If Johnson's argument is correct, than any COIN CONOP that involves pushing the authority of a central government upon Pashtun tribes who have never submitted to such an arrangement is akin to pouring gasoline on a fire. But...the focus of current U.S. strategy is to strengthen the Afghan government and security forces, thereby allowing U.S. military forces to depart.
Since we are tied into that plan pretty deeply by now, and desire to have a government that can be relied on to live up to its part of the bargain (minimal corruption, more efficiency, etc., etc.), do we need to modify the approach and shape that government into a body that can be less a dose of gasoline and more like a pan lid that can quell the fire somewhat?

Put another way, can we ever facilitate central government power over Pashtun areas in a way that compliments their daily way of life, as opposed to being two pieces of sand paper rubbing against each other? If the honest answer is no, then we have some serious decisions within decisions that have to be made. Why we would have elements of a overall strategy that work at cross purposes is depressing at times.

In better news, there were 9 military servicemember deaths in Iraq last month, by CNN's tally. Only 2 of them were due to hostile action. The preceding few months are similar. Sectarianism aside, Iraqis at least had a tradition of a strong central base they had lived under, perhaps making it easier to return to central government control.