Supply routes to Afghanistan

[davidbfpo]

Cavguy,

Maybe some are saying, as you stated:

Heard that through deals w/Russia and the Stans, 70% of our Afghanistan logistics now comes from the north rather than through Pakistan. That is a change that has occurred over the last 6-12 months.....For those thinking along those lines, I imagine that's what we got when we traded the missile defense in East Europe. Seems a good deal to me.

Elsewhere and from SWJ daily roundup: Russian Deal on Afghan Supply Route Not a Deal Yet - Peter Baker, New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/14/wo...s.html?_r=1&hp.

When he met President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia in April, President Obama sought to open an important new supply corridor for Afghanistan by flying American troops and weapons through Russian airspace. Visiting Moscow in July, he sealed a deal for as many as 4,500 flights a year, in what he called a “substantial contribution” to the war and a sign of improving relations with Russia. Seven months after the idea was raised and four months after the agreement was signed, the number of American flights that have actually traversed Russian airspace? One. ....For eight years, the American military has struggled to find and maintain reliable supply routes into Afghanistan, but Mr. Obama may send more troops in a single order than at any point in the war, straining the system.

I don't doubt that people and some supplies can be flown into the 'stans', but enough heavier items and particularly fuel cannot. Now maybe we can buy fuel locally from the 'stans'?

I'd like to some references to the Northern route having such capacity (70% cited). Karachi remains IMHO the port and the roads northwards.

[davidbfpo]

A small item that suggests that the Russian route has yet to open: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2009-170-32.cfm

Airplanes en route to Afghanistan carrying U.S. cargo will start flying over Russian airspace in the near future, the ambassador said.

[Fuchs]

Cavguy,

Maybe some are saying, as you stated:

Elsewhere and from SWJ daily roundup: Russian Deal on Afghan Supply Route Not a Deal Yet - Peter Baker, New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/14/wo...s.html?_r=1&hp.

I don't doubt that people and some supplies can be flown into the 'stans', but enough heavier items and particularly fuel cannot. Now maybe we can buy fuel locally from the 'stans'?

I'd like to some references to the Northern route having such capacity (70% cited). Karachi remains IMHO the port and the roads northwards.

The key is that the Pakistan route was previously the preferred route. The switch - if it happens - is obviously a deterioration.
No matter whether the cost was political, fiscal, prestige, timeliness, security or whatever - the supplies would most likely have flown primarily through the Northern route if it wasn't the worse route initially.


We should re-learn the lesson that the logistical challenge isn't only about putting the needed amount of supplies through the logistics channels; it's also about keeping the logistical requirements low.
That's something at which Western forces did in my opinion fail badly post-'45.

Imagine the West would have been forced to fight the Vietnam War using the Ho Chi Minh trail instead of the ports. We would have a much smaller logistical footprint today.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 10 Nov 09: The MAGAI™ Construct and the Northern Distribution Network

....The MAGAI™ Construct presents a unique way to capture the transcontinental, indeed global, dimensions of instability in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. The MAGAI combines two post–Cold War strategic realities:

• A Modern Activity Gap (MAG) precariously positioned in Central Asia that acts as a barricade to the flow of deepening economic interdependencies that circumnavigate the northern hemisphere; and

• The Arch of Instability (AI), a zone of unstable conditions from the Middle East to South Asia first identified by Zbigniew Brzezinski nearly 30 years ago. This post–Cold War instability has gained a firm foothold in the MAG where its risks are magnified by Islamic extremists seeking to overthrow weak regional governments as well as foment terrorist acts around the globe.

The MAG exists in stark contrast to the rapidly evolving economic conditions to its east and west. Rooted in the MAG, unstable conditions meet an inexorable demand to connect Europe with Asia across a new land bridge, the modern Silk Road (MSR). Along the MSR, transcontinental tensions among the world’s largest economies, competition for access to resources and routes, and a radical Muslim agenda merge.

In this environment, CENTCOM’s Northern Distribution Network pursues options for Afghanistan resupply by involving a wider group of linked partners along the MSR. To meet the demand signals from increased force levels engaged in higher levels of sustained combat, supporting transport infrastructure and processes need to be improved, security needs to be maintained, and sensitive political conditions must be considered. Addressing the immense challenges and the opportunities across the MAG is an imperative, and tools that help the experts to visualize, quantify, and analyze the MAGAI™ Construct are badly needed....

[Danny]

This is an extremely good find, and I appreciate your bringing this to our attention. This is a more sophisticated version of my own arguments in:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...-the-caucasus/

and:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...oreign-policy/

Russia has keen interest in the Caucasus for more reasons than one (they have assets and basing rights in Armenia that are essentially cut off without access through Georgia). Further, the oil and natural gas supplies in this region are enormous.

Serious engagement of (and political and military ties with) the Caucasus would be a smart, forward-thinking, audacious way both to ensure logistics for a larger force in Afghanistan (thus avoiding the problems associated with Karachi and the Khyber pass or Chamen), and ensure that Russia is checked in its coming re-expansion into their near abroad.

That's why it won't happen. It's nice to think, though, about smart decisions that could be made.

[davidbfpo]

Jedburgh,

Thanks for this:

CSIS, 10 Nov 09: The MAGAI™ Construct and the Northern Distribution Network

Good strategic viewpoint and IMHO hopeless on what can be achieved now and soon.

I was puzzled at the maps, the Pakistani railways are little-used, in great contrast to India; and the Karokorum Highway was a great PR scheme for China, but use for trading in volumes? No. Overland transport rarely beats slow and steady sea transport.

Will the US DoD use Russian controlled and influenced land routes for anything but the most innocuous items? Methinks not.

The lack of logistic support is one reason why I have questioned a larger foriegn commitment in Afghanistan. Ironically a safer way is via Iran, an even more prickly political issue, but not a logistic issue!

[davidbfpo]

Fom SWJ daily news round-up:

The U.S. and NATO have already started using Georgian ports, rail lines and roads to transport nonlethal supplies to Afghanistan.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...490533738.html

[Steve the Planner]

No matter how you slice any of this, the route to the South, through Pakistan, is the most needed, most basic access route.

Back to Baluchistan.

Lately, Afghan promotion of concepts to exploit its natural resources (all along that corridor) are predicated on this route and system that doesn't exist.

Economic Geography 101.

[SethB]

We should re-learn the lesson that the logistical challenge isn't only about putting the needed amount of supplies through the logistics channels; it's also about keeping the logistical requirements low.

I routinely make this argument. I wrote my last paper in college about the need for increased fuel efficiency and conservation, essentially arguing that about 80% of fuel consumption (and therefore about 40% of all logistics inputs by weight) is unecessary at current force levels, and that a reduction in logistical inputs could reduce personnel requirements, since logistics requirements compound over time in a "snowball."

This idea doesn't make me the most popular guy around...

[davidbfpo]

Seth B,

One would hope that the logistic planners have a contingency plan for the loss or restictions being placed on the various touted overland routes into Afghanistan. Even that thought is applied to reducing the amounts shipped would help.

[SethB]

One would hope so.

I like to check up on the DoD Energy Blog because it has a lot of information about how the military uses energy.

Since about half of everything that DoD moves by weight is fuel, I think this is relevant to this thread.

Bullets and beans make up a small portion of what is transported.

[davidbfpo]

The first time IIRC of NATO / US supply trucks attacked there:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/wo...html?ref=world

[Infanteer]

I've seen it in the news before - I remember catching a story a while back that saw insurgents cruising around in hijacked Humvees.