...my battalion ran Distributed Ops in the Defence against a superior armoured force on a TESEX last year, which worked very well. Distributed, highly dispersed light role infantry operating as small groups of determined men, with cached CSS, autonamous aufragstaktik guidance, clearly delineated & simple battlespace management and C2 redundancy. It was a great success. By the same token, 'multiples' or 3 x fire teams of 4 men (about the same size as an ODA...) can routinely conduct all sorts of useful activity on operations if connected to the right ISTAR enablers. As ever, it all needs to be J2 led, and this pushed down to Company level. Inefficient? Nonsense. What's inefficient is taking a high school graduate, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars training and equipping him, and then employing him like a WW1 doughboy as part of a swarm, or on a front gate doing fatigues when PMCs could stag on and guard the camp for a fraction of the price. With embedded specialists at the right level, you can get a far greater return on your investment by making your operations meaningful (and I don't just mean CT Strike - J2 led ops apply to EVERYTHING).
Tiger and King Tiger analogies are all great sport, but inappropriate for this. J2 specialists are 'inefficient' if you're trying to resource a clanking great industrial age nation-state army. But we're in a different game today, and we need to be able to do it all.

What's REALLY inefficient is when deterrence fails because assymetric actors feel invulnerable to clumsy retaliation. If we (the West) had grasped this and adapted to the emerging AQ/non state threat in the 90s (numerous clarion Agency warnings, all unheeded), rather than configuring for Desert Storm Ultra, perhaps we'd be a few pages ahead in history than we are today.

Price of preparing for what you want to, rather than what you need to. Perhaps I should write a book....