First U.S. Official Resigns Over Afghan War

[MikeF]

Mike:

I started with that meta-physical stuff (after a stint as an NCO in 3/64 Armor).

It took a while to outgrow it.

Maybe doing it the other way around (after you know enough) will be more enlightening (and with less unintended consequences).

Actually, one of my favorite readings was from Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, who really probes the depths of the role of government and society in an age of public scepticism and theoretical uncertainty (1970's).

"The new science of organizations: a reconceptualization of the wealth of nations." Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1989 Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1989, is one of those books that takes years to read, and leaves you confused for decades.

Steve

I should have known that you were in the wrong batallion. 1-64 AR, Desert Rogues here....I'm doing it all in reverse- from practice to theory. Thanks for the links. We'll see where it leads.

Mike

[Pol-Mil FSO]

Steve:

Your previous question about recruitment of civilians in Afghanistan is a good one, but the DOS PRT officer is supposed to be a political officer rather than a development expert. His (or her) responsibilities include reporting on political, pol-mil, economic, and social developments of interest to the Embassy in Kabul. The PRT officer should also be a political advisor to the PRT Commander and, depending on the situation, a political advisor to Afghan officials, notably the Provincial Governor.

My list of desired qualities of a PRT officer would include: at least one (preferably two or more) overseas tours as a political officer involving interaction with host national politicians (without a translator) with related analysis and reporting for Washington consumers; experience with the interagency process developed in a Washington assignment as a country desk officer; understanding of military structure, procedures, and operations gained through a pol-mil assignment or through prior military service; a basic understanding of counterinsurgency theory; service overseas in a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment; service in at least two Embassies; and, supervisory experience in an Embassy or in a domestic assignment in the State Department.

We do not have too many FSOs who fit all of the above requirements and many of the PRT officers in Afghanistan are junior officers who have not spent enough time in the Foreign Service to have gained the experience that would help them to perform effectively in such an environment. (This is not to say that they are not doing a good job but it is a steep learning curve without the years of experience.)

I think in the case of Mr. Hoh, the recruiters did not do a good job of looking at his qualifications. I suspect they decided that being a Marine combat veteran in Iraq and a civilian veteran in Iraq were sufficient without examining his actual duties in those jobs. There are military personnel who could do a credible job as a political officer but I would look for someone with more years of experience (i.e. MAJ or LTC), especially those with a FAO qualification, and look first at the Army SF and CA communities. I've also run across a few NCOs and Warrant Officers from 7th and 20th SFG whom I believe could do the job.

[Steve the Planner]

That certainly makes sense.

Steve

[vertnyc]

Here are my two cents after having briefly worked with Matt.

Overall, I thought of him to be a go-getter type of guy.

He left...my first impression: so what, the mission still continues.

Zabul is hard...organizational issues between the Romanians and American Task Force and its headquarters in Kandahar. It's the poorest province in Afghanistan. What district or province isn't hard? No easy button in Afghanistan...sorry.

Most of us at Task Force Stryker cover both Kandahar and Zabul and all the headaches that generate from that. Governance, Reconstruction, Development and all that other jazz.

In conclusion- we are fine. Other people have stepped up to fill the roles. In fact I've never even seen heard of the media attention until I signed up for this forum today...so maybe it's a case of armchair generals and reporters overanalyzing things.

P.S. Building a girl's school is dumb, especially in a place like Zabul. Z-PRT has been assessed to not move too far away from HWY1.

[Pol-Mil FSO]

There seems to be a competition for bragging rights as the poorest province in Afghanistan. Bagdhis Province in RC-West has also claimed the title. I imagine that a few other provinces could also make a good case. I don't know if there are credible statistics to establish a winner.

Early last year at KAF I heard a U.S. SOF officer say the following: "God bless the Romanians, their hearts are in the right place but when you talk COIN and look into their eyes you can see that it is way over their heads."

I was at Camp Atterbury in June as an interagency OC/T for the MRX of the 12 U.S. PRTs getting ready to deploy to Afghanistan. Our lane was the elections scenario that included Afghan role players playing the provincial governor, provincial Chief of Police, UNAMA official, and UNDP official. The PRT Zabul team that came through our lane made quite an impression because it was led by a USAF FAO who spoke better Pashto than all of the Afghan role players (who spoke Dari as their first language). In fact, this FAO and a woman FSO who was formerly assigned as the DOS PRT Officer in Kunar are the only U.S. officers whom I have met that are competent Pashto speakers.