I think that what is glossed over in the overall reconciliation debate is that GIRoA must be worth reconciling with. Given that the farcicial elections came part way through a relatively successful year in the south for the Taleban, it's pretty difficult to imagine any commanders whose lives are not in frequent danger giving it so much as a second thought.

Take a random Taleban leader esconced in Quetta. What precisely is his motivation? He never travels into Afghanistan so his life is not under threat that way. So long as he doesn't upset the Pakistanis, or other Talebs with ISI connections, he won't be arested in Quetta either. In addition, there is barely any chance for the drone strikes in Waziristan to be replicated in Quetta. He's as safe as safe can be. Correctly, we speak of the requirement for both carrot and stick in the context of reconciliation, but for a great many key individuals, nor we nor GIRoA can even locate a suitable tree, never mind find a stick.

This is an instance where the reality on the ground is about, at a conservative estimate, 7 or 8 years behind the public debate in London and Washington. OK, if the tide is shown to be turning in GIRoA's favour some individuals may flip, but let's be blunt, GIRoA is in a chronic state and the Quetta led Taleban, for the time being, is doing just fine, thank you.