size and procedures.

Manstein wrote in a book about the huge difference between staff work in combat ops and in resting phases; the paperwork and slow stuff was done in the latter. He lead an army group (dozens of divisions) from a few railway cars.

OK, that's why you have staffs. Staffs today are -based on evidence - less effective than they were in WW2.

And that will change once change is necessary for survival. Major warfare is an evolutionary shock for military organizations. They change a lot.
We couldn't even triple our brigade count without a switch to much leaner Bde HQs, for example.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Even if small units did not advance quicker - who cares? Many small ones advancing at 3 km/h gain way more ground and info than few large ones doing so. There's also no need to accept major battles quickly, and even 3 km/h cover a very long distance in a mere week (500 km)! Many small elements advancing at 3km/h get far behind enemy main forces in a single day.
Movement speed is no bottleneck and therefore of marginal interest (today).

Well please note I did originally refer to rate of advance, not speed of movement.
I think 2-3 km/h seems reasonable - and you can only advance as fast as your Recce forces do.

I also think that all the things that have made Formation, unit and even sub-unit moves problematic in the past will continue be problems.

[Fuchs]

1 Take a map of a potential conflict region, take the quantity of arm units that would fight there. Now take away one third as reserve.
2 Look at the force density along an imagined "front".
3 Now forget about that already low figure quickly because the units won't be distributed evenly.
4 Take away a third of one side's brigades and replace it with reinforced Coy all over the place. These Coy dash forward using elements of about small Plt size. Few of them would experience losses, while all others would quickly flood the area and do their job there.
That's worth the price in MCW.

You seem to be glued to the concept of advance against opposition, but that's a stupid force-on-force exception. That's like American Football where players ram each other along a line, not like in European Football where players advance through gaps and don't need to ram anyone to advance.
Now imagine American Football with only four players per team on the same field size. Who would still care about the pushing power of these players?


The obvious counter-tactic if of course the use of a similar dispersion; that's why I emphasize the optimisation of small elements (reinforced Coy) for the low force density (a.k.a. economy of force) shaping mission.
The team with the better low force density units (or more) would gain the upper hand (up to an optimum, for there's of course a potential for over-emphasizing the low force density units in overall force structure).


I don't expect you to agree because the whole concept is material for a 30-50 pp chapter and too unorthodox to be understood based only on a few lines in a forum.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

You seem to be glued to the concept of advance against opposition, but that's a stupid force-on-force exception.

I'm actually glued to finding the enemy so I can defeat him. - Find being the first core function

I don't expect you to agree because the whole concept is material for a 30-50 pp chapter and too unorthodox to be understood based only on a few lines in a forum.

Actual new conceptual writing on Land Warfare is incredibly and that of the type you propose even less common.

What experience has taught me, is that the novelty or originality of the ideas - in this area is usually very unimportant. What is important is their adoption - or serious consideration, because only then can fresh eyes spot the things that may cause it to fail.

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

What experience has taught me, is that the novelty or originality of the ideas - in this area is usually very unimportant. What is important is their adoption - or serious consideration, because only then can fresh eyes spot the things that may cause it to fail.

The originality is not so much in the concept as in the gluing together of its parts. There are historical examples and analogies for pretty much every bit.

And I guess I'm not gonna help the adoption of new ideas before I can present one in written form.

[RJ]

Fuchs,

Have you studied the disengaement of Patton's Third Army from one front and the movement to engage the German Forces in what is called the Battle of the Bulge?


"In late 1944, the German army launched a last-ditch offensive across Belgium, Luxembourg, and northeastern France, popularly known as the Battle of the Bulge, nominally led by German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. On December 16, 1944, the German army massed 29 divisions (totaling some 250,000 men) at a weak point in the Allied lines and made massive headway towards the Meuse River during one of the worst winters Europe had seen in years."

"Patton rapidly disengaged his army from fighting in another sector and moved it over 100 miles in 48 hours to relieve the siege."

"Patton turned the Third Army abruptly north (a notable tactical and logistical achievement), disengaging from the front line to relieve the surrounded and besieged U.S. troops holding the Belgian crossroads town of Bastogne. Many military historians remark that this complicated maneuver was Patton's (and the Third Army's) greatest accomplishment during the war. (John MacDonald, a management consultant specializing in operations and quality control, cites it as one of the greatest examples of logistics, stating, "General Patton is extolled as one of the greatest battlefield commanders and motivators of military trooops, yet probably his greatest miltary achievement, unsurpassed at the time, was the logistic repositioning, within twenty-four hours, of a whole army corps at the Battle of the Bulge."[26]) By February, the Germans were in full retreat and Patton had pushed units into the Saarland. Elements of the Third Army crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim on March 22, 1945"

He moved an Army Corps, in harsh winter conditions, a hundred miles in two days and they averaged 50 miles a day. Considerably more than the 40 Km speed you suggested.

Nudging numbers is basic, but each fight is different and affected by terrain, opposition and the leadership of both sides. You can figure the pattern and numbers but you can not create a blue print that will work in every case.

The movement Patton led to relieve the pressure on the Allied Forces seems to be the best, modern war example of movement into an attack and it included recon, logistics and fighting spirit and excellent leadership. That movement contributed greatly tothe defeat of 29 enemy divisions and helped brig the war in Europe to a quicker finish.

Do you have the statistics on which of the German forces in that fight moved as quickly and as far?

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by RJ

He moved an Army Corps, in harsh winter conditions, a hundred miles in two days and they averaged 50 miles a day. Considerably more than the 40 Km speed you suggested.
...
Do you have the statistics on which of the German forces in that fight moved as quickly and as far?

I used the search function and only found 40 kph (Wilf) and 40 km/h (me), not a single one mentioning 40 km/day.


About the speed of the German units in the 2. Ardennes battle:
Are you aware that the Germans had almost no fuel for their motorized/armoured vehicles and most of the German troops were moving on foot, using horse carts for transport of material and supplies?
They did so under Winter conditions and *serious* threat of air attack.

Their march speeds are very much irrelevant for modern theory unless we're talking about worst possible conditions.


I already mentioned Manstein's 1941 dash to the river bridges in Lithuania where his corps defeated several enemy divisions and averaged about 50 miles/day as well (I've got to correct my previous statement; 320 km not 400 km in 4 days - memory is tricky). The whole corps had if I remember correctly only two real roads available.

Btw, where comes your 100 miles from for the XII corps?
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...2/P23(map).jpg
That doesn't look like a geographical distance to me.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by RJ

He moved an Army Corps, in harsh winter conditions, a hundred miles in two days and they averaged 50 miles a day. Considerably more than the 40 Km speed you suggested.

The 40 kph is me, not FUCHS and IIRC it's the the NATO STANAG Convoy planning speed - meaning in 10 hours you can march 400kms - so a march rate of 500 miles in 2 days.

Based on your figures Patton was doing 80 miles a day on the march. Correct?
Harold Godwinson marched his Army 185 miles in about four days, in 1066, so 46 miles a day on foot!

Food for thought?

[Fuchs]

Wilf, such figures are for units, but large units need to march on a street one after another.

Thin of pre-20th century armies setting up amp at the end of a day's march when the last units were beginning their march at the earlier camp (part of the reason why musket and rifle age corps had a practical limit at 25k-30k men).

Today we should bother about brigades, not corps. A brigade (still too many vehicles) needs a time slot of about an hour on a one-lane road. And then there's friction...

Btw, I recall 50 km/h as a standard for road march, but I think 80 km/h convoys are the norm in peacetime (for truck convoys, obviously not so for armour) and if there's no real threat of obstacles (other than explosives) on the road.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Thin of pre-20th century armies setting up amp at the end of a day's march when the last units were beginning their march at the earlier camp (part of the reason why musket and rifle age corps had a practical limit at 25k-30k men).

Correct. Napoleon marched 90K men on three routes, each column spread out over 5 miles.

[jcustis]

Btw, I recall 50 km/h as a standard for road march, but I think 80 km/h convoys are the norm in peacetime (for truck convoys, obviously not so for armour) and if there's no real threat of obstacles (other than explosives) on the road.

I was trained to use 40 KPH as a reasonable standard for tactical roadmarch planning along an unblocked, undefended (peacetime) route. It has proven reasonable through dozens of marches I've conducted along a particular corridor in S. California. 80 KPH is really a pipe dream because that number does not factor in crew rest, "hot check" maintenance halts, civilian traffic

Just a week ago, I traveled 209.214 km in an LAV in 5 hours, at a speed of 8 KPH below the speed limit, for a rate of march of 41.8 KPH. We had two ~15 minute short halts to check planetaries and differentials, and did not hit traffic along the way.

[tankersteve]

Absolutely. Anything over 40kph is a dream, not considering the typical age of the equipment we are operating, the typical age of the Operators , and ole Murphy getting involved. Add some traffic and that is as good as it gets.

Even in Germany, where we would 'roadmarch' elements of our companies (arms rooms, mainly) back and forth to Grafenwoehr/Hohenfels on the autobahn, we would rarely make much better than 40kph, despite starting at the typical 0'dark-thirty. And this was just a few HMMWVs and some old 5-tons.

Add some track vehicles to the mix and watch out!

Tankersteve