Urban / City Warfare (merged thread)

[DDilegge]

Moderator's Note

This thread is the result of several threads being merged.

There is a separate thread on the USMC's experience @ Fallujah which maybe worth checking.(Ends).


I had the opportunity to attend the Joint Urban Operations Senior Leadership Seminar on 15 December. The AFPS article about this event is posted below. While this article reads more like an official press release, I found it heartening that much of the senior DoD leadership "got" the fact that urban operations are about people over technology, tactical in nature and an interagency and coalition affair. These themes were hammered in during the discussions that followed each JFCOM briefing.

Senior Leaders Focus on Urban Fight
By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service


WASHINGTON, Dec. 15, 2005 – Senior defense and government leaders gathered at Fort McNair here today to consider challenges the U.S. military faces operating in urban environments and to discuss strategies to make them as effective in cities as in open terrain.

The Urban Operations Senior Leader Review, sponsored by U.S. Joint Forces Command, focused on better ways to fight an enemy that's increasingly moving into urban areas to plan and launch its attacks.

"Military operations in urban terrain," or MOUT, has been part of the military vernacular for decades. But traditionally, MOUT involved attacking a city from the outside and moving on, not conducting extensive operations within that city, explained David Ozolek, director of the Joint Urban Operations Office. Similarly, traditional MOUT operations viewed local populations more as obstacles to work around rather than partners in the fight.

"Five years ago, the thought was that we were never going to do urban operations. The idea was basically that you'd blow up the city or go around it," said Duane Schattle, deputy director of the Joint Urban Operations Office. "But the war on terror changed that. The enemy knows they can't compete against us in the open, so they are moving to the cities."

Cities offer terrorists an environment in which they can blend easily with the local population as they plan and carry out attacks, explained retired Army Brig. Gen. Mike Hall, a senior concept developer for the Joint Urban Operations Office.

All indications are that the type of enemy U.S. troops face today and are likely to face for the foreseeable future will continue using cities as their battlefields of choice, Hall said. Joint Forces Command is shepherding DoD's efforts to ensure troops engaged in urban operations have the best equipment, tactics and intelligence they need to carry out their mission. Today's session brought together people involved in developing these assets and policies with the decision makers who will ultimately get them to people operating in an urban setting, said Janet Tucker, chief of strategic engagement for the Joint Urban Operations Office.

But operating in build-up areas requires "more than just better gadgets and mousetraps," Hall said. "We need to learn to think differently."

Today's session focused on improving battle-space awareness and visualization to help troops "find the enemy faster than he can find us," Ozolek said.

Leaders also considered better ways to encourage local residents to help support military operations under way in their cities, either actively, by helping advise U.S. troops, or passively, by not interfering with their operations, Ozolek explained. That includes figuring out how to make munitions more precise and using them with the proper amount of firepower so they don't inflict excessive collateral damage that angers local residents, he said.

Today's seminar also included discussions about ways to improve coordination among U.S. agencies and allied militaries to better support urban operations. Representatives from NATO's Allied Command Transformation and numerous coalition militaries participated in the session.

Many of the concepts discussed today are already in use in Iraq or on the drawing boards, being readied for implementation. "We're trying to move as quickly as possible so we can get these developments to the guys in the theater," Schattle said.

[GorTex6]

An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments, Brian Michael Jenkins(Rand 1972!)

[SWJED]

Air Force Operations in Urban Environments. US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board report, August 2005. Full report at link, summary of conclusions and recommendations below.

The team assessed Urban Operations in all stages; namely, Understand, Shape, Engage, Consolidate and Transition (USECT). Findings from the panels were consolidated and vetted through vignettes generated by the SC&I panel. Generally, these findings could be viewed as capability shortfalls, or gaps, in the current Air Force. The team next created visions of Air Force capabilities with all of those gaps resolved and then looked at what steps in capability would get to those capabilities. Those steps became the study recommendations.

General Conclusions

There were some very clear and fundamental conclusions that became evident as the study progressed. Those conclusions were as follows:

a) Urban Operations (Urban Ops) is a three dimensional scenario,
b) The USAF brings a critically important vertical dimension to Urban Ops,
c) The USAF is essential in all five USECT phases of Urban Ops,
d) The USAF has some “star performers” (AC-130 Gunship and Predator/Hellfire) that are highly regarded and frequently requested by Ground Commanders,
e) Unit size for typical ground maneuvers is typically small, either a platoon (40 personnel) or a squad (8-13 personnel),
f) Air support in Urban Ops is not a lesser included case of Conventional Close Air Support (CAS),
g) The desired response time to a call for support from a ground maneuver unit should be in single digit minutes (ideally, one to two minutes),
h) Communications and some forms of ISR are considerably less effective in urban environments because of obscuration, multipath and interference in dense signal environments,
i) While rapid response time in support of ground maneuver units is critical, the number of aircraft (A/C) capable of delivering the desired effects in the airspace over an urban area is severely constrained by airspace management procedures, and
j) When the USAF is able to upgrade capabilities for Urban Ops, many of those capabilities will also enhance other missions (Urban Ops is the “most stressing case” for several capabilities).

Recommendations

As the study progressed through the stages of analyzing shortfalls and generating visions,
the team was then able to identify some specific recommendations that are near term, quantitative steps toward an ultimate capability. Those recommendations are summarized below:

a) Support Joint CONOPS, TTPs and training—At this time, there are no USAF or Joint
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) or Tactic, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for Urban Ops. There are “practices” that have evolved as Urban Ops continue, but it is extremely important to generate CONOPS and TTPs and make them a part of the overall structure of the Air Force. When those are in place, Urban Ops should be incorporated into the training curriculum and we will then be able to send both Air Force and Joint command personnel to the field fully trained in Urban Ops.

b) Lead Development of a Joint Automated Control Capability (JACC)—To resolve the procedural limitation of the number of A/C over an urban area and to dramatically reduce timelines for delivering effects when called for by ground maneuver units, the team recommends that the USAF lead an effort aimed, in the long term, at an automated, man-on-the loop system that performs airspace management, ISR platform positioning/sensor management, management of an integrated “information system”, weapon-target pairing and modeling and simulation based planning/rehearsal. In the near term, the team recommends that the Air Force work jointly with the Army to integrate real time USAF weapon platform data into the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) to enhance joint fires capability. Another near term recommendation is to define the JACC architecture as a first step toward implementation of JACC.

c) Augment Mobile ad hoc Urban Ops network—To resolve many of the communications problems for ground maneuver units, the team recommends that the USAF build on existing USAF Roll-On Beyond-line-of-sight Enhancement (ROBE) communications node capability by expanding the functionality to include key waveforms used by the ground forces. Then as ground forces transition to more advanced waveforms, the ROBE system can be upgraded correspondingly. In the near term, the team recommends that the Air Force select a platform for this communications node capability and begin upgrading ROBE for this application.

d) Deliver Urban-Tailored ISR—To enable progress toward a multi-sensor Joint Battlespace Information Enterprise Service (JBIES) system the team recommends that the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) be viewed as a point of departure. By utilizing data from DCGS, we can evolve toward an accessible all-source information database and we will have enhanced near term capability that will provide valuable experience in serving various echelons of users in a responsive manner. The team further recommends that all USAF sensors be upgraded to have autonomous geo-registration capability so the information they provide can be properly registered in an all-source database. Further, the team recommends that the on-going Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sensor management system address cordoning as an important function of a sensor platform. Additional recommendations are to proceed with three dimensional (3-D) mapping capability for urban areas using active laser technology and to proceed with the next phase of “staring ISR” as being developed at Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL).

e) Improve Operations via Modeling, Simulation and Training (MS&T)—The team observed that current efforts in the area of MS&T, particularly as it relates to Urban Ops, are quite dispersed among and between the services and generally not well coordinated. Therefore, the team recommends that the Air Force take a proactive role in ensuring that urban MS&T is pursued as a Joint R&D Development Activity, and that special emphasis be placed on incorporating realistic urban infrastructure models and cultural/social/behavioral models. It is reasonable to expect that capabilities will evolve as spirals and they should be incorporated in operational systems as they become available. Models should be designed to be adaptive and responsive to feedback so they can be used operationally in a “learning” mode. MS&T will also be extremely useful for training/rehearsals, for prediction of outcomes and for evaluations of various courses of action (COAs).

f) Develop weapons tailored for Urban Ops—Legacy USAF weapons are typically highly lethal but, in many cases, are inappropriate for use in urban environments where limiting collateral damage is vitally important and where friendly forces and non-combatants may be nearby. The urban environment is ideal for non-lethal weapons and the team recommends them whenever they can be effectively employed; but, there is still a clear need for kinetic weapons with yields considerably lower than currently available. The team recommends development of a low yield, precision weapons that can be used effectively against targets within 150 meters of friendly forces or non-combatants. The team also recommends that AFRL look at techniques for achieving a cockpit-selectable yield weapon and for a maneuverable air dropped munition capable of vertical decent at low speed into urban canyons. Continued work on non-kinetic weapons such as Directed Energy, Laser and Information Operations (IO) are also important and should be institutionalized so they are considered by a warfighter or planer on an equal footing with more conventional weapons.

g) Develop Joint Urban Ops S&T Plan—For each of the capability visions addressed in the study, there are key technologies required to enable their implementation. As a part of the study, the team worked with AFRL and determined that 30 development areas apply to Urban Ops and that three of AFRL’s eleven future long-term challenges also apply to Urban Ops. The team recommends that AFRL coordinate with the other services and development agencies to develop a Joint Urban Ops Science and Technology (S&T) strategy.

[SWJED]

7 July Associated Press - Israel Has Edge Over U.S. in Urban Combat by Thomas Wagner.

In waging urban warfare, Israeli soldiers in Gaza and U.S.-led troops in Iraq use some of the same battlefield tactics, but Israel is less likely to get bogged down in prolonged combat.

The Israelis are fighting a temporary offensive in a tiny area with a limited objective _ winning the release of a soldier captured by Palestinian militants - while the Americans are pursuing the complex task of building a nation while fighting a widespread insurgency.

There are differences, too, in the threat of casualties even though both forces are far better armed than their opponents.

Israel's army often keeps its casualties to a minimum by using heavily armored tanks and troop carriers, while the Americans rely mainly on Humvees and trucks to patrol as they try to build up trust among Iraqi civilians.

Douglas A. Macgregor, a former American colonel who helped draft the concept for the U.S. advance to Baghdad, said the limited objectives of Israel's generally brief military missions don't require its troops to get out among the Palestinian people...

Israel also has an edge in preventing suicide attacks after years of intelligence gathering in the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli forces obtain far more information about planned attacks by Palestinians than U.S. or Iraqi troops get about Sunni Arab and foreign insurgents in Iraq.

Such intelligence often allows Israel's air force to kill suspected Palestinian militants who are driving in cars or its ground forces to raid houses where they are hiding...

In Iraq, U.S. and Iraqi leaders are working hard to gather more intelligence about insurgent groups, such as by offering rewards for information. But they haven't had the time it takes to painstakingly build up intelligence networks.

Still, like the Americans in Iraq, Israeli soldiers face a complex mix of militant groups that have sometimes competing agendas but who are all determined to drive out a force they consider an occupier.

In Iraq, that commitment means suicide bombers often attack U.S. forces and Iraqi civilians in marketplaces, city centers and even mosques.

In Gaza and the West Bank, it means Israeli troops fighting militants in populated areas often find young Palestinian boys joining the battle, sometimes armed only with stones...

[Strickland]

I could not disagree more with this piece. As for the protection tanks and APCs afford Israeli troops, the PLO demonstrated in the Battle of Jenin that small hunter-killer or RPG teams could negate this. Urban combat is made easier when you (the Israelis) follow the Russian model in Grozny. Everything is made easier when you perceive all persons (civilians, women, children, military aged males, etc.) as enemy combatants.

I assume that the reference to Doug MacGregor is one to the same individual that proposed rushing to Baghdad with a brigade and nothing else in 2002?

[SWJED]

I could not disagree more with this piece. As for the protection tanks and APCs afford Israeli troops, the PLO demonstrated in the Battle of Jenin that small hunter-killer or RPG teams could negate this. Urban combat is made easier when you (the Israelis) follow the Russian model in Grozny. Everything is made easier when you perceive all persons (civilians, women, children, military aged males, etc.) as enemy combatants.

... but the author would not come out and say "exactly" why the claimed edge exists.

If you understand urban operations, the differences in the political and military situations between Gaza and Iraq and between the IDF and Coalition forces you can read / understand what is implied throughout the article. To the casual reader this piece could be implied that we need to be following the IDF lead in tackling the sit in Iraq. That would be a very bad thing indeed.

[SWJED]

I assume that the reference to Doug MacGregor is one to the same individual that proposed rushing to Baghdad with a brigade and nothing else in 2002?

That would be the man... Breaking the Phalanx...

[Jedburgh]

I also strongly disagree with this piece. We've discussed the false analogy of the US in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian issue before on this board.

[Tom Odom]

The real difference is that Israel does not engage in what we call COIN. The IDF operates as a purely punitive/containment force; there is no such thing as CMO, IO as we call it, or fight for a population's loyalties.

They did not do COIN in Lebanon. They did not do COIN in Gaza and they do not do COIN on the West Bank.

Tom

[SWJED]

29 August Marine Corps Times - DVD Offers Different Approach to Urban Combat by Christian Lowe.

It isn’t exactly like watching Black Hawk Down, but maybe if the Rangers and Delta Force soldiers who were caught in that film’s deadly ambush had been able to watch this video before they deployed to Somalia, that tragedy might have been avoided.

When most people think of urban operations, they think of blind alleys, rooftop snipers and roadside ambushes — much like the fatal warrens of Mogadishu. But a new DVD presentation produced by the Marine Corps Wargaming Division may better prepare Marines and soldiers to fight on the increasingly complex urban battlefield and prompt new thinking about how to approach the city fight...

“It had always been stressed when you go into urban combat it’s all about the urban structures,” says one Marine commander on the DVD. “The epiphany I had was that the buildings and the streets and the physical landscape really weren’t nearly as important as that political landscape. … Because the city’s most dense asset is the people.”

Developed over the last six months, the video — titled “New Challenges for Military Operations in the 21st Century: Emerald Express Insights and Observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom” — is a combination of combat footage from Iraq, picture montages and interviews of experienced Marine, Army and coalition Iraq veterans giving their take on what’s tough about an urban fight and how to work there effectively...

While the video focuses on Iraq, Marine war-gaming experts say the lessons imparted in the video transcend any specific war zone. As an Australian officer interviewed on the DVD says, winning the urban fight isn’t so much about immediate action drills as it is about being intellectually nimble.

“You are better off investing your training time into issues of how to think, rather than templated solutions of what to think,” he explains...

“If people can grasp this and understand the environment that we talk about in this video, I think half the battle is won,” said Dave Dilegge, action officer for the Wargaming Division’s Emerald Express and Joint Urban Warrior projects...

[jcustis]

Mr. Dilegge,

If you could kindly set aside a copy for Co D, 4th LAR, I'll try to swing by and pick it up later this week.

[Tom Odom]

see Dr. Roger Spiller's monograph for a historical discussion of the population as a critical element in Urban Warfare.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resour...tent.asp#sharp

Great Job, Dave!

best

Tom

[SWJED]

The Marine Corps Times has posted a very small segment from the EE OIF video - Urban Operations. Not sure, but they may post several more...

[bismark17]

Is there any way for local Law Enforcement to obtain this?

[HeavyRecon]

Is there a way an AD US Army NCO can get a copy of this? Always looking for insight. Thanks.

[SWJED]

Is there a way an AD US Army NCO can get a copy of this? Always looking for insight. Thanks.

E-mail here - wargaming@usmc.mil - best from a .mil address, include rank, name, unit and official mailing address.

[SWJED]

Is there any way for local Law Enforcement to obtain this?

I don't do the distro nor decide who beyond the military can get the DVD. Best I can say is request it from the official source - wargaming@usmc.mil

[SWJED]

The Marine Corps Times has posted several more brief clips from the video.

Sneak Peak:

View previews from the DVD “New Challenges for Military Operations in the 21st Century: Emerald Express Insights and Observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

• Maj. Philip Shepherd-Walwyn: SA2 Fire Support, Land Warfare Centre of Tactical Doctrine, United Kingdom

• Lt. Col. Andrew Ross: Former Company Commander, British Royal Marines

• Col. Chris Conlin: Former Commanding Officer, 1st Bn., 7th Marines, OIF I

[selil]

I’m looking for information (unclassified, not sensitive, able to be discussed with foreign nationals, etc...)…..

The scenario is facilities, and or training locations that can support a variety of missions and unit sizes for training in urban warfare (MOUT). I know about the facilities being built or used at MCAGCC 29 Palms California for the Marines, and the facility for the Army at Fort Lewis. I also know about places like www.urbanwarfarecenter.com. Are there any other large or larger facilities? Fort Polk only has about 40 buildings and I’m researching facilities that can simulate a small city or town.

[sgmgrumpy]

Alot of information Some sites have already been updated.

MOUT Training Facilities:

The Urban Target Complex (UTC) - "Yodaville" (Major Floyd Usry - "Yoda")
Yodaville - Urban Close Air Support (CAS) Bombing Range (Marine Corps Gazette)
Yodaville - USMC Urban Bombing Range at Yuma (San Diego Union-Tribune)
Yodaville - Urban Bombing Range at Yuma (The Arizona New Republic)
Camp Lejuene MOUT Facility Familiarization (Images)
JRTC MOUT Facility (Fort Polk, LA)
Shughart-Gordon (Article)
Fort Pickett MOUT Assault Course
Combat Maneuver Training Center (MOUT facility at Hohenfels, Germany)
Urban Training Complex at the RCTA (MOUT City)
Camp Ripley (Minnesota)
McKenna MOUT Site (Fort Benning, GA)
McKenna MOUT Facility Flythrough (3D Visualization - STRICOM)
McKenna MOUT Site (VRSG overhead image, commercial site)
Mounted Urban Combat Training Site (Fort Knox)
It Takes a Village for Urban Combat.....and Fort Knox is Getting One (Armor)
F/X for Urban Warfare (Soldiers - special effects at Fort Knox)
Copehill Down - UK FIBUA Training Facility (NATO Instructors' FIBUA Course)
Reconfigurable MOUT Training Site
Ft. Leonard Wood Maneuver Support Center Briefing Slides (U.S. Army Engineer Center - future home of the MP and Chemical Schools)]

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/64...tsimagesa.html