Col. Jones,
A few more thoughts on your post:
WHAT exactly is strategic intelligence?
There are the book answers, but I think strategic intel can be divided into two categories: (1) Strategic warning and (2) strategic estimates that support policy. One aspect of Strategic intelligence that I believe is important is that it must be purposely limited (or focused) in some way to make it manageable and meaningful. Just because the issues may be "big picture" doesn't mean they can be open-ended or unlimited in scope. That why intel shops (and even CoCOMS) have specific responsibilities and that is why, I believe, there aren't many people dedicated to looking at the "big picture."

Warning is very broad and deep from an intelligence perspective since it can include any kind of intelligence (including a lot of tactical intel) and is continually updated, so it is also timely. It is functionally limited, however, to the narrow purpose of preventing surprise. That narrow purpose makes it manageable.

Estimates, by contrast, are not functionally limited. Instead, the scope of intelligence is limited as well as the time frame (ie. It’s difficult to keep the estimate continuously current). The NIE is the most obvious example of this kind of strategic intel.

why is it so rarely asked for, and even more rarely provided?
A few reasons (which are only my subjective, but informed opinion):

- Military commanders are used to tactical and operational intelligence and they want what they know (a point you touched on).

- Military intelligence people are trained in tactical and operational intelligence support and they provide what they know. It's easy to see how ops and intel people reinforce each other’s tendency to stay inside the operational/tactical box. Personally, I didn't begin to develop a strategic mindset until graduate school because my entire military experience was at the tactical and operational levels. So strategic education and training for intelligence people and senior leaders is necessary and it's simply not happening.

- The strategic questions that many want answered are usually too broad and unfocused to be practically answered. Consider the issues you list in your original post. You have probably hundreds doctoral theses worth of research and analysis in there. The questions you want answered require the kind of knowledge that is both a mile wide and a mile deep. I submit that it’s impossible to continuously maintain that level of expertise. The intel community works on such big questions through committees of experts who have the mile deep knowledge and together they potentially reach the mile-deep and mile-wide goal. They can’t sustain that, though, because they have to maintain their expertise. Now, there are certainly those who look at strategic problems through the mile-wide, inch-deep model. That is the realm of politicians, pundits and current intelligence. A middle ground is difficult to find. Be glad your intel people gave you a 1000 yard stare instead of trying to give you a shallow “Fred Barnes” answer.

- The cost-benefit of resourcing strategic intel vs. current/tactical/operational is perceived to be low most of the time for a variety of reasons one could write a book on. One reason is the "what have you done for me lately" syndrome. The guy who produces daily or weekly and can answer tactical and operational questions in minutes or hours is simply more valued than the guy who produces quarterly or semi-annually and needs weeks or months to answer strategic questions. For example, the history of strategic warning since 1947 shows a recurring pattern:
1. Resources get pulled out of strategic warning to support something else.
2. A major warning failure occurs.
3. The AAR identifies lack of support to strategic warning as a major factor in the failure.
4. Strategic warning becomes well-resourced and respected in the immediate aftermath.
5. Memories are short and pretty soon the leadership begins wondering why so much is going to the warning function when they don't appear to be doing much of anything.
6. Return to step 1.

There is also the problem that significant resources can be spent on a strategic subject that turns out to be irrelevant or simply confirms the common wisdom. Leaders then view the effort as wasted. That's not nearly as a big a problem at the operational and tactical level.

- Strategic intel requires direction and the continuous support of leadership. Unlike other types of intelligence, it can't be done ad hoc or as an additional or secondary duty. It's hard to overestimate how important that is. No analyst, no matter how proactive, is going to be able to answer those questions you listed unless that is their primary job. If you want them to be able to answer strategic-level intel questions then you need to get them out of the tactical and operation environment and assign them to work on strategic-level intelligence, exclusively.

- Strategic intel usually requires a depth of knowledge that is incompatible with the 2-3 year PCS cycle and the frequent internal moves over the course of one assignment. When I was at EUCOM, for example, I was in training for 3 months, on a watchfloor supporting theater units for 8 months, in an analysis shop doing mainly operational-level analysis (with a bit of what I'd call strategic) for six months, supporting a war (Allied Force) for 4 months, back to the analysis shop for 3 months, then PCS. Also, a turnover with your replacement is almost always inadequate (a couple of weeks usually) and is often nonexistent since assignments (at least in my experience) are frequently gaped. It's not hard to get quickly spun-up to support current intel. It's very hard to get spun-up on strategic topics because the required depth-of-knowledge is so great.

- Strategic intel has been intentionally and unintentionally outsourced. Most inputs into strategic intel are open-source, so the unclassified guys (Janes, EIU, etc.) can seriously compete. The obsession with current intel and punditry doesn’t help.

- Stovepiping, which is still a problem. Strategic intelligence questions are almost always interdisciplinary and it's unlikely a CoCOM or any one agency will have all the expertise in-house. Getting analysts at another agency to help you with your problem can be a bureaucratic nightmare unless you're at the NSC-level and can order production of an NIE and force the various agencies to participate.

-Communication. Requests for analysis and information are invariably altered as they pass through layers of bureaucracy so the problem an analysts gets is often much different from what the originator wanted. I’ve seen this particularly with sycophantic officers who, upon hearing a question from the General during a briefing, will order up reams of wide-ranging analysis for what was only a simple clarification. More wasted effort is the result.

- Finally, there is asking the right question, which is more difficult than most people think. IOW, defining the intelligence requirement is critically important. This requires collaboration between the analyst and the “customer” to determine exactly what is and is NOT needed. It’s important that the problem not be too open-ended but it also can’t be overly narrow. The latter was a serious flaw in the Iraq WMD NIE which led to OIF. Here’s how Robert Clark puts it in his book on intelligence analysis:

The problem definition was focused solely on the question of whether Iraq had WMD programs, and if so, what they were. By focusing on weapons of mass destruction, analysts had a tendency to fit all evidence into a WMD model. Analysts assumed that Iraq had WMD programs, and analysis proceeded from that point. A broader look at Iraq’s overall military capability would have found more logical explanations for some of the evidence.
I think your issues are worth exploring. I think you need to sell the idea to your leadership in order to get the resources. I think you’d be best served by forming a group of experts to look at your issues and giving them the time and resources necessary to examine your issues. As I mentioned to you in another thread, a Commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR's) are how intel people prioritize intelligence production. Changing the PIR's to strategic priorities is an important first step. Good luck!